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Win32-OpenSSH/sshd.c
dkulwin 44d8ddddb1 Implement generic interface for bignum and diffie-hellman 
Implementation of a generic wrap interface for bignum and diffie-hellman
based upon Damien's wrap code in openssh-openbsd.  This commit adds the
generic interface along with the backing code for openssl, cng, and cng
with an openssl fallback.  Currently, openssl is the only provider for
bignum and the diffie-hellman generic interface is only for static and
negotiated oakley groups..
2016-01-16 16:10:16 -06:00

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/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.458 2015/08/20 22:32:42 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
* and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
* information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
* connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
* authentication agent connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
/*
* We support only client side kerberos on Windows.
*/
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
#undef GSSAPI
#undef KRB5
#define ECONNABORTED WSAECONNABORTED
#define ECONNREFUSED WSAECONNREFUSED
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
#include <sys/security.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh1.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "rsa.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "buffer.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor_mm.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "roaming.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef RUNTIME_LIBPAM
#include "pam.h"
#endif
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */
int test_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
int no_daemon_flag = 0;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
int log_stderr = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
char **saved_argv;
int saved_argc;
/* Arguments to used for fake forked child processes of sshd.exe */
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
FIXME: GFPZR: Function stat() may be undeclared.
*/
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <tlhelp32.h>
char *fake_fork_args;
extern int logfd;
extern int sfd_start;
#endif
/* re-exec */
int rexeced_flag = 0;
int rexec_flag = 1;
int rexec_argc = 0;
char **rexec_argv;
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
*/
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
int num_listen_socks = 0;
/*
* the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL,
* sshd will skip the version-number exchange
*/
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
int have_agent = 0;
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
* that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
* problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
* have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */
Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */
Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh1_key;
int have_ssh2_key;
u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
} sensitive_data;
/*
* Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated.
* Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
/* same for ssh2 */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
/* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */
int *startup_pipes = NULL;
int startup_pipe; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
/* global authentication context */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
Buffer cfg;
/* message to be displayed after login */
Buffer loginmsg;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
static void do_ssh1_kex(void);
#endif
static void do_ssh2_kex(void);
/*
* Retrieve path to current running module.
*
* path - buffer, where to store path (OUT).
* pathSize - size of path buffer in bytes (IN).
*
* RETURNS: 0 if OK.
*/
int GetCurrentModulePath(char *path, int pathSize)
{
int exitCode = -1;
//
// Windows.
//
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
if (GetModuleFileName(NULL, path, pathSize))
{
int i;
int lastSlashPos = 0;
for (i = 0; path[i]; i++)
{
if (path[i] == '/' || path[i] == '\\')
{
lastSlashPos = i;
}
}
path[lastSlashPos] = 0;
exitCode = 0;
}
#endif
//
// Linux.
//
#ifdef __linux__
if (readlink ("/proc/self/exe", path, pathSize) != -1)
{
dirname(path);
strcat(path, "/");
exitCode = 0;
}
#endif
//
// MacOS.
//
#ifdef __APPLE__
#endif
return exitCode;
}
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Win32 only.
*/
SERVICE_STATUS_HANDLE gSvcStatusHandle;;
SERVICE_STATUS gSvcStatus;
int ranServiceMain = 0;
int iAmAService = 1;
#define SVCNAME "SSHD"
static VOID ReportSvcStatus(DWORD dwCurrentState, DWORD dwWin32ExitCode, DWORD dwWaitHint)
{
static DWORD dwCheckPoint = 1;
/*
* Fill in the SERVICE_STATUS structure.
*/
gSvcStatus.dwCurrentState = dwCurrentState;
gSvcStatus.dwWin32ExitCode = dwWin32ExitCode;
gSvcStatus.dwWaitHint = dwWaitHint;
if (dwCurrentState == SERVICE_START_PENDING)
{
gSvcStatus.dwControlsAccepted = 0;
}
else
{
gSvcStatus.dwControlsAccepted = SERVICE_ACCEPT_STOP;
}
if ((dwCurrentState == SERVICE_RUNNING) || (dwCurrentState == SERVICE_STOPPED))
{
gSvcStatus.dwCheckPoint = 0;
}
else
{
gSvcStatus.dwCheckPoint = dwCheckPoint++;
}
/*
* Report the status of the service to the SCM.
*/
SetServiceStatus( gSvcStatusHandle, &gSvcStatus );
}
static VOID WINAPI SSHDHandlerEx(DWORD dwControl)
{
debug("Request received (%u)", dwControl);
/*
* Handle the requested control code.
*/
switch(dwControl)
{
case SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP:
{
debug("SERVICE_CONTROL_STOP signal received...");
ReportSvcStatus(SERVICE_STOP_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 500);
/*
* Send exit signal to child 'sshd.exe' processes.
*/
/*
FIXME: Group childs in job to isolate childs from parent.
Reason: childs should be killed by sending SIGBRK, but
parent (this service) should NOT.
debug("Sending exit signal to child 'sshd.exe' processes...");
if (!GenerateConsoleCtrlEvent(CTRL_BREAK_EVENT, 0))
{
debug("ERROR: Cannot send exit signal to childs (%u).\n", GetLastError());
}
*/
/*
* Signal the service to stop.
*/
ReportSvcStatus(SERVICE_STOPPED, NO_ERROR, 0);
return;
}
case SERVICE_CONTROL_INTERROGATE:
{
/*
* Fall through to send current status.
*/
break;
}
default:
{
break;
}
}
ReportSvcStatus(gSvcStatus.dwCurrentState, NO_ERROR, 0);
}
static VOID SvcUninstall()
{
SC_HANDLE schSCManager;
SC_HANDLE schService;
/*
* Get a handle to the SCM database.
*/
schSCManager = OpenSCManager(NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
if (NULL == schSCManager)
{
printf("OpenSCManager failed (%d)\n", GetLastError());
return;
}
schService = OpenService(schSCManager, SVCNAME, DELETE);
if (NULL == schService)
{
printf("OpenService failed (%d)\n", GetLastError());
return;
}
if (!DeleteService(schService))
{
printf("DeleteService failed (%d)\n", GetLastError());
return;
}
printf("Service (%s) deleted.", SVCNAME);
}
static VOID SvcInstall()
{
SC_HANDLE schSCManager;
SC_HANDLE schService;
TCHAR szPath[MAX_PATH];
if(GetModuleFileName(NULL, szPath, MAX_PATH) == FALSE)
{
printf("Cannot install service (%d)\n", GetLastError());
return;
}
/*
* Get a handle to the SCM database.
*/
schSCManager = OpenSCManager(NULL, NULL, SC_MANAGER_ALL_ACCESS);
if (NULL == schSCManager)
{
printf("OpenSCManager failed (%d)\n", GetLastError());
return;
}
/*
* Create the service
*/
schService = CreateService(schSCManager, SVCNAME, SVCNAME, SERVICE_ALL_ACCESS,
SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS, SERVICE_DEMAND_START,
SERVICE_ERROR_NORMAL, szPath, NULL, NULL,
NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (schService == NULL)
{
printf("CreateService failed (%d)\n", GetLastError());
CloseServiceHandle(schSCManager);
return;
}
else
{
printf("Service installed successfully\n");
}
CloseServiceHandle(schService);
CloseServiceHandle(schSCManager);
}
#endif /* WIN32_FIXME */
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
close(startup_pipes[i]);
}
/*
* Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
int save_errno = errno;
received_sighup = 1;
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
errno = save_errno;
#endif
}
/*
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
* Restarts the server.
*/
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
platform_pre_restart();
close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes();
alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
#endif
}
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
/*
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
* reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid < 0 && errno == EINTR))
;
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
errno = save_errno;
#endif
}
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/*
* Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
* keys command helpers.
*/
if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
kill(0, SIGTERM);
}
/* Log error and exit. */
sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
#endif
}
/*
* Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this
* alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not
* do anything with the private key or random state before forking.
* Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution
* problems.
*/
static void
generate_ephemeral_server_key(void)
{
verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.",
sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits);
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1,
options.server_key_bits);
verbose("RSA key generation complete.");
arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
key_regeneration_alarm(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
errno = save_errno;
key_do_regen = 1;
}
static void
sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out)
{
u_int i;
int mismatch;
int remote_major, remote_minor;
int major, minor;
char *s, *newline = "\n";
char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */
char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) {
major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
minor = 99;
} else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2;
minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2;
newline = "\r\n";
} else {
major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1;
minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1;
}
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
major, minor, SSH_VERSION,
*options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
options.version_addendum, newline);
#else
xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s",
major, minor, SSH_RELEASE,
*options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ",
options.version_addendum, newline);
#endif
/* Send our protocol version identification. */
if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string,
strlen(server_version_string))
!= strlen(server_version_string)) {
logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr());
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/* Read other sides version identification. */
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) {
logit("Did not receive identification string from %s",
get_remote_ipaddr());
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
buf[i] = 0;
/* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */
if (i == 12 &&
strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0)
break;
continue;
}
if (buf[i] == '\n') {
buf[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
client_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
s = "Protocol mismatch.\n";
(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' "
"from %s port %d", client_version_string,
get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
SetEnvironmentVariable("SSH_CLIENT_ID", remote_version);
#endif
active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.",
get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
}
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) {
fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; "
"refusing connection", remote_version);
}
mismatch = 0;
switch (remote_major) {
case 1:
if (remote_minor == 99) {
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)
enable_compat20();
else
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) {
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
if (remote_minor < 3) {
packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and "
"is no longer supported. Please install a newer version.");
} else if (remote_minor == 3) {
/* note that this disables agent-forwarding */
enable_compat13();
}
break;
case 2:
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) {
enable_compat20();
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
chop(server_version_string);
debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string);
if (mismatch) {
s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n";
(void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s));
close(sock_in);
close(sock_out);
logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
server_version_string, client_version_string);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
int i;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH);
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
Key *tmp;
int i;
if (sensitive_data.server_key) {
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key);
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = tmp;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1)
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
/* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */
}
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
u_int32_t rnd[256];
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
if (options.gss_authentication)
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
#if 0
/* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */
do_setusercontext(privsep_pw);
#else
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
#endif
#endif
}
static int
privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex;
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
if (r != 0) {
error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor);
/* Sync memory */
monitor_sync(pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
privsep_is_preauth = 0;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
__func__, WTERMSIG(status));
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
/* Demote the child */
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
#else
/*
* Not implemented on Win32.
*/
return 0;
#endif
}
static void
privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
use_privsep = 0;
goto skip;
}
/* New socket pair */
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
skip:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor);
/*
* Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
* this information is not part of the key state.
*/
packet_set_authenticated();
#endif /* !WIN32_FIXME */
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
Buffer b;
const char *p;
char *ret;
int i;
Key *key;
buffer_init(&b);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_RSA1)
continue;
/* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
p = key_ssh_name(key);
buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if (buffer_len(&b) > 0)
buffer_append(&b, ",", 1);
p = key_ssh_name(key);
buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p));
break;
}
}
buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1);
ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b));
buffer_free(&b);
debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret);
return ret;
}
static Key *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int i;
Key *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL && !need_private)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
if (key != NULL && key->type == type &&
(key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
}
return NULL;
}
Key *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
Key *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}
Key *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}
Key *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
int
get_hostkey_index(Key *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (key_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key,
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
return (i);
if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct sshkey *key;
int i, nkeys, r;
char *fp;
/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (nkeys == 0) {
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST);
packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com");
packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */
}
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
__func__, i, ssh_err(r));
packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
nkeys++;
}
debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
packet_send();
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
* of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
* all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
*/
static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
if (startups >= options.max_startups)
return 1;
if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
return 1;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
r = arc4random_uniform(100);
debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
" [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
{
Buffer m;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd,
buffer_len(conf));
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
* u_int ephemeral_key_follows
* bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1)
* bignum n "
* bignum d "
* bignum iqmp "
* bignum p "
* bignum q "
* string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
*/
buffer_init(&m);
buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf));
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL &&
sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
buffer_put_int(&m, 1);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
} else
#endif
buffer_put_int(&m, 0);
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(&m);
#endif
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf)
{
Buffer m;
char *cp;
u_int len;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
buffer_init(&m);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len);
if (conf != NULL)
buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1);
free(cp);
if (buffer_get_int(&m)) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL)
key_free(sensitive_data.server_key);
sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p);
buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q);
if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters "
"error", __func__);
#endif
}
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m);
#endif
buffer_free(&m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
/* Accept a connection from inetd */
static void
server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
{
int fd;
startup_pipe = -1;
if (rexeced_flag) {
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if (!debug_flag) {
startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
}
} else {
*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
}
/*
* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
* as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
* ttyfd happens to be one of those.
*/
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (!log_stderr)
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
close(fd);
}
debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
}
/*
* Listen for TCP connections
*/
static void
server_listen(void)
{
int ret, listen_sock, on = 1;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock < 0) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/*
* Set socket options.
* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT.
*/
if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR,
&on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Forbid inheriting of listen socket.
*/
if (SetHandleInformation(sfd_to_handle(listen_sock),
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0) == FALSE)
{
debug("ERROR: Cannot clear inherit flag from listen socket [%d]. "
"Error code : %u.", listen_sock, GetLastError());
}
#endif
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0)
fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport);
}
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs);
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}
/*
* The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
int key_used = 0, startups = 0;
int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
pid_t pid;
u_char rnd[256];
/* setup fd set for accept */
fdset = NULL;
maxfd = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
maxfd = listen_socks[i];
/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
/*
* Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
* the daemon is killed with a signal.
*/
for (;;) {
if (received_sighup)
sighup_restart();
if (fdset != NULL)
free(fdset);
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
#else
fdset = (fd_set *) xmalloc(sizeof(fd_set));
FD_ZERO(fdset);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
close_listen_socks();
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
}
if (key_used && key_do_regen) {
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
key_used = 0;
key_do_regen = 0;
}
if (ret < 0)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 &&
FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) {
/*
* the read end of the pipe is ready
* if the child has closed the pipe
* after successful authentication
* or if the child has died
*/
close(startup_pipes[i]);
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
startups--;
}
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
continue;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
if (*newsock < 0) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK
&& errno != ECONNABORTED
&& errno != EAGAIN)
error("accept: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
usleep(100 * 1000);
continue;
}
if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
debug("drop connection #%d", startups);
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
error("reexec socketpair: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(*newsock);
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
continue;
}
#endif
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
break;
}
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Win32 code.
*/
{
PROCESS_INFORMATION pi;
STARTUPINFO si;
BOOL b;
/*
* Assign sockets to StartupInfo.
*/
memset(&si, 0 , sizeof(STARTUPINFO));
char remotesoc[64];
snprintf ( remotesoc, sizeof(remotesoc), "%d", sfd_to_handle(*newsock));
SetEnvironmentVariable("SSHD_REMSOC", remotesoc);
si.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFO);
si.hStdInput = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); //(HANDLE) sfd_to_handle(*newsock);
si.hStdOutput = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
si.hStdError = GetStdHandle(STD_ERROR_HANDLE);
si.wShowWindow = SW_HIDE;
si.dwFlags = STARTF_USESHOWWINDOW | STARTF_USESTDHANDLES;
/*
* Create the child process
*/
b = CreateProcess(NULL, fake_fork_args, NULL, NULL, TRUE,
CREATE_NEW_PROCESS_GROUP, NULL, NULL,
&si, &pi);
if (!b)
{
debug("CreateProcess failure: %d", GetLastError());
exit(1);
}
/*
* Close child thread and process handles so it can go away
*/
CloseHandle(pi.hThread);
CloseHandle(pi.hProcess);
close(*newsock);
/*
* FIXME pipes are not used so instead of
* cleaning we can disable creation.
*/
close(startup_pipes[i]);
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
startups--;
}
#else
/*
* Original OpenSSH code.
*/
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening
* socket, and start processing the
* connection without forking.
*/
debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0],
&cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
}
break;
}
/*
* Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
* the child process the connection. The
* parent continues listening.
*/
platform_pre_fork();
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
/*
* Child. Close the listening and
* max_startup sockets. Start using
* the accepted socket. Reinitialize
* logging (since our pid has changed).
* We break out of the loop to handle
* the connection.
*/
platform_post_fork_child();
startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
close_startup_pipes();
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level,
options.log_facility,
log_stderr);
if (rexec_flag)
close(config_s[0]);
break;
}
/* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
if (pid < 0)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
close(config_s[1]);
}
/*
* Mark that the key has been used (it
* was "given" to the child).
*/
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) &&
key_used == 0) {
/* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */
signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm);
alarm(options.key_regeneration_time);
key_used = 1;
}
close(*newsock);
/*
* Ensure that our random state differs
* from that of the child
*/
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#endif /* else WIN32_FIXME */
}
/* child process check (or debug mode) */
if (num_listen_socks < 0)
break;
}
}
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Win32 only.
*/
char *create_fake_fork_args(int ac, char **av)
{
char *orig_cmd_line = GetCommandLine();
char fake_fork_param[] = " -~";
int orig_cmd_line_len = strlen(orig_cmd_line);
char *new_cmd_line = xmalloc (orig_cmd_line_len + 1 + sizeof(fake_fork_param));
strcpy(new_cmd_line, orig_cmd_line);
strcpy(new_cmd_line + orig_cmd_line_len, fake_fork_param);
return new_cmd_line;
}
/*
* This function handles exit signal from parent process.
*/
BOOL WINAPI CtrlHandlerRoutine(DWORD dwCtrlType)
{
switch( dwCtrlType )
{
case CTRL_C_EVENT:
return TRUE; // control C will be passed to shell but sshd wil not exit
case CTRL_BREAK_EVENT:
case CTRL_LOGOFF_EVENT:
break;
default:
break;
}
debug("Exit signal received...");
cleanup_exit(0);
return TRUE;
}
#endif /* WIN32_FIXME */
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, i, j, on = 1;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
const char *remote_ip;
int remote_port;
char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
u_int n;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
Key *key;
Key *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0);
#ifdef HAVE_STARTUP_NEEDS
int startup_handler(void);
startup_handler();
#endif
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Setup exit signal handler for receiving signal, when
* parent server is stopped.
*/
AllocConsole();
SetConsoleCtrlHandler(CtrlHandlerRoutine, TRUE);
//authctxt -> hTokenLsa_ = NULL;
WSHELPinitialize();
allocate_standard_descriptor(STDIN_FILENO);
allocate_standard_descriptor(STDOUT_FILENO);
allocate_standard_descriptor(STDERR_FILENO);
sfd_start = 3;
/*
* Initialize log.
*/
logfd = _open("sshd.log", O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_APPEND,
S_IREAD | S_IWRITE | _O_NOINHERIT);
/*
* Forbid to inherit log file handle.
*/
if (SetHandleInformation(_get_osfhandle(logfd),
HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0) == FALSE)
{
debug("ERROR: Cannot clear inherit flag for logfd handle. "
"Error code : %u.", GetLastError());
}
#endif /* WIN32_FIXME */
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Create arguments for starting fake forked sshd.exe instances.
*/
fake_fork_args = create_fake_fork_args(ac, av);
#endif /* WIN32_FIXME */
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
#endif
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
//debug_flag = 1;
#define FAKE_FORK_ARG "~"
#else
#define FAKE_FORK_ARG
#endif
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt" FAKE_FORK_ARG)) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
case '~':
{
debug("fake fork child");
options.i_am_a_fake_fork = 1;
break;
}
#endif
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'c':
if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] =
derelativise_path(optarg);
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = xstrdup(optarg);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
rexec_flag = 0;
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256,
32768, NULL);
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'g':
if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'k':
if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'h':
if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] =
derelativise_path(optarg);
break;
case 't':
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
test_flag = 2;
break;
case 'C':
if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
"command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
exit(1);
free(line);
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
/*
* Win32 only.
*/
WSHELPinitialize();
/*
* Handle install and uninstall service options
*/
if (ac > 1 && strcmp("install", av[1]) == 0)
{
/*
* Install the service
*/
SvcInstall();
return 0;
}
else if (ac > 1 && strcmp("uninstall", av[1]) == 0)
{
/*
* Remove the service
*/
SvcUninstall();
return 0;
}
if (!options.i_am_a_fake_fork)
{
if (!ranServiceMain)
{
do
{
SERVICE_TABLE_ENTRY DispatchTable[] =
{
{SVCNAME, (LPSERVICE_MAIN_FUNCTION) main},
{NULL, NULL}
};
/*
* Don't come back here now
*/
ranServiceMain = 1;
/*
* This call returns when the service has stopped.
*/
/*
* The process should simply terminate when the call returns.
*/
/*
* If the service control dispatcher failed to register
* for any other reason, bail out.
*/
if (!StartServiceCtrlDispatcher(DispatchTable))
{
if (GetLastError() == ERROR_FAILED_SERVICE_CONTROLLER_CONNECT)
{
/*
* We're a console app, baby!
*/
iAmAService = 0;
break;
}
/*
* We're a service that can't go any further
*/
return -1;
}
return 0;
} while (0);
}
else
{
/*
* Finish up the service initialization
*/
gSvcStatusHandle = RegisterServiceCtrlHandler("SSHD", SSHDHandlerEx);
ZeroMemory(&gSvcStatus, sizeof(gSvcStatus));
gSvcStatus.dwServiceType = SERVICE_WIN32_OWN_PROCESS;
ReportSvcStatus(SERVICE_START_PENDING, NO_ERROR, 300);
ReportSvcStatus(SERVICE_RUNNING, NO_ERROR, 0);
}
}
rexec_flag = 0;
use_privsep = 0;
#endif /* WIN32_FIXME */
{
/*
* Use relative './sshd_config' or '../etc/sshd_config' path.
*/
struct stat s;
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
#define PATH_SIZE MAX_PATH
#else
#define PATH_SIZE PATH_MAX
#endif
char basePath[PATH_SIZE] = {0};
char path[PATH_SIZE] = {0};
/*
* Get path to current running module.
*/
if (GetCurrentModulePath(basePath, PATH_SIZE) == 0)
{
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
chdir(basePath);
#endif
/*
* Try './sshd_config' first.
*/
strncpy(path, basePath, PATH_SIZE);
strncat(path, "/sshd_config", PATH_SIZE);
if (stat(path, &s) == 0)
{
config_file_name = path;
}
else
{
/*
* Try '../etc/sshd_config'.
*/
strncpy(path, basePath, PATH_SIZE);
strncat(path, "/../etc/sshd_config", PATH_SIZE);
if (stat(path, &s) == 0)
{
config_file_name = path;
}
}
}
#undef PATH_SIZE
}
if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
rexec_flag = 0;
if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/')))
fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (rexeced_flag)
closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
else
closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
#endif
/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
if (logfile != NULL) {
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
free(logfile);
}
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
*/
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
*/
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
(void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
#endif
#ifdef _UNICOS
/* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now!
* Not needed on PRIV_SU systems!
*/
drop_cray_privs();
#endif
sensitive_data.server_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL;
sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0;
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
/*
* If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of
* the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test,
* do not silently ignore connection test params.
*/
if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0)
fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing "
"Match configs");
if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0)
fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
"test mode (-T)");
/* Fetch our configuration */
buffer_init(&cfg);
if (rexeced_flag)
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg);
else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg);
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
&cfg, NULL);
seed_rng();
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
#ifdef RUNTIME_LIBPAM
if(options.use_pam)
{
if(initPAM(options.pamLibrary_))
{
debug("sshd PAM: libpam loaded!\n");
}
else
{
options.use_pam = 0;
error("cannot load PAM library! PAM is turned off!");
}
}
#endif
/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
/* Check that options are sensible */
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
"AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
/*
* Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
* Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
* daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
* and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1))
fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with "
"SSH protocol 1");
for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n],
1) == 0)
break;
}
if (n >= options.num_auth_methods)
fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
"enabled authentication methods");
}
/* set default channel AF */
channel_set_af(options.address_family);
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
logit("[Build " __DATE__ " " __TIME__ "]");
#endif
/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication)
fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
} else {
explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd,
strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd);
privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
}
endpwent();
/* load host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(Key *));
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(Key *));
if (options.host_key_agent) {
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
have_agent = 1;
else
error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r));
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL);
pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL);
if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
pubkey = key_demote(key);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 &&
have_agent) {
debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
keytype = pubkey->type;
} else if (key != NULL) {
keytype = key->type;
} else {
error("Could not load host key: %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
switch (keytype) {
case KEY_RSA1:
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key;
sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
if (have_agent || key != NULL)
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ?
sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
free(fp);
}
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) {
logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1;
}
if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key");
options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2;
}
if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
* indices to the public keys that they relate to.
*/
sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(Key *));
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL);
if (key == NULL) {
error("Could not load host certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
continue;
}
if (!key_is_cert(key)) {
error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
key_free(key);
continue;
}
/* Find matching private key */
for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
if (key_equal_public(key,
sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
break;
}
}
if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
key_free(key);
continue;
}
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type,
key_type(key));
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
/* Check certain values for sanity. */
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) {
if (options.server_key_bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
options.server_key_bits > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This
* is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I
* hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels
*/
if (options.server_key_bits >
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) -
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits <
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
options.server_key_bits =
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED;
debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.",
options.server_key_bits);
}
}
#endif
if (use_privsep) {
struct stat st;
if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
(st.st_uid != getuid () ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
#else
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
#endif
fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
"world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
#endif
}
if (test_flag > 1) {
if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1)
parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
/*
* Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
* prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
* portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
* to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
* module which might be used).
*/
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
#endif
if (rexec_flag) {
rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) {
debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
}
rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
}
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/*
* If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect
* from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process
* exits.
*/
if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) {
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
int fd;
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
if (daemon(0, 0) < 0)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0) {
(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
close(fd);
}
#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
}
/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
if (chdir("/") == -1)
error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
} else {
platform_pre_listen();
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
if (!options.i_am_a_fake_fork)
#endif
server_listen();
if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
if (!options.i_am_a_fake_fork)
{
/*
* Accept a connection and return in a forked child
*/
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s);
}
else
{
//STARTUPINFO si;
//memset(&si, 0 , sizeof(STARTUPINFO));
//si.cb = sizeof(STARTUPINFO);
/*
* Get the stdin handle from process info to use for client
*/
//GetStartupInfo(&si);
int remotesochandle ;
remotesochandle = atoi( getenv("SSHD_REMSOC") );
sock_in = sock_out = newsock = allocate_sfd(remotesochandle) ; //si.hStdInput);
// we have the socket handle, delete it for child processes we create like shell
SetEnvironmentVariable("SSHD_REMSOC", NULL);
SetHandleInformation(remotesochandle, HANDLE_FLAG_INHERIT, 0); // make the handle not to be inherited
/*
* We don't have a startup_pipe
*/
startup_pipe = -1;
}
#else
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);
#endif
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
/*
* If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
* controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
* controlling tty" errors.
*/
if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
#endif
if (rexec_flag) {
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
int fd;
debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (startup_pipe == -1)
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
}
dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
close(config_s[1]);
execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Clean up fds */
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(fd);
}
debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
#endif /* !WIN32_FIXME */
}
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
#endif
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
* key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
* will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
*/
alarm(0);
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out);
packet_set_server();
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() &&
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) {
debug("get_remote_port failed");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of
* get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked.
*/
(void) get_canonical_hostname(0);
/*
* The rest of the code depends on the fact that
* get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
* the socket goes away.
*/
remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr();
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d",
remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port());
free(laddr);
/*
* We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
* indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out);
/* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */
if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL)
generate_ephemeral_server_key();
packet_set_nonblocking();
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg;
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
buffer_init(&loginmsg);
auth_debug_reset();
if (use_privsep) {
if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1)
goto authenticated;
} else if (compat20 && have_agent) {
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
if (compat20) {
do_ssh2_kex();
do_authentication2(authctxt);
} else {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
do_ssh1_kex();
do_authentication(authctxt);
#else
fatal("ssh1 not supported");
#endif
}
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
exit(0);
}
authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
authctxt->authenticated = 1;
if (startup_pipe != -1) {
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = -1;
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
do_pam_session();
}
#endif
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
*/
if (use_privsep) {
privsep_postauth(authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
if (!compat20)
destroy_sensitive_data();
}
packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
if (compat20)
notify_hostkeys(active_state);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
#endif
packet_close();
if (use_privsep)
mm_terminate();
exit(0);
}
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
/*
* Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key
* (key with larger modulus first).
*/
int
ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int)
{
int rsafail = 0;
if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) {
/* Server key has bigger modulus. */
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) <
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
fatal("do_connection: %s: "
"server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
}
if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
rsafail++;
if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
rsafail++;
} else {
/* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */
if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) <
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) +
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) {
fatal("do_connection: %s: "
"host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d",
get_remote_ipaddr(),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED);
}
if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0)
rsafail++;
if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int,
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0)
rsafail++;
}
return (rsafail);
}
/*
* SSH1 key exchange
*/
static void
do_ssh1_kex(void)
{
int i, len;
int rsafail = 0;
BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int;
u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH];
u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8];
size_t fake_key_len;
u_char cookie[8];
u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags;
/*
* Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user
* packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip
* spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody
* doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local
* network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random
* cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one
* of the reasons why it is inherently insecure.
*/
arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie));
/*
* Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random
* data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP
* spoofing.
*/
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
packet_put_char(cookie[i]);
/* Store our public server RSA key. */
packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n));
packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e);
packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n);
/* Store our public host RSA key. */
packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e);
packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n);
/* Put protocol flags. */
packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN);
/* Declare which ciphers we support. */
packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0));
/* Declare supported authentication types. */
auth_mask = 0;
if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA;
if (options.rsa_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA;
if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS;
if (options.password_authentication)
auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD;
packet_put_int(auth_mask);
/* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.",
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n),
BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n));
/* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */
packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY);
/* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */
cipher_type = packet_get_char();
if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type)))
packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher.");
/* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we
sent earlier with the public key packet. */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char())
packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match.");
debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type));
/* Get the encrypted integer. */
if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
packet_get_bignum(real_key_int);
protocol_flags = packet_get_int();
packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags);
packet_check_eom();
/* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */
if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed");
fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int);
if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes))
fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes);
arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len);
if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL)
fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed");
/* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */
rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int));
/* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */
if (rsafail)
session_key_int = fake_key_int;
else
session_key_int = real_key_int;
/*
* Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the
* least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the
* key is in the highest bits.
*/
(void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8);
len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int);
if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) {
error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: "
"session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu",
get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key));
rsafail++;
} else {
explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
BN_bn2bin(session_key_int,
session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len);
derive_ssh1_session_id(
sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n,
sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n,
cookie, session_id);
/*
* Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the
* session id.
*/
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
session_key[i] ^= session_id[i];
}
/* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */
destroy_sensitive_data();
if (use_privsep)
mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id);
/* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */
BN_clear_free(real_key_int);
BN_clear_free(fake_key_int);
/* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */
packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type);
/* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */
explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key));
debug("Received session key; encryption turned on.");
/* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */
packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS);
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
}
#endif
int
sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int flag)
{
int r;
u_int xxx_slen, xxx_dlen = dlen;
if (privkey) {
if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0))
fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__);
if (slen)
*slen = xxx_slen;
} else if (use_privsep) {
if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0)
fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__);
if (slen)
*slen = xxx_slen;
} else {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slen,
data, dlen, datafellows)) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
return 0;
}
/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
do_ssh2_kex(void)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
options.kex_algorithms);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
} else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit,
(time_t)options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = active_state->kex;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server;
# endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server;
kex->server = 1;
kex->client_version_string=client_version_string;
kex->server_version_string=server_version_string;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state);
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
if (the_authctxt) {
do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
#ifndef WIN32_FIXME
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
#endif
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
#ifdef WIN32_FIXME
if (!iAmAService || options.i_am_a_fake_fork)
#endif
_exit(i);
}
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