audk/NetworkPkg/TcpDxe/TcpDriver.c

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/** @file
The driver binding and service binding protocol for the TCP driver.
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237 REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4542 Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #9 CVE-2023-45237 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) Use of a Weak PseudoRandom Number Generator Change Overview: Updates all Instances of NET_RANDOM (NetRandomInitSeed ()) to either > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandomU32 ( > OUT UINT32 *Output > ); > or (depending on the use case) > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandom ( > OUT VOID *Output, > IN UINTN OutputLength > ); > This is because the use of Example: The following code snippet PseudoRandomU32 () function is used: > > UINT32 Random; > > Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random); > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); > return Status; > } > This also introduces a new PCD to enable/disable the use of the secure implementation of algorithms for PseudoRandom () and instead depend on the default implementation. This may be required for some platforms where the UEFI Spec defined algorithms are not available. > > PcdEnforceSecureRngAlgorithms > If the platform does not have any one of the UEFI defined secure RNG algorithms then the driver will assert. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:28 +02:00
Copyright (c) Microsoft Corporation
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "TcpMain.h"
UINT16 mTcp4RandomPort;
UINT16 mTcp6RandomPort;
TCP_HEARTBEAT_TIMER mTcpTimer = {
NULL,
0
};
EFI_TCP4_PROTOCOL gTcp4ProtocolTemplate = {
Tcp4GetModeData,
Tcp4Configure,
Tcp4Routes,
Tcp4Connect,
Tcp4Accept,
Tcp4Transmit,
Tcp4Receive,
Tcp4Close,
Tcp4Cancel,
Tcp4Poll
};
EFI_TCP6_PROTOCOL gTcp6ProtocolTemplate = {
Tcp6GetModeData,
Tcp6Configure,
Tcp6Connect,
Tcp6Accept,
Tcp6Transmit,
Tcp6Receive,
Tcp6Close,
Tcp6Cancel,
Tcp6Poll
};
SOCK_INIT_DATA mTcpDefaultSockData = {
SockStream,
SO_CLOSED,
NULL,
TCP_BACKLOG,
TCP_SND_BUF_SIZE,
TCP_RCV_BUF_SIZE,
IP_VERSION_4,
NULL,
TcpCreateSocketCallback,
TcpDestroySocketCallback,
NULL,
NULL,
0,
TcpDispatcher,
NULL,
};
EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcp4DriverBinding = {
Tcp4DriverBindingSupported,
Tcp4DriverBindingStart,
Tcp4DriverBindingStop,
0xa,
NULL,
NULL
};
EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcp6DriverBinding = {
Tcp6DriverBindingSupported,
Tcp6DriverBindingStart,
Tcp6DriverBindingStop,
0xa,
NULL,
NULL
};
EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL gTcpServiceBinding = {
TcpServiceBindingCreateChild,
TcpServiceBindingDestroyChild
};
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
//
// This is the handle for the Hash2ServiceBinding Protocol instance this driver produces
// if the platform does not provide one.
//
EFI_HANDLE mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
/**
Create and start the heartbeat timer for the TCP driver.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The timer was successfully created and started.
@retval other The timer was not created.
**/
EFI_STATUS
TcpCreateTimer (
VOID
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
if (mTcpTimer.RefCnt == 0) {
Status = gBS->CreateEvent (
EVT_TIMER | EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,
TPL_NOTIFY,
TcpTicking,
NULL,
&mTcpTimer.TimerEvent
);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = gBS->SetTimer (
mTcpTimer.TimerEvent,
TimerPeriodic,
(UINT64)(TICKS_PER_SECOND / TCP_TICK_HZ)
);
}
}
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
mTcpTimer.RefCnt++;
}
return Status;
}
/**
Stop and destroy the heartbeat timer for TCP driver.
**/
VOID
TcpDestroyTimer (
VOID
)
{
ASSERT (mTcpTimer.RefCnt > 0);
mTcpTimer.RefCnt--;
if (mTcpTimer.RefCnt > 0) {
return;
}
gBS->SetTimer (mTcpTimer.TimerEvent, TimerCancel, 0);
gBS->CloseEvent (mTcpTimer.TimerEvent);
mTcpTimer.TimerEvent = NULL;
}
/**
The entry point for Tcp driver, which is used to install Tcp driver on the ImageHandle.
@param[in] ImageHandle The firmware allocated handle for this driver image.
@param[in] SystemTable Pointer to the EFI system table.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The driver loaded.
@retval other The driver did not load.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
TcpDriverEntryPoint (
IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237 REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4542 Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #9 CVE-2023-45237 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) Use of a Weak PseudoRandom Number Generator Change Overview: Updates all Instances of NET_RANDOM (NetRandomInitSeed ()) to either > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandomU32 ( > OUT UINT32 *Output > ); > or (depending on the use case) > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandom ( > OUT VOID *Output, > IN UINTN OutputLength > ); > This is because the use of Example: The following code snippet PseudoRandomU32 () function is used: > > UINT32 Random; > > Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random); > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); > return Status; > } > This also introduces a new PCD to enable/disable the use of the secure implementation of algorithms for PseudoRandom () and instead depend on the default implementation. This may be required for some platforms where the UEFI Spec defined algorithms are not available. > > PcdEnforceSecureRngAlgorithms > If the platform does not have any one of the UEFI defined secure RNG algorithms then the driver will assert. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:28 +02:00
UINT32 Random;
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
//
// Initialize the Secret used for hashing TCP sequence numbers
//
// Normally this should be regenerated periodically, but since
// this is only used for UEFI networking and not a general purpose
// operating system, it is not necessary to regenerate it.
//
Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&mTcpGlobalSecret);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
return Status;
}
//
// Get a random number used to generate a random port number
// Intentionally not linking this to mTcpGlobalSecret to avoid leaking information about the secret
//
NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237 REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4542 Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #9 CVE-2023-45237 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) Use of a Weak PseudoRandom Number Generator Change Overview: Updates all Instances of NET_RANDOM (NetRandomInitSeed ()) to either > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandomU32 ( > OUT UINT32 *Output > ); > or (depending on the use case) > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandom ( > OUT VOID *Output, > IN UINTN OutputLength > ); > This is because the use of Example: The following code snippet PseudoRandomU32 () function is used: > > UINT32 Random; > > Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random); > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); > return Status; > } > This also introduces a new PCD to enable/disable the use of the secure implementation of algorithms for PseudoRandom () and instead depend on the default implementation. This may be required for some platforms where the UEFI Spec defined algorithms are not available. > > PcdEnforceSecureRngAlgorithms > If the platform does not have any one of the UEFI defined secure RNG algorithms then the driver will assert. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:28 +02:00
Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a Failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status));
return Status;
}
//
// Install the TCP Driver Binding Protocol
//
Status = EfiLibInstallDriverBindingComponentName2 (
ImageHandle,
SystemTable,
&gTcp4DriverBinding,
ImageHandle,
&gTcpComponentName,
&gTcpComponentName2
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
// Install the TCP Driver Binding Protocol
//
Status = EfiLibInstallDriverBindingComponentName2 (
ImageHandle,
SystemTable,
&gTcp6DriverBinding,
NULL,
&gTcpComponentName,
&gTcpComponentName2
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
EfiLibUninstallDriverBindingComponentName2 (
&gTcp4DriverBinding,
&gTcpComponentName,
&gTcpComponentName2
);
return Status;
}
//
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
// Initialize the random port.
//
NetworkPkg: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45237 REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4542 Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #9 CVE-2023-45237 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-338 Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) Use of a Weak PseudoRandom Number Generator Change Overview: Updates all Instances of NET_RANDOM (NetRandomInitSeed ()) to either > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandomU32 ( > OUT UINT32 *Output > ); > or (depending on the use case) > > EFI_STATUS > EFIAPI > PseudoRandom ( > OUT VOID *Output, > IN UINTN OutputLength > ); > This is because the use of Example: The following code snippet PseudoRandomU32 () function is used: > > UINT32 Random; > > Status = PseudoRandomU32 (&Random); > if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) { > DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "%a failed to generate random number: %r\n", __func__, Status)); > return Status; > } > This also introduces a new PCD to enable/disable the use of the secure implementation of algorithms for PseudoRandom () and instead depend on the default implementation. This may be required for some platforms where the UEFI Spec defined algorithms are not available. > > PcdEnforceSecureRngAlgorithms > If the platform does not have any one of the UEFI defined secure RNG algorithms then the driver will assert. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:28 +02:00
mTcp4RandomPort = (UINT16)(TCP_PORT_KNOWN + (Random % TCP_PORT_KNOWN));
mTcp6RandomPort = mTcp4RandomPort;
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
/**
Create a new TCP4 or TCP6 driver service binding protocol
@param[in] Controller Controller handle of device to bind driver to.
@param[in] Image The TCP driver's image handle.
@param[in] IpVersion IP_VERSION_4 or IP_VERSION_6.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES Failed to allocate some resources.
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED Service Binding Protocols are unavailable.
@retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED The TCP driver is already started on the controller.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS A new IP6 service binding private was created.
**/
EFI_STATUS
TcpCreateService (
IN EFI_HANDLE Controller,
IN EFI_HANDLE Image,
IN UINT8 IpVersion
)
{
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_GUID *IpServiceBindingGuid;
EFI_GUID *TcpServiceBindingGuid;
TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
IP_IO_OPEN_DATA OpenData;
EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
EFI_HASH2_PROTOCOL *Hash2Protocol;
if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
IpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiIp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
TcpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiTcp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
} else {
IpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiIp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
TcpServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
}
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
Controller,
TcpServiceBindingGuid,
NULL,
Image,
Controller,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
}
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
Controller,
IpServiceBindingGuid,
NULL,
Image,
Controller,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (&gEfiHash2ProtocolGuid, NULL, (VOID **)&Hash2Protocol);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// If we can't find the Hashing protocol, then we need to create one.
//
//
// Platform is expected to publish the hash service binding protocol to support TCP.
//
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
&gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
(VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild == NULL)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
//
// Create an instance of the hash protocol for this controller.
//
Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->CreateChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, &mHash2ServiceHandle);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
}
//
// Create the TCP service data.
//
TcpServiceData = AllocateZeroPool (sizeof (TCP_SERVICE_DATA));
if (TcpServiceData == NULL) {
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
TcpServiceData->Signature = TCP_DRIVER_SIGNATURE;
TcpServiceData->ControllerHandle = Controller;
TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle = Image;
TcpServiceData->IpVersion = IpVersion;
CopyMem (
&TcpServiceData->ServiceBinding,
&gTcpServiceBinding,
sizeof (EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL)
);
TcpServiceData->IpIo = IpIoCreate (Image, Controller, IpVersion);
if (TcpServiceData->IpIo == NULL) {
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
goto ON_ERROR;
}
InitializeListHead (&TcpServiceData->SocketList);
ZeroMem (&OpenData, sizeof (IP_IO_OPEN_DATA));
if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
CopyMem (
&OpenData.IpConfigData.Ip4CfgData,
&mIp4IoDefaultIpConfigData,
sizeof (EFI_IP4_CONFIG_DATA)
);
OpenData.IpConfigData.Ip4CfgData.DefaultProtocol = EFI_IP_PROTO_TCP;
} else {
CopyMem (
&OpenData.IpConfigData.Ip6CfgData,
&mIp6IoDefaultIpConfigData,
sizeof (EFI_IP6_CONFIG_DATA)
);
OpenData.IpConfigData.Ip6CfgData.DefaultProtocol = EFI_IP_PROTO_TCP;
}
OpenData.PktRcvdNotify = TcpRxCallback;
Status = IpIoOpen (TcpServiceData->IpIo, &OpenData);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto ON_ERROR;
}
Status = TcpCreateTimer ();
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
goto ON_ERROR;
}
Status = gBS->InstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
&Controller,
TcpServiceBindingGuid,
&TcpServiceData->ServiceBinding,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
TcpDestroyTimer ();
goto ON_ERROR;
}
return EFI_SUCCESS;
ON_ERROR:
if (TcpServiceData->IpIo != NULL) {
IpIoDestroy (TcpServiceData->IpIo);
TcpServiceData->IpIo = NULL;
}
FreePool (TcpServiceData);
return Status;
}
/**
Callback function which provided by user to remove one node in NetDestroyLinkList process.
@param[in] Entry The entry to be removed.
@param[in] Context Pointer to the callback context corresponds to the Context in NetDestroyLinkList.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The entry has been removed successfully.
@retval Others Fail to remove the entry.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
TcpDestroyChildEntryInHandleBuffer (
IN LIST_ENTRY *Entry,
IN VOID *Context
)
{
SOCKET *Sock;
EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *ServiceBinding;
UINTN NumberOfChildren;
EFI_HANDLE *ChildHandleBuffer;
if ((Entry == NULL) || (Context == NULL)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
Sock = NET_LIST_USER_STRUCT_S (Entry, SOCKET, Link, SOCK_SIGNATURE);
ServiceBinding = ((TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT *)Context)->ServiceBinding;
NumberOfChildren = ((TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT *)Context)->NumberOfChildren;
ChildHandleBuffer = ((TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT *)Context)->ChildHandleBuffer;
if (!NetIsInHandleBuffer (Sock->SockHandle, NumberOfChildren, ChildHandleBuffer)) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
return ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (ServiceBinding, Sock->SockHandle);
}
/**
Destroy a TCP6 or TCP4 service binding instance. It will release all
the resources allocated by the instance.
@param[in] Controller Controller handle of device to bind driver to.
@param[in] ImageHandle The TCP driver's image handle.
@param[in] NumberOfChildren Number of Handles in ChildHandleBuffer. If number
of children is zero stop the entire bus driver.
@param[in] ChildHandleBuffer An array of child handles to be freed. May be NULL
if NumberOfChildren is 0.
@param[in] IpVersion IP_VERSION_4 or IP_VERSION_6
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The resources used by the instance were cleaned up.
@retval Others Failed to clean up some of the resources.
**/
EFI_STATUS
TcpDestroyService (
IN EFI_HANDLE Controller,
IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
IN UINTN NumberOfChildren,
IN EFI_HANDLE *ChildHandleBuffer OPTIONAL,
IN UINT8 IpVersion
)
{
EFI_HANDLE NicHandle;
EFI_GUID *IpProtocolGuid;
EFI_GUID *ServiceBindingGuid;
EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *ServiceBinding;
TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
EFI_STATUS Status;
LIST_ENTRY *List;
TCP_DESTROY_CHILD_IN_HANDLE_BUF_CONTEXT Context;
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *Hash2ServiceBinding;
ASSERT ((IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) || (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_6));
if (IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp4ProtocolGuid;
ServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiTcp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
} else {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp6ProtocolGuid;
ServiceBindingGuid = &gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid;
}
NicHandle = NetLibGetNicHandle (Controller, IpProtocolGuid);
if (NicHandle == NULL) {
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
//
// Destroy the Hash2ServiceBinding instance if it is created by Tcp driver.
//
if (mHash2ServiceHandle != NULL) {
Status = gBS->LocateProtocol (
&gEfiHash2ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
(VOID **)&Hash2ServiceBinding
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status) || (Hash2ServiceBinding == NULL) || (Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild == NULL)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
//
// Destroy the instance of the hashing protocol for this controller.
//
Status = Hash2ServiceBinding->DestroyChild (Hash2ServiceBinding, mHash2ServiceHandle);
NetworkPkg TcpDxe: SECURITY PATCH CVE-2023-45236 REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4541 REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1948.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6528.txt REF: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9293.txt Bug Overview: PixieFail Bug #8 CVE-2023-45236 CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N CWE-200 Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor Updates TCP ISN generation to use a cryptographic hash of the connection's identifying parameters and a secret key. This prevents an attacker from guessing the ISN used for some other connection. This is follows the guidance in RFC 1948, RFC 6528, and RFC 9293. RFC: 9293 Section 3.4.1. Initial Sequence Number Selection A TCP implementation MUST use the above type of "clock" for clock- driven selection of initial sequence numbers (MUST-8), and SHOULD generate its initial sequence numbers with the expression: ISN = M + F(localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport, secretkey) where M is the 4 microsecond timer, and F() is a pseudorandom function (PRF) of the connection's identifying parameters ("localip, localport, remoteip, remoteport") and a secret key ("secretkey") (SHLD-1). F() MUST NOT be computable from the outside (MUST-9), or an attacker could still guess at sequence numbers from the ISN used for some other connection. The PRF could be implemented as a cryptographic hash of the concatenation of the TCP connection parameters and some secret data. For discussion of the selection of a specific hash algorithm and management of the secret key data, please see Section 3 of [42]. For each connection there is a send sequence number and a receive sequence number. The initial send sequence number (ISS) is chosen by the data sending TCP peer, and the initial receive sequence number (IRS) is learned during the connection-establishing procedure. For a connection to be established or initialized, the two TCP peers must synchronize on each other's initial sequence numbers. This is done in an exchange of connection-establishing segments carrying a control bit called "SYN" (for synchronize) and the initial sequence numbers. As a shorthand, segments carrying the SYN bit are also called "SYNs". Hence, the solution requires a suitable mechanism for picking an initial sequence number and a slightly involved handshake to exchange the ISNs. Cc: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com> Cc: Zachary Clark-williams <zachary.clark-williams@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Doug Flick [MSFT] <doug.edk2@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Saloni Kasbekar <saloni.kasbekar@intel.com>
2024-05-09 07:56:29 +02:00
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
mHash2ServiceHandle = NULL;
}
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
NicHandle,
ServiceBindingGuid,
(VOID **)&ServiceBinding,
ImageHandle,
Controller,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_DEVICE_ERROR;
}
TcpServiceData = TCP_SERVICE_FROM_THIS (ServiceBinding);
if (NumberOfChildren != 0) {
List = &TcpServiceData->SocketList;
Context.ServiceBinding = ServiceBinding;
Context.NumberOfChildren = NumberOfChildren;
Context.ChildHandleBuffer = ChildHandleBuffer;
Status = NetDestroyLinkList (
List,
TcpDestroyChildEntryInHandleBuffer,
&Context,
NULL
);
} else if (IsListEmpty (&TcpServiceData->SocketList)) {
//
// Uninstall TCP servicebinding protocol
//
gBS->UninstallMultipleProtocolInterfaces (
NicHandle,
ServiceBindingGuid,
ServiceBinding,
NULL
);
//
// Destroy the IpIO consumed by TCP driver
//
IpIoDestroy (TcpServiceData->IpIo);
TcpServiceData->IpIo = NULL;
//
// Destroy the heartbeat timer.
//
TcpDestroyTimer ();
//
// Release the TCP service data
//
FreePool (TcpServiceData);
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
return Status;
}
/**
Test to see if this driver supports ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This Protocol instance pointer.
@param[in] ControllerHandle Handle of device to test.
@param[in] RemainingDevicePath Optional parameter use to pick a specific
child device to start.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS This driver supports this device.
@retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED This driver is already running on this device.
@retval other This driver does not support this device.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp4DriverBindingSupported (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *RemainingDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
//
// Test for the Tcp4ServiceBinding Protocol
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ControllerHandle,
&gEfiTcp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
ControllerHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
}
//
// Test for the Ip4ServiceBinding Protocol
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ControllerHandle,
&gEfiIp4ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
ControllerHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
return Status;
}
/**
Start this driver on ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This Protocol instance pointer.
@param[in] ControllerHandle Handle of device to bind driver to.
@param[in] RemainingDevicePath Optional parameter use to pick a specific child
device to start.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The driver is added to ControllerHandle.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough resources to start the
driver.
@retval other The driver cannot be added to ControllerHandle.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp4DriverBindingStart (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *RemainingDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
Status = TcpCreateService (ControllerHandle, This->DriverBindingHandle, IP_VERSION_4);
if ((Status == EFI_ALREADY_STARTED) || (Status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)) {
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
return Status;
}
/**
Stop this driver on ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This A pointer to the EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL instance.
@param[in] ControllerHandle A handle to the device being stopped. The handle must
support a bus specific I/O protocol for the driver
to use to stop the device.
@param[in] NumberOfChildren The number of child device handles in ChildHandleBuffer.
@param[in] ChildHandleBuffer An array of child handles to be freed. May be NULL
if NumberOfChildren is 0.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The device was stopped.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device could not be stopped due to a device error.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp4DriverBindingStop (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN UINTN NumberOfChildren,
IN EFI_HANDLE *ChildHandleBuffer OPTIONAL
)
{
return TcpDestroyService (
ControllerHandle,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
NumberOfChildren,
ChildHandleBuffer,
IP_VERSION_4
);
}
/**
Test to see if this driver supports ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This Protocol instance pointer.
@param[in] ControllerHandle Handle of device to test.
@param[in] RemainingDevicePath Optional parameter use to pick a specific
child device to start.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS This driver supports this device.
@retval EFI_ALREADY_STARTED This driver is already running on this device.
@retval other This driver does not support this device.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp6DriverBindingSupported (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *RemainingDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
//
// Test for the Tcp6ServiceBinding Protocol
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ControllerHandle,
&gEfiTcp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
ControllerHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
}
//
// Test for the Ip6ServiceBinding Protocol
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ControllerHandle,
&gEfiIp6ServiceBindingProtocolGuid,
NULL,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
ControllerHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_TEST_PROTOCOL
);
return Status;
}
/**
Start this driver on ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This Protocol instance pointer.
@param[in] ControllerHandle Handle of device to bind driver to.
@param[in] RemainingDevicePath Optional parameter use to pick a specific child
device to start.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The driver is added to ControllerHandle.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough resources to start the
driver.
@retval other The driver cannot be added to ControllerHandle.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp6DriverBindingStart (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *RemainingDevicePath OPTIONAL
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
Status = TcpCreateService (ControllerHandle, This->DriverBindingHandle, IP_VERSION_6);
if ((Status == EFI_ALREADY_STARTED) || (Status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED)) {
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
}
return Status;
}
/**
Stop this driver on ControllerHandle.
@param[in] This A pointer to the EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL instance.
@param[in] ControllerHandle A handle to the device being stopped. The handle must
support a bus specific I/O protocol for the driver
to use to stop the device.
@param[in] NumberOfChildren The number of child device handles in ChildHandleBuffer.
@param[in] ChildHandleBuffer An array of child handles to be freed. May be NULL
if NumberOfChildren is 0.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The device was stopped.
@retval EFI_DEVICE_ERROR The device could not be stopped due to a device error.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
Tcp6DriverBindingStop (
IN EFI_DRIVER_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ControllerHandle,
IN UINTN NumberOfChildren,
IN EFI_HANDLE *ChildHandleBuffer OPTIONAL
)
{
return TcpDestroyService (
ControllerHandle,
This->DriverBindingHandle,
NumberOfChildren,
ChildHandleBuffer,
IP_VERSION_6
);
}
/**
The Callback function called after the TCP socket was created.
@param[in] This Pointer to the socket just created
@param[in] Context Context of the socket
@retval EFI_SUCCESS This protocol installed successfully.
@retval other An error occurred.
**/
EFI_STATUS
TcpCreateSocketCallback (
IN SOCKET *This,
IN VOID *Context
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
EFI_GUID *IpProtocolGuid;
VOID *Ip;
if (This->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp4ProtocolGuid;
} else {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp6ProtocolGuid;
}
TcpServiceData = ((TCP_PROTO_DATA *)This->ProtoReserved)->TcpService;
//
// Open the default IP protocol of IP_IO BY_DRIVER.
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
TcpServiceData->IpIo->ChildHandle,
IpProtocolGuid,
&Ip,
TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle,
This->SockHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_BY_CHILD_CONTROLLER
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
// Open the device path on the handle where service binding resides on.
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
TcpServiceData->ControllerHandle,
&gEfiDevicePathProtocolGuid,
(VOID **)&This->ParentDevicePath,
TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle,
This->SockHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
gBS->CloseProtocol (
TcpServiceData->IpIo->ChildHandle,
IpProtocolGuid,
TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle,
This->SockHandle
);
} else {
//
// Insert this socket into the SocketList.
//
InsertTailList (&TcpServiceData->SocketList, &This->Link);
}
return Status;
}
/**
The callback function called before the TCP socket was to be destroyed.
@param[in] This The TCP socket to be destroyed.
@param[in] Context The context of the socket.
**/
VOID
TcpDestroySocketCallback (
IN SOCKET *This,
IN VOID *Context
)
{
TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
EFI_GUID *IpProtocolGuid;
if (This->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp4ProtocolGuid;
} else {
IpProtocolGuid = &gEfiIp6ProtocolGuid;
}
TcpServiceData = ((TCP_PROTO_DATA *)This->ProtoReserved)->TcpService;
//
// Remove this node from the list.
//
RemoveEntryList (&This->Link);
//
// Close the IP protocol.
//
gBS->CloseProtocol (
TcpServiceData->IpIo->ChildHandle,
IpProtocolGuid,
TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle,
This->SockHandle
);
}
/**
Creates a child handle with a set of TCP services.
The CreateChild() function installs a protocol on ChildHandle.
If ChildHandle is a pointer to NULL, then a new handle is created and returned in ChildHandle.
If ChildHandle is not a pointer to NULL, then the protocol installs on the existing ChildHandle.
@param[in] This Pointer to the EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL instance.
@param[in, out] ChildHandle Pointer to the handle of the child to create.
If it is NULL, then a new handle is created.
If it is a pointer to an existing UEFI handle,
then the protocol is added to the existing UEFI handle.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The protocol was added to ChildHandle.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER ChildHandle is NULL.
@retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES There are not enough resources available to create
the child.
@retval other The child handle was not created.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
TcpServiceBindingCreateChild (
IN EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN OUT EFI_HANDLE *ChildHandle
)
{
SOCKET *Sock;
TCP_SERVICE_DATA *TcpServiceData;
TCP_PROTO_DATA TcpProto;
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_TPL OldTpl;
if ((NULL == This) || (NULL == ChildHandle)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
OldTpl = gBS->RaiseTPL (TPL_CALLBACK);
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
TcpServiceData = TCP_SERVICE_FROM_THIS (This);
TcpProto.TcpService = TcpServiceData;
TcpProto.TcpPcb = NULL;
//
// Create a tcp instance with default Tcp default
// sock init data and TcpProto
//
mTcpDefaultSockData.ProtoData = &TcpProto;
mTcpDefaultSockData.DataSize = sizeof (TCP_PROTO_DATA);
mTcpDefaultSockData.DriverBinding = TcpServiceData->DriverBindingHandle;
mTcpDefaultSockData.IpVersion = TcpServiceData->IpVersion;
if (TcpServiceData->IpVersion == IP_VERSION_4) {
mTcpDefaultSockData.Protocol = &gTcp4ProtocolTemplate;
} else {
mTcpDefaultSockData.Protocol = &gTcp6ProtocolTemplate;
}
Sock = SockCreateChild (&mTcpDefaultSockData);
if (NULL == Sock) {
DEBUG (
(DEBUG_ERROR,
"TcpDriverBindingCreateChild: No resource to create a Tcp Child\n")
);
Status = EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
} else {
*ChildHandle = Sock->SockHandle;
}
mTcpDefaultSockData.ProtoData = NULL;
gBS->RestoreTPL (OldTpl);
return Status;
}
/**
Destroys a child handle with a set of TCP services.
The DestroyChild() function does the opposite of CreateChild(). It removes a protocol
that was installed by CreateChild() from ChildHandle. If the removed protocol is the
last protocol on ChildHandle, then ChildHandle is destroyed.
@param This Pointer to the EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL instance.
@param ChildHandle Handle of the child to be destroyed.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The protocol was removed from ChildHandle.
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED ChildHandle does not support the protocol that is being removed.
@retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER Child handle is NULL.
@retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED The protocol could not be removed from the ChildHandle
because its services are being used.
@retval other The child handle was not destroyed.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
TcpServiceBindingDestroyChild (
IN EFI_SERVICE_BINDING_PROTOCOL *This,
IN EFI_HANDLE ChildHandle
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
VOID *Tcp;
SOCKET *Sock;
if ((NULL == This) || (NULL == ChildHandle)) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
//
// retrieve the Tcp4 protocol from ChildHandle
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ChildHandle,
&gEfiTcp4ProtocolGuid,
&Tcp,
gTcp4DriverBinding.DriverBindingHandle,
ChildHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// No Tcp4, try the Tcp6 protocol
//
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol (
ChildHandle,
&gEfiTcp6ProtocolGuid,
&Tcp,
gTcp6DriverBinding.DriverBindingHandle,
ChildHandle,
EFI_OPEN_PROTOCOL_GET_PROTOCOL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
}
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// destroy this sock and related Tcp protocol control
// block
//
Sock = SOCK_FROM_THIS (Tcp);
SockDestroyChild (Sock);
}
return Status;
}