audk/OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf

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## @file
# SEC Driver
#
# Copyright (c) 2008 - 2015, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
#
# This program and the accompanying materials
# are licensed and made available under the terms and conditions of the BSD License
# which accompanies this distribution. The full text of the license may be found at
# http://opensource.org/licenses/bsd-license.php
#
# THE PROGRAM IS DISTRIBUTED UNDER THE BSD LICENSE ON AN "AS IS" BASIS,
# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR REPRESENTATIONS OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED.
#
##
[Defines]
INF_VERSION = 0x00010005
BASE_NAME = SecMain
FILE_GUID = df1ccef6-f301-4a63-9661-fc6030dcc880
MODULE_TYPE = SEC
VERSION_STRING = 1.0
ENTRY_POINT = SecMain
#
# The following information is for reference only and not required by the build tools.
#
# VALID_ARCHITECTURES = IA32 X64 IPF EBC
#
[Sources]
SecMain.c
[Sources.IA32]
Ia32/SecEntry.nasm
[Sources.X64]
X64/SecEntry.nasm
[Packages]
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
[LibraryClasses]
BaseLib
DebugLib
BaseMemoryLib
PeiServicesLib
PcdLib
UefiCpuLib
DebugAgentLib
IoLib
PeCoffLib
PeCoffGetEntryPointLib
PeCoffExtraActionLib
ExtractGuidedSectionLib
LocalApicLib
[Ppis]
gEfiTemporaryRamSupportPpiGuid # PPI ALWAYS_PRODUCED
[Pcd]
OvmfPkg: Split MAINFV into a separate PEI and DXE FVs By splitting the PEI and DXE phases into separate FVs, we can only reserve the PEI FV for ACPI S3 support. This should save about 7MB. Unfortunately, this all has to happen in a single commit. DEC: * Remove PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfPeiMemFv(Base|Size) * Add PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) FDF: * Add new PEIFV. Move PEI modules here. * Remove MAINFV * Add PEIFV and DXEFV into FVMAIN_COMPACT - They are added as 2 sections of a file, and compressed together so they should retain good compression * PcdOvmf(Pei|Dxe)MemFv(Base|Size) are set SEC: * Find both the PEI and DXE FVs after decompression. - Copy them separately to their memory locations. Platform PEI driver: * Fv.c: Publish both FVs as appropriate * MemDetect.c: PcdOvmfMemFv(Base|Size) => PcdOvmfDxeMemFv(Base|Size) OVMF.fd before: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed MAINFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed FV FFS file compressed with PI_NONE DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed OVMF.fd after: Non-volatile data storage FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed FV FFS file LZMA compressed PEIFV uncompressed individual PEI modules uncompressed DXEFV uncompressed individual DXE modules uncompressed SECFV uncompressed Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15151 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2014-01-21 20:39:13 +01:00
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
OvmfPkg: Sec: force reinit of BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib handler table BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib uses a table at the static physical address PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress, and modules that are linked against BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib are expected to work together on that table. Namely, some modules can register handlers for GUIDed sections, some other modules can decode such sections with the pre-registered handlers. The table carries persistent information between these modules. BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib checks a table signature whenever it is used (by whichever module that is linked against it), and at the first use (identified by a signature mismatch) it initializes the table. One of the module types that BaseExtractGuidedSectionLib can be used with is SEC, if the SEC module in question runs with the platform's RAM already available. In such cases the question emerges whether the initial contents of the RAM (ie. contents that predate the very first signature check) can be trusted. Normally RAM starts out with all zeroes (leading to a signature mismatch on the first check); however a malicious runtime OS can populate the area with some payload, then force a warm platform reset or an S3 suspend-and-resume. In such cases the signature check in the SEC module might not fire, and ExtractGuidedSectionDecode() might run code injected by the runtime OS, as part of SEC (ie. with high privileges). Therefore we clear the handler table in SEC. See also git commit ad43bc6b2e (SVN rev 15433) -- this patch secures the (d) and (e) code paths examined in that commit. Furthermore, a non-malicious runtime OS will observe no change in behavior; see case (c) in said commit. Cc: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [michael.d.kinney@intel.com: prevent VS20xx loop intrinsic with volatile] Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Michael Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19035 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 19:41:14 +01:00
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDecompressionScratchEnd
OvmfPkg: decompress FVs on S3 resume if SMM_REQUIRE is set If OVMF was built with -D SMM_REQUIRE, that implies that the runtime OS is not trusted and we should defend against it tampering with the firmware's data. One such datum is the PEI firmware volume (PEIFV). Normally PEIFV is decompressed on the first boot by SEC, then the OS preserves it across S3 suspend-resume cycles; at S3 resume SEC just reuses the originally decompressed PEIFV. However, if we don't trust the OS, then SEC must decompress PEIFV from the pristine flash every time, lest we execute OS-injected code or work with OS-injected data. Due to how FVMAIN_COMPACT is organized, we can't decompress just PEIFV; the decompression brings DXEFV with itself, plus it uses a temporary output buffer and a scratch buffer too, which even reach above the end of the finally installed DXEFV. For this reason we must keep away a non-malicious OS from DXEFV too, plus the memory up to PcdOvmfDecomprScratchEnd. The delay introduced by the LZMA decompression on S3 resume is negligible. If -D SMM_REQUIRE is not specified, then PcdSmmSmramRequire remains FALSE (from the DEC file), and then this patch has no effect (not counting some changed debug messages). If QEMU doesn't support S3 (or the user disabled it on the QEMU command line), then this patch has no effect also. Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19037 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2015-11-30 19:41:24 +01:00
[FeaturePcd]
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSmmSmramRequire