audk/UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm/Ia32/PageTbl.c

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/** @file
Page table manipulation functions for IA-32 processors
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2017, AMD Incorporated. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.h"
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
/**
Disable CET.
**/
VOID
EFIAPI
DisableCet (
VOID
);
/**
Enable CET.
**/
VOID
EFIAPI
EnableCet (
VOID
);
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Reflect page table depth with page table address When trying to get page table base, if mInternalCr3 is zero, it will use the page table from CR3, and reflect the page table depth by CR4 LA57 bit. If mInternalCr3 is non zero, it will use the page table from mInternalCr3 and reflect the page table depth of mInternalCr3 at same time. In the case of X64, we use m5LevelPagingNeeded to reflect the depth of the page table. And in the case of IA32, it will not the page table depth information. This patch is a bug fix when enable CET feature with 5 level paging. The SMM page tables are allocated / initialized in PiCpuSmmEntry(). When CET is enabled, PiCpuSmmEntry() must further modify the attribute of shadow stack pages. This page table is not set to CR3 in PiCpuSmmEntry(). So the page table base address is set to mInternalCr3 for modifty the page table attribute. It could not use CR4 LA57 bit to reflect the page table depth for mInternalCr3. So we create a architecture-specific implementation GetPageTable() with 2 output parameters. One parameter is used to output the page table address. Another parameter is used to reflect if it is 5 level paging or not. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3015 Signed-off-by: Sheng Wei <w.sheng@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
2020-11-09 06:16:57 +01:00
/**
Get page table base address and the depth of the page table.
@param[out] Base Page table base address.
@param[out] FiveLevels TRUE means 5 level paging. FALSE means 4 level paging.
**/
VOID
GetPageTable (
OUT UINTN *Base,
OUT BOOLEAN *FiveLevels OPTIONAL
)
{
*Base = ((mInternalCr3 == 0) ?
(AsmReadCr3 () & PAGING_4K_ADDRESS_MASK_64) :
mInternalCr3);
if (FiveLevels != NULL) {
*FiveLevels = FALSE;
}
}
/**
Create PageTable for SMM use.
@return PageTable Address
**/
UINT32
SmmInitPageTable (
VOID
)
{
UINTN PageFaultHandlerHookAddress;
IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *IdtEntry;
EFI_STATUS Status;
//
// Initialize spin lock
//
InitializeSpinLock (mPFLock);
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Fix memory protection crash https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=624 reports memory protection crash in PiSmmCpuDxeSmm, Ia32 build with RAM above 4GB (of which 2GB are placed in 64-bit address). It is because UEFI builds identity mapping page tables, >4G address is not supported at Ia32 build. This patch is to get the PhysicalAddressBits that is used to build in PageTbl.c(Ia32/X64), and use it to check whether the address is supported or not in ConvertMemoryPageAttributes(). With this patch, the debug messages will be like below. UefiMemory protection: 0x0 - 0x9F000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x100000 - 0x807000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x808000 - 0x810000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x818000 - 0x820000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x1510000 - 0x7B798000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7B79B000 - 0x7E538000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7E539000 - 0x7E545000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7E55A000 - 0x7E61F000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7E62B000 - 0x7F6AB000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7F703000 - 0x7F70B000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x7F70F000 - 0x7F778000 Success UefiMemory protection: 0x100000000 - 0x180000000 Unsupported Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Originally-suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reported-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2017-08-24 04:59:14 +02:00
mPhysicalAddressBits = 32;
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable) ||
HEAP_GUARD_NONSTOP_MODE ||
NULL_DETECTION_NONSTOP_MODE) {
//
// Set own Page Fault entry instead of the default one, because SMM Profile
// feature depends on IRET instruction to do Single Step
//
PageFaultHandlerHookAddress = (UINTN)PageFaultIdtHandlerSmmProfile;
IdtEntry = (IA32_IDT_GATE_DESCRIPTOR *) gcSmiIdtr.Base;
IdtEntry += EXCEPT_IA32_PAGE_FAULT;
IdtEntry->Bits.OffsetLow = (UINT16)PageFaultHandlerHookAddress;
IdtEntry->Bits.Reserved_0 = 0;
IdtEntry->Bits.GateType = IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32;
IdtEntry->Bits.OffsetHigh = (UINT16)(PageFaultHandlerHookAddress >> 16);
} else {
//
// Register SMM Page Fault Handler
//
Status = SmmRegisterExceptionHandler (&mSmmCpuService, EXCEPT_IA32_PAGE_FAULT, SmiPFHandler);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
//
// Additional SMM IDT initialization for SMM stack guard
//
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)) {
InitializeIDTSmmStackGuard ();
}
return Gen4GPageTable (TRUE);
}
/**
Page Fault handler for SMM use.
**/
VOID
SmiDefaultPFHandler (
VOID
)
{
CpuDeadLoop ();
}
/**
ThePage Fault handler wrapper for SMM use.
@param InterruptType Defines the type of interrupt or exception that
occurred on the processor.This parameter is processor architecture specific.
@param SystemContext A pointer to the processor context when
the interrupt occurred on the processor.
**/
VOID
EFIAPI
SmiPFHandler (
IN EFI_EXCEPTION_TYPE InterruptType,
IN EFI_SYSTEM_CONTEXT SystemContext
)
{
UINTN PFAddress;
UINTN GuardPageAddress;
UINTN CpuIndex;
ASSERT (InterruptType == EXCEPT_IA32_PAGE_FAULT);
AcquireSpinLock (mPFLock);
PFAddress = AsmReadCr2 ();
//
// If a page fault occurs in SMRAM range, it might be in a SMM stack guard page,
// or SMM page protection violation.
//
if ((PFAddress >= mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrBase) &&
(PFAddress < (mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrBase + mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrSize))) {
DumpCpuContext (InterruptType, SystemContext);
CpuIndex = GetCpuIndex ();
GuardPageAddress = (mSmmStackArrayBase + EFI_PAGE_SIZE + CpuIndex * mSmmStackSize);
if ((FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmStackGuard)) &&
(PFAddress >= GuardPageAddress) &&
(PFAddress < (GuardPageAddress + EFI_PAGE_SIZE))) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SMM stack overflow!\n"));
} else {
if ((SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->ExceptionData & IA32_PF_EC_ID) != 0) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SMM exception at execution (0x%x)\n", PFAddress));
DEBUG_CODE (
DumpModuleInfoByIp (*(UINTN *)(UINTN)SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Esp);
);
} else {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "SMM exception at access (0x%x)\n", PFAddress));
DEBUG_CODE (
DumpModuleInfoByIp ((UINTN)SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Eip);
);
}
if (HEAP_GUARD_NONSTOP_MODE) {
GuardPagePFHandler (SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->ExceptionData);
goto Exit;
}
}
CpuDeadLoop ();
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
goto Exit;
}
//
// If a page fault occurs in non-SMRAM range.
//
if ((PFAddress < mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrBase) ||
(PFAddress >= mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrBase + mCpuHotPlugData.SmrrSize)) {
if ((SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->ExceptionData & IA32_PF_EC_ID) != 0) {
DumpCpuContext (InterruptType, SystemContext);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Code executed on IP(0x%x) out of SMM range after SMM is locked!\n", PFAddress));
DEBUG_CODE (
DumpModuleInfoByIp (*(UINTN *)(UINTN)SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Esp);
);
CpuDeadLoop ();
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
goto Exit;
}
//
// If NULL pointer was just accessed
//
if ((PcdGet8 (PcdNullPointerDetectionPropertyMask) & BIT1) != 0 &&
(PFAddress < EFI_PAGE_SIZE)) {
DumpCpuContext (InterruptType, SystemContext);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "!!! NULL pointer access !!!\n"));
DEBUG_CODE (
DumpModuleInfoByIp ((UINTN)SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Eip);
);
if (NULL_DETECTION_NONSTOP_MODE) {
GuardPagePFHandler (SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->ExceptionData);
goto Exit;
}
CpuDeadLoop ();
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
goto Exit;
}
if (IsSmmCommBufferForbiddenAddress (PFAddress)) {
DumpCpuContext (InterruptType, SystemContext);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Access SMM communication forbidden address (0x%x)!\n", PFAddress));
DEBUG_CODE (
DumpModuleInfoByIp ((UINTN)SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Eip);
);
CpuDeadLoop ();
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
goto Exit;
}
}
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable)) {
SmmProfilePFHandler (
SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->Eip,
SystemContext.SystemContextIa32->ExceptionData
);
} else {
DumpCpuContext (InterruptType, SystemContext);
SmiDefaultPFHandler ();
}
Exit:
ReleaseSpinLock (mPFLock);
}
/**
This function sets memory attribute for page table.
**/
VOID
SetPageTableAttributes (
VOID
)
{
UINTN Index2;
UINTN Index3;
UINT64 *L1PageTable;
UINT64 *L2PageTable;
UINT64 *L3PageTable;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Reflect page table depth with page table address When trying to get page table base, if mInternalCr3 is zero, it will use the page table from CR3, and reflect the page table depth by CR4 LA57 bit. If mInternalCr3 is non zero, it will use the page table from mInternalCr3 and reflect the page table depth of mInternalCr3 at same time. In the case of X64, we use m5LevelPagingNeeded to reflect the depth of the page table. And in the case of IA32, it will not the page table depth information. This patch is a bug fix when enable CET feature with 5 level paging. The SMM page tables are allocated / initialized in PiCpuSmmEntry(). When CET is enabled, PiCpuSmmEntry() must further modify the attribute of shadow stack pages. This page table is not set to CR3 in PiCpuSmmEntry(). So the page table base address is set to mInternalCr3 for modifty the page table attribute. It could not use CR4 LA57 bit to reflect the page table depth for mInternalCr3. So we create a architecture-specific implementation GetPageTable() with 2 output parameters. One parameter is used to output the page table address. Another parameter is used to reflect if it is 5 level paging or not. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3015 Signed-off-by: Sheng Wei <w.sheng@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
2020-11-09 06:16:57 +01:00
UINTN PageTableBase;
BOOLEAN IsSplitted;
BOOLEAN PageTableSplitted;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
BOOLEAN CetEnabled;
//
// Don't mark page table to read-only if heap guard is enabled.
//
// BIT2: SMM page guard enabled
// BIT3: SMM pool guard enabled
//
if ((PcdGet8 (PcdHeapGuardPropertyMask) & (BIT3 | BIT2)) != 0) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Don't mark page table to read-only as heap guard is enabled\n"));
return ;
}
//
// Don't mark page table to read-only if SMM profile is enabled.
//
if (FeaturePcdGet (PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable)) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Don't mark page table to read-only as SMM profile is enabled\n"));
return ;
}
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SetPageTableAttributes\n"));
//
// Disable write protection, because we need mark page table to be write protected.
// We need *write* page table memory, to mark itself to be *read only*.
//
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
CetEnabled = ((AsmReadCr4() & CR4_CET_ENABLE) != 0) ? TRUE : FALSE;
if (CetEnabled) {
//
// CET must be disabled if WP is disabled.
//
DisableCet();
}
AsmWriteCr0 (AsmReadCr0() & ~CR0_WP);
do {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Start...\n"));
PageTableSplitted = FALSE;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Reflect page table depth with page table address When trying to get page table base, if mInternalCr3 is zero, it will use the page table from CR3, and reflect the page table depth by CR4 LA57 bit. If mInternalCr3 is non zero, it will use the page table from mInternalCr3 and reflect the page table depth of mInternalCr3 at same time. In the case of X64, we use m5LevelPagingNeeded to reflect the depth of the page table. And in the case of IA32, it will not the page table depth information. This patch is a bug fix when enable CET feature with 5 level paging. The SMM page tables are allocated / initialized in PiCpuSmmEntry(). When CET is enabled, PiCpuSmmEntry() must further modify the attribute of shadow stack pages. This page table is not set to CR3 in PiCpuSmmEntry(). So the page table base address is set to mInternalCr3 for modifty the page table attribute. It could not use CR4 LA57 bit to reflect the page table depth for mInternalCr3. So we create a architecture-specific implementation GetPageTable() with 2 output parameters. One parameter is used to output the page table address. Another parameter is used to reflect if it is 5 level paging or not. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3015 Signed-off-by: Sheng Wei <w.sheng@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
2020-11-09 06:16:57 +01:00
GetPageTable (&PageTableBase, NULL);
L3PageTable = (UINT64 *)PageTableBase;
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpuDxeSmm: Reflect page table depth with page table address When trying to get page table base, if mInternalCr3 is zero, it will use the page table from CR3, and reflect the page table depth by CR4 LA57 bit. If mInternalCr3 is non zero, it will use the page table from mInternalCr3 and reflect the page table depth of mInternalCr3 at same time. In the case of X64, we use m5LevelPagingNeeded to reflect the depth of the page table. And in the case of IA32, it will not the page table depth information. This patch is a bug fix when enable CET feature with 5 level paging. The SMM page tables are allocated / initialized in PiCpuSmmEntry(). When CET is enabled, PiCpuSmmEntry() must further modify the attribute of shadow stack pages. This page table is not set to CR3 in PiCpuSmmEntry(). So the page table base address is set to mInternalCr3 for modifty the page table attribute. It could not use CR4 LA57 bit to reflect the page table depth for mInternalCr3. So we create a architecture-specific implementation GetPageTable() with 2 output parameters. One parameter is used to output the page table address. Another parameter is used to reflect if it is 5 level paging or not. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3015 Signed-off-by: Sheng Wei <w.sheng@intel.com> Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
2020-11-09 06:16:57 +01:00
SmmSetMemoryAttributesEx ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)PageTableBase, SIZE_4KB, EFI_MEMORY_RO, &IsSplitted);
PageTableSplitted = (PageTableSplitted || IsSplitted);
for (Index3 = 0; Index3 < 4; Index3++) {
L2PageTable = (UINT64 *)(UINTN)(L3PageTable[Index3] & ~mAddressEncMask & PAGING_4K_ADDRESS_MASK_64);
if (L2PageTable == NULL) {
continue;
}
SmmSetMemoryAttributesEx ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)L2PageTable, SIZE_4KB, EFI_MEMORY_RO, &IsSplitted);
PageTableSplitted = (PageTableSplitted || IsSplitted);
for (Index2 = 0; Index2 < SIZE_4KB/sizeof(UINT64); Index2++) {
if ((L2PageTable[Index2] & IA32_PG_PS) != 0) {
// 2M
continue;
}
L1PageTable = (UINT64 *)(UINTN)(L2PageTable[Index2] & ~mAddressEncMask & PAGING_4K_ADDRESS_MASK_64);
if (L1PageTable == NULL) {
continue;
}
SmmSetMemoryAttributesEx ((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)L1PageTable, SIZE_4KB, EFI_MEMORY_RO, &IsSplitted);
PageTableSplitted = (PageTableSplitted || IsSplitted);
}
}
} while (PageTableSplitted);
//
// Enable write protection, after page table updated.
//
AsmWriteCr0 (AsmReadCr0() | CR0_WP);
UefiCpuPkg/PiSmmCpu: Add Shadow Stack Support for X86 SMM. REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1521 We scan the SMM code with ROPgadget. http://shell-storm.org/project/ROPgadget/ https://github.com/JonathanSalwan/ROPgadget/tree/master This tool reports the gadget in SMM driver. This patch enabled CET ShadowStack for X86 SMM. If CET is supported, SMM will enable CET ShadowStack. SMM CET will save the OS CET context at SmmEntry and restore OS CET context at SmmExit. Test: 1) test Intel internal platform (x64 only, CET enabled/disabled) Boot test: CET supported or not supported CPU on CET supported platform CET enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmCetEnable enabled/disabled Single core/Multiple core PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmProfileEnable enabled/disabled PcdCpuSmmStaticPageTable enabled/disabled CET exception test: #CF generated with PcdCpuSmmStackGuard enabled/disabled. Other exception test: #PF for normal stack overflow #PF for NX protection #PF for RO protection CET env test: Launch SMM in CET enabled/disabled environment (DXE) - no impact to DXE The test case can be found at https://github.com/jyao1/SecurityEx/tree/master/ControlFlowPkg 2) test ovmf (both IA32 and X64 SMM, CET disabled only) test OvmfIa32/Ovmf3264, with -D SMM_REQUIRE. qemu-system-x86_64.exe -machine q35,smm=on -smp 4 -serial file:serial.log -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=0,file=OVMF_CODE.fd,readonly=on -drive if=pflash,format=raw,unit=1,file=OVMF_VARS.fd QEMU emulator version 3.1.0 (v3.1.0-11736-g7a30e7adb0-dirty) 3) not tested IA32 CET enabled platform Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com> Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2019-02-22 14:30:36 +01:00
if (CetEnabled) {
//
// re-enable CET.
//
EnableCet();
}
return ;
}
/**
This function returns with no action for 32 bit.
@param[out] *Cr2 Pointer to variable to hold CR2 register value.
**/
VOID
SaveCr2 (
OUT UINTN *Cr2
)
{
return ;
}
/**
This function returns with no action for 32 bit.
@param[in] Cr2 Value to write into CR2 register.
**/
VOID
RestoreCr2 (
IN UINTN Cr2
)
{
return ;
}
/**
Return whether access to non-SMRAM is restricted.
@retval TRUE Access to non-SMRAM is restricted.
@retval FALSE Access to non-SMRAM is not restricted.
**/
BOOLEAN
IsRestrictedMemoryAccess (
VOID
)
{
return TRUE;
}