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OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
## @file
# Open Virtual Machine Firmware: FDF
#
# Copyright (c) 2006 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
# (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
#
# SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
#
##
################################################################################
[Defines]
!include OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgDefines.fdf.inc
#
# Build the variable store and the firmware code as one unified flash device
# image.
#
[FD.OVMF]
BaseAddress = $(FW_BASE_ADDRESS)
Size = $(FW_SIZE)
ErasePolarity = 1
BlockSize = $(BLOCK_SIZE)
NumBlocks = $(FW_BLOCKS)
!include OvmfPkg/VarStore.fdf.inc
$(VARS_SIZE)|$(FVMAIN_SIZE)
FV = FVMAIN_COMPACT
$(SECFV_OFFSET)|$(SECFV_SIZE)
FV = SECFV
################################################################################
[FD.MEMFD]
BaseAddress = $(MEMFD_BASE_ADDRESS)
Size = 0xD00000
ErasePolarity = 1
BlockSize = 0x10000
NumBlocks = 0xD0
0x000000|0x006000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPageTablesSize
0x006000|0x001000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfLockBoxStorageSize
0x007000|0x001000
gEfiMdePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableAddress|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdGuidedExtractHandlerTableSize
0x008000|0x001000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbPageTableSize
0x009000|0x002000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbSize
0x00B000|0x001000
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaBase|gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevEsWorkAreaSize
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: reserve MEMFD space for for firmware config hashes Split the existing 4KB page reserved for SEV launch secrets into two parts: first 3KB for SEV launch secrets and last 1KB for firmware config hashes. The area of the firmware config hashes will be attested (measured) by the PSP and thus the untrusted VMM can't pass in different files from what the guest owner allows. Declare this in the Reset Vector table using GUID 7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454 and a uint32_t table of a base and size value (similar to the structure used to declare the launch secret block). Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457 Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2021-01-16 23:42:44 +01:00
0x00C000|0x000C00
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: assign and reserve the Sev Secret area Create a one page secret area in the MEMFD and reserve the area with a boot time HOB. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-6-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: s/protect/reserve/g in the commit message, at Ard's and James's suggestion]
2020-11-30 21:28:18 +01:00
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdSevLaunchSecretSize
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: reserve MEMFD space for for firmware config hashes Split the existing 4KB page reserved for SEV launch secrets into two parts: first 3KB for SEV launch secrets and last 1KB for firmware config hashes. The area of the firmware config hashes will be attested (measured) by the PSP and thus the untrusted VMM can't pass in different files from what the guest owner allows. Declare this in the Reset Vector table using GUID 7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454 and a uint32_t table of a base and size value (similar to the structure used to declare the launch secret block). Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457 Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
2021-01-16 23:42:44 +01:00
0x00CC00|0x000400
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuHashTableBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdQemuHashTableSize
OvmfPkg/VmgExitLib: Support nested #VCs BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108 In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support for nested #VCs. In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable area. Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU will enter CpuDeadLoop (). For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the backup area. For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages using the memory allocation library. Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
2021-01-07 19:48:23 +01:00
0x00D000|0x001000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecGhcbBackupSize
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
0x010000|0x010000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfSecPeiTempRamSize
0x020000|0x0E0000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfPeiMemFvSize
FV = PEIFV
0x100000|0xC00000
gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvBase|gUefiOvmfPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOvmfDxeMemFvSize
FV = DXEFV
################################################################################
[FV.SECFV]
FvNameGuid = 763BED0D-DE9F-48F5-81F1-3E90E1B1A015
BlockSize = 0x1000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
#
# SEC Phase modules
#
# The code in this FV handles the initial firmware startup, and
# decompresses the PEI and DXE FVs which handles the rest of the boot sequence.
#
INF OvmfPkg/Sec/SecMain.inf
INF RuleOverride=RESET_VECTOR OvmfPkg/ResetVector/ResetVector.inf
################################################################################
[FV.PEIFV]
FvNameGuid = 6938079B-B503-4E3D-9D24-B28337A25806
BlockSize = 0x10000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
APRIORI PEI {
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Pei/Pcd.inf
}
#
# PEI Phase modules
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/Pei/PeiMain.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Pei/Pcd.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/Pei/ReportStatusCodeRouterPei.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/Pei/StatusCodeHandlerPei.inf
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/DxeIplPeim/DxeIpl.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/Universal/Acpi/S3Resume2Pei/S3Resume2Pei.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuMpPei/CpuMpPei.inf
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: assign and reserve the Sev Secret area Create a one page secret area in the MEMFD and reserve the area with a boot time HOB. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-6-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: s/protect/reserve/g in the commit message, at Ard's and James's suggestion]
2020-11-30 21:28:18 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretPei/SecretPei.inf
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
!if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei: Mark TPM MMIO range as unencrypted for SEV-ES BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345 During PEI, the MMIO range for the TPM is marked as encrypted when running as an SEV guest. While this isn't an issue for an SEV guest because of the way the nested page fault is handled, it does result in an SEV-ES guest terminating because of a mitigation check in the #VC handler to prevent MMIO to an encrypted address. For an SEV-ES guest, this range must be marked as unencrypted. Create a new x86 PEIM for TPM support that will map the TPM MMIO range as unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. The gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid PPI will be unconditionally installed before exiting. The PEIM will exit with the EFI_ABORTED status so that the PEIM does not stay resident. This new PEIM will depend on the installation of the permanent PEI RAM, by PlatformPei, so that in case page table splitting is required during the clearing of the encryption bit, the new page table(s) will be allocated from permanent PEI RAM. Update all OVMF Ia32 and X64 build packages to include this new PEIM. Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com> Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Message-Id: <42794cec1f9d5bc24cbfb9dcdbe5e281ef259ef5.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com> [lersek@redhat.com: refresh subject line] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2021-04-29 19:12:13 +02:00
INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei/TpmMmioSevDecryptPei.inf
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigPei.inf
INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgPei/TcgPei.inf
INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Pei/Tcg2Pei.inf
!endif
################################################################################
[FV.DXEFV]
FvForceRebase = FALSE
FvNameGuid = 7CB8BDC9-F8EB-4F34-AAEA-3EE4AF6516A1
BlockSize = 0x10000
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
APRIORI DXE {
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DevicePathDxe/DevicePathDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesRuntimeDxe.inf
}
#
# DXE Phase modules
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/Dxe/DxeMain.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ReportStatusCodeRouter/RuntimeDxe/ReportStatusCodeRouterRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/StatusCodeHandler/RuntimeDxe/StatusCodeHandlerRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PCD/Dxe/Pcd.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Core/RuntimeDxe/RuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/SecurityStubDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/EbcDxe/EbcDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/8259InterruptControllerDxe/8259.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuIo2Dxe/CpuIo2Dxe.inf
INF UefiCpuPkg/CpuDxe/CpuDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/8254TimerDxe/8254Timer.inf
INF OvmfPkg/IncompatiblePciDeviceSupportDxe/IncompatiblePciDeviceSupport.inf
INF OvmfPkg/PciHotPlugInitDxe/PciHotPlugInit.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciHostBridgeDxe/PciHostBridgeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciBusDxe/PciBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/ResetSystemRuntimeDxe/ResetSystemRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Metronome/Metronome.inf
INF PcAtChipsetPkg/PcatRealTimeClockRuntimeDxe/PcatRealTimeClockRuntimeDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioPciDeviceDxe/VirtioPciDeviceDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/Virtio10Dxe/Virtio10.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioBlkDxe/VirtioBlk.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioScsiDxe/VirtioScsi.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioRngDxe/VirtioRng.inf
!if $(PVSCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/PvScsiDxe/PvScsiDxe.inf
!endif
!if $(MPT_SCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/MptScsiDxe/MptScsiDxe.inf
!endif
!if $(LSI_SCSI_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF OvmfPkg/LsiScsiDxe/LsiScsiDxe.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/WatchdogTimerDxe/WatchdogTimer.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe/MonotonicCounterRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/CapsuleRuntimeDxe/CapsuleRuntimeDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConPlatformDxe/ConPlatformDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/ConSplitterDxe/ConSplitterDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/GraphicsConsoleDxe/GraphicsConsoleDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Console/TerminalDxe/TerminalDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DriverHealthManagerDxe/DriverHealthManagerDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/BdsDxe/BdsDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Application/UiApp/UiApp.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe/QemuKernelLoaderFsDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DevicePathDxe/DevicePathDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/PrintDxe/PrintDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/DiskIoDxe/DiskIoDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/PartitionDxe/PartitionDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/RamDiskDxe/RamDiskDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UnicodeCollation/EnglishDxe/EnglishDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiBusDxe/ScsiBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Scsi/ScsiDiskDxe/ScsiDiskDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SataControllerDxe/SataControllerDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaAtapiPassThru/AtaAtapiPassThru.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Ata/AtaBusDxe/AtaBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/NvmExpressDxe/NvmExpressDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/HiiDatabaseDxe/HiiDatabaseDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SetupBrowserDxe/SetupBrowserDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/DisplayEngineDxe/DisplayEngineDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/MemoryTest/NullMemoryTestDxe/NullMemoryTestDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SioBusDxe/SioBusDxe.inf
!if $(SOURCE_DEBUG_ENABLE) == FALSE
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/PciSioSerialDxe/PciSioSerialDxe.inf
!endif
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Isa/Ps2KeyboardDxe/Ps2KeyboardDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/SmbiosDxe/SmbiosDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/SmbiosPlatformDxe/SmbiosPlatformDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/AcpiTableDxe/AcpiTableDxe.inf
OvmfPkg: switch the AmdSev platform to the fw_cfg-only ACPI platform driver For consistency with the historical OvmfPkg* platforms, switch the remotely attested, QEMU/KVM-only, AmdSev platform from the AcpiPlatformDxe driver to the QemuFwCfgAcpiPlatformDxe driver. No module remains dependent on XenPlatformLib, so remove the XenPlatformLib class resolution too, from the DSC file. Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122 Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-5-lersek@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
2021-05-26 22:14:07 +02:00
INF OvmfPkg/AcpiPlatformDxe/QemuFwCfgAcpiPlatformDxe.inf
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Acpi/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe/BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe.inf
INF FatPkg/EnhancedFatDxe/Fat.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Disk/UdfDxe/UdfDxe.inf
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option (This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will only boot to grub. This is done by copying the Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub and then customizing it. Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid <e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid <10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
2020-11-30 21:28:16 +01:00
!if $(TOOL_CHAIN_TAG) != "XCODE5" && $(BUILD_SHELL) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand/LinuxInitrdDynamicShellCommand.inf
!endif
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev Secret area using a configuration table Now that the secret area is protected by a boot time HOB, extract its location details into a configuration table referenced by gSevLaunchSecretGuid so the boot loader or OS can locate it before a call to ExitBootServices(). Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-7-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: fix indentation of InstallConfigurationTable() args]
2020-11-30 21:28:19 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe/SecretDxe.inf
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option (This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will only boot to grub. This is done by copying the Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub and then customizing it. Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid <e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid <10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
2020-11-30 21:28:16 +01:00
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSev/Grub/Grub.inf
!if $(BUILD_SHELL) == TRUE
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
INF ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf
OvmfPkg/AmdSev: add Grub Firmware Volume Package This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option (This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will only boot to grub. This is done by copying the Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub and then customizing it. Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> [lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment] Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> [lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid <e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid <10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
2020-11-30 21:28:16 +01:00
!endif
OvmfPkg/Amdsev: Base commit to build encrypted boot specific OVMF This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor changes to change the build name. This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features. Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the separated build of code and variables is eliminated. Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077 Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com> Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
2020-11-30 21:28:15 +01:00
INF MdeModulePkg/Logo/LogoDxe.inf
#
# Usb Support
#
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/UhciDxe/UhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/EhciDxe/EhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Pci/XhciDxe/XhciDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbBusDxe/UsbBusDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbKbDxe/UsbKbDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Bus/Usb/UsbMassStorageDxe/UsbMassStorageDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuVideoDxe/QemuVideoDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/QemuRamfbDxe/QemuRamfbDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/VirtioGpuDxe/VirtioGpu.inf
INF OvmfPkg/PlatformDxe/Platform.inf
INF OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe/AmdSevDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/IoMmuDxe/IoMmuDxe.inf
#
# Variable driver stack (non-SMM)
#
INF OvmfPkg/QemuFlashFvbServicesRuntimeDxe/FvbServicesRuntimeDxe.inf
INF OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe/Fvb.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/FaultTolerantWriteDxe/FaultTolerantWriteDxe.inf
INF MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/VariableRuntimeDxe.inf
#
# TPM support
#
!if $(TPM_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/TcgDxe/TcgDxe.inf
INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Dxe/Tcg2Dxe.inf
!if $(TPM_CONFIG_ENABLE) == TRUE
INF SecurityPkg/Tcg/Tcg2Config/Tcg2ConfigDxe.inf
!endif
!endif
################################################################################
[FV.FVMAIN_COMPACT]
FvNameGuid = 48DB5E17-707C-472D-91CD-1613E7EF51B0
FvAlignment = 16
ERASE_POLARITY = 1
MEMORY_MAPPED = TRUE
STICKY_WRITE = TRUE
LOCK_CAP = TRUE
LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_STATUS = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
WRITE_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
READ_DISABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_ENABLED_CAP = TRUE
READ_STATUS = TRUE
READ_LOCK_CAP = TRUE
READ_LOCK_STATUS = TRUE
FILE FV_IMAGE = 9E21FD93-9C72-4c15-8C4B-E77F1DB2D792 {
SECTION GUIDED EE4E5898-3914-4259-9D6E-DC7BD79403CF PROCESSING_REQUIRED = TRUE {
#
# These firmware volumes will have files placed in them uncompressed,
# and then both firmware volumes will be compressed in a single
# compression operation in order to achieve better overall compression.
#
SECTION FV_IMAGE = PEIFV
SECTION FV_IMAGE = DXEFV
}
}
!include OvmfPkg/FvmainCompactScratchEnd.fdf.inc
################################################################################
[Rule.Common.SEC]
FILE SEC = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING ="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING ="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.PEI_CORE]
FILE PEI_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 Align=Auto $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING ="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING ="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.PEIM]
FILE PEIM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PEI_DEPEX PEI_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 Align=Auto $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_CORE]
FILE DXE_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
RAW ACPI Optional |.acpi
RAW ASL Optional |.aml
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_DRIVER]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_DRIVER.BINARY]
FILE DRIVER = $(NAMED_GUID) {
DXE_DEPEX DXE_DEPEX Optional |.depex
PE32 PE32 |.efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.UEFI_APPLICATION.BINARY]
FILE APPLICATION = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 |.efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.SEC.RESET_VECTOR]
FILE RAW = $(NAMED_GUID) {
RAW BIN Align = 16 |.bin
}
[Rule.Common.SMM_CORE]
FILE SMM_CORE = $(NAMED_GUID) {
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}
[Rule.Common.DXE_SMM_DRIVER]
FILE SMM = $(NAMED_GUID) {
SMM_DEPEX SMM_DEPEX Optional $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).depex
PE32 PE32 $(INF_OUTPUT)/$(MODULE_NAME).efi
UI STRING="$(MODULE_NAME)" Optional
VERSION STRING="$(INF_VERSION)" Optional BUILD_NUM=$(BUILD_NUMBER)
}