audk/SecurityPkg/FvReportPei/FvReportPei.c

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SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is independent of hardware based root-of-trust. Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust. To be hardware/platform independent, PPI gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver. This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in required boot mode. struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo; UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[1]; }; To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after permanent memory has been discovered. For a measured boot, this driver will install gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid to report digest of each FV to TCG driver. For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value (calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware. If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass. If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail and go to dead loop if status report returns. The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail cases differently. Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification for the performance consideration. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
2019-05-10 04:19:36 +02:00
/** @file
This driver verifies and reports OBB FVs.
Copyright (c) 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "FvReportPei.h"
STATIC CONST HASH_ALG_INFO mHashAlgInfo[] = {
{TPM_ALG_SHA256, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha256Init, Sha256Update, Sha256Final, Sha256HashAll}, // 000B
{TPM_ALG_SHA384, SHA384_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha384Init, Sha384Update, Sha384Final, Sha384HashAll}, // 000C
{TPM_ALG_SHA512, SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE, Sha512Init, Sha512Update, Sha512Final, Sha512HashAll}, // 000D
};
/**
Find hash algorithm information from mHashAlgInfo according to given ID.
@param[in] HashAlgId Hash algorithm type id.
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is independent of hardware based root-of-trust. Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust. To be hardware/platform independent, PPI gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver. This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in required boot mode. struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo; UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[1]; }; To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after permanent memory has been discovered. For a measured boot, this driver will install gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid to report digest of each FV to TCG driver. For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value (calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware. If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass. If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail and go to dead loop if status report returns. The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail cases differently. Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification for the performance consideration. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
2019-05-10 04:19:36 +02:00
@retval Pointer to HASH_ALG_INFO if given hash algorithm is supported.
@retval NULL if given algorithm is not supported.
**/
STATIC
CONST
HASH_ALG_INFO *
FindHashAlgInfo (
IN UINT16 HashAlgId
)
{
UINTN Index;
for (Index = 0; Index < ARRAY_SIZE (mHashAlgInfo); ++Index) {
if (mHashAlgInfo[Index].HashAlgId == HashAlgId) {
return &mHashAlgInfo[Index];
}
}
return NULL;
}
/**
Install a EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI instance so that
TCG driver may use to extend PCRs.
@param[in] FvBuffer Buffer containing the whole FV.
@param[in] FvLength Length of the FV.
@param[in] HashAlgoId Hash algorithm type id.
@param[in] HashSize Hash size.
@param[in] HashValue Hash value buffer.
**/
STATIC
VOID
InstallPreHashFvPpi (
IN VOID *FvBuffer,
IN UINTN FvLength,
IN UINT16 HashAlgoId,
IN UINT16 HashSize,
IN UINT8 *HashValue
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR *FvInfoPpiDescriptor;
EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI *PreHashedFvPpi;
UINTN PpiSize;
HASH_INFO *HashInfo;
PpiSize = sizeof (EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_PREHASHED_FV_PPI)
+ sizeof (sizeof (HASH_INFO))
+ HashSize;
PreHashedFvPpi = AllocatePool (PpiSize);
ASSERT (PreHashedFvPpi != NULL);
PreHashedFvPpi->FvBase = (UINT32)(UINTN)FvBuffer;
PreHashedFvPpi->FvLength = (UINT32)FvLength;
PreHashedFvPpi->Count = 1;
HashInfo = HASH_INFO_PTR (PreHashedFvPpi);
HashInfo->HashAlgoId = HashAlgoId;
HashInfo->HashSize = HashSize;
CopyMem (HASH_VALUE_PTR (HashInfo), HashValue, HashSize);
FvInfoPpiDescriptor = AllocatePool (sizeof (EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR));
ASSERT (FvInfoPpiDescriptor != NULL);
FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Guid = &gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid;
FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Flags = EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_PPI | EFI_PEI_PPI_DESCRIPTOR_TERMINATE_LIST;
FvInfoPpiDescriptor->Ppi = (VOID *) PreHashedFvPpi;
Status = PeiServicesInstallPpi (FvInfoPpiDescriptor);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
/**
Calculate and verify hash value for given FV.
@param[in] HashInfo Hash information of the FV.
@param[in] FvInfo Information of FV used for verification.
@param[in] FvNumber Length of the FV.
@param[in] BootMode Length of the FV.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The given FV is integrate.
@retval EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED The given FV is corrupted (hash mismatch).
@retval EFI_UNSUPPORTED The hash algorithm is not supported.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
VerifyHashedFv (
IN FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo,
IN HASHED_FV_INFO *FvInfo,
IN UINTN FvNumber,
IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode
)
{
UINTN FvIndex;
CONST HASH_ALG_INFO *AlgInfo;
UINT8 *HashValue;
UINT8 *FvHashValue;
VOID *FvBuffer;
EFI_STATUS Status;
if (HashInfo == NULL ||
HashInfo->HashSize == 0 ||
HashInfo->HashAlgoId == TPM_ALG_NULL) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Bypass FV hash verification\r\n"));
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}
AlgInfo = FindHashAlgInfo (HashInfo->HashAlgoId);
if (AlgInfo == NULL || AlgInfo->HashSize != HashInfo->HashSize) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "Unsupported or wrong hash algorithm: %04X (size=%d)\r\n",
HashInfo->HashAlgoId, HashInfo->HashSize));
return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
}
ASSERT (FvInfo != NULL);
ASSERT (FvNumber > 0);
//
// We need a hash value for each FV as well as one for all FVs.
//
HashValue = AllocateZeroPool (AlgInfo->HashSize * (FvNumber + 1));
ASSERT (HashValue != NULL);
//
// Calculate hash value for each FV first.
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is independent of hardware based root-of-trust. Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust. To be hardware/platform independent, PPI gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver. This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in required boot mode. struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo; UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[1]; }; To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after permanent memory has been discovered. For a measured boot, this driver will install gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid to report digest of each FV to TCG driver. For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value (calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware. If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass. If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail and go to dead loop if status report returns. The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail cases differently. Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification for the performance consideration. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
2019-05-10 04:19:36 +02:00
//
FvHashValue = HashValue;
for (FvIndex = 0; FvIndex < FvNumber; ++FvIndex) {
//
// FV must be meant for verified boot and/or measured boot.
//
ASSERT ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) != 0 ||
(FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) != 0);
//
// Skip any FV not meant for current boot mode.
//
if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Skip FV[%016lX] for boot mode[%d]\r\n",
FvInfo[FvIndex].Base, BootMode));
continue;
}
DEBUG ((
DEBUG_INFO,
"Pre-hashed[alg=%04X,size=%d,flag=%016lX] FV: 0x%016lX (%08lX) (Flag=%016lX)\r\n",
HashInfo->HashAlgoId,
HashInfo->HashSize,
HashInfo->HashFlag,
FvInfo[FvIndex].Base,
FvInfo[FvIndex].Length,
FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag
));
//
// Copy FV to permanent memory to avoid potential TOC/TOU.
//
FvBuffer = AllocatePages (EFI_SIZE_TO_PAGES((UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Length));
ASSERT (FvBuffer != NULL);
CopyMem (FvBuffer, (CONST VOID *)(UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Base, (UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Length);
if (!AlgInfo->HashAll (FvBuffer, (UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Length, FvHashValue)) {
Status = EFI_ABORTED;
goto Done;
}
//
// Report the FV measurement.
//
if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_MEASURED_BOOT) != 0) {
InstallPreHashFvPpi (
FvBuffer,
(UINTN)FvInfo[FvIndex].Length,
HashInfo->HashAlgoId,
HashInfo->HashSize,
FvHashValue
);
}
//
// Don't keep the hash value of current FV if we don't need to verify it.
//
if ((FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_VERIFIED_BOOT) != 0) {
FvHashValue += AlgInfo->HashSize;
}
//
// Use memory copy of the FV from now on.
//
FvInfo[FvIndex].Base = (UINT64)(UINTN)FvBuffer;
}
//
// Check final hash for all FVs.
//
if (FvHashValue == HashValue ||
(AlgInfo->HashAll (HashValue, FvHashValue - HashValue, FvHashValue) &&
CompareMem (HashInfo->Hash, FvHashValue, AlgInfo->HashSize) == 0)) {
Status = EFI_SUCCESS;
} else {
Status = EFI_VOLUME_CORRUPTED;
}
Done:
FreePool (HashValue);
return Status;
}
/**
Report FV to PEI and/or DXE core for dispatch.
@param[in] FvInfo Information of a FV.
**/
STATIC
VOID
ReportHashedFv (
IN HASHED_FV_INFO *FvInfo
)
{
CONST EFI_GUID *FvFormat;
if ((FvInfo->Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_HOB) != 0) {
//
// Require DXE core to process this FV.
//
BuildFvHob (
(EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)FvInfo->Base,
FvInfo->Length
);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Reported FV HOB: %016lX (%08lX)\r\n", FvInfo->Base, FvInfo->Length));
}
if ((FvInfo->Flag & HASHED_FV_FLAG_REPORT_FV_INFO_PPI) != 0) {
//
// Require PEI core to process this FV.
//
FvFormat = &((EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER *)(UINTN)FvInfo->Base)->FileSystemGuid;
PeiServicesInstallFvInfoPpi (
FvFormat,
(VOID *)(UINTN)FvInfo->Base,
(UINT32)FvInfo->Length,
NULL,
NULL
);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "Reported FV PPI: %016lX (%08lX)\r\n", FvInfo->Base, FvInfo->Length));
}
}
/**
Verify and report pre-hashed FVs.
Doing this must be at post-memory to make sure there's enough memory to hold
all FVs to be verified. This is necessary for mitigating TOCTOU issue.
This function will never return if the verification is failed.
@param[in] StoredHashFvPpi Pointer to PPI containing hash information.
@param[in] BootMode Current boot mode.
@retval Pointer to structure containing valid hash information for current boot mode.
SecurityPkg/FvReportPei: implement a common FV verifier and reporter https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1617 This driver implements a common checker, verifier and reporter which is independent of hardware based root-of-trust. Usually the hardware based root-of-trust will not verify all BIOS but part of it. For example, Boot Guard will only verify IBB segment. The IBB needs to verify other part of BIOS, i.e. other FVs to transfer control to from IBB. This driver plays the role in IBB to verify FVs not covered by hardware root-of-trust to make sure integrity of the chain of trust. To be hardware/platform independent, PPI gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid is introduced for platform to pass digest information to this driver. This PPI should include all information needed to verify required FVs in required boot mode. struct _EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI { FV_HASH_INFO HashInfo; UINTN FvNumber; HASHED_FV_INFO FvInfo[1]; }; To avoid TOCTOU issue, all FVs to be verified will be copied to memory before hash calculation. That also means this driver has to be run after permanent memory has been discovered. For a measured boot, this driver will install gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPrehashedFvPpiGuid to report digest of each FV to TCG driver. For a verified boot, this driver will verify the final hash value (calculated from the concatenation of each FV's hash) for indicated FVs against the hash got from platform/hardware. If pass, it will build EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV (consumed by DXE core) and/or install gEfiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoPpiGuid (consumed by PEI core), and then report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass. If fail, it just report status code PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail and go to dead loop if status report returns. The platform can register customized handler to process pass and fail cases differently. Currently, this driver only supports hash (sha256/384/512) verification for the performance consideration. Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Cc: "Hernandez Beltran, Jorge" <jorge.hernandez.beltran@intel.com> Cc: Harry Han <harry.han@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com> Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
2019-05-10 04:19:36 +02:00
@retval NULL if there's no hash associated with current boot mode.
**/
STATIC
FV_HASH_INFO *
GetHashInfo (
IN EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI *StoredHashFvPpi,
IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode
)
{
FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo;
if ((StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo.HashFlag & FV_HASH_FLAG_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) != 0) {
HashInfo = &StoredHashFvPpi->HashInfo;
} else {
HashInfo = NULL;
}
return HashInfo;
}
/**
Verify and report pre-hashed FVs.
Doing this must be at post-memory to make sure there's enough memory to hold
all FVs to be verified. This is necessary for mitigating TOCTOU issue.
This function will never return if the verification is failed.
@param[in] PeiServices General purpose services available to every PEIM.
@param[in] BootMode Current boot mode.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS The function completed successfully.
**/
STATIC
EFI_STATUS
CheckStoredHashFv (
IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices,
IN EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
EDKII_PEI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_INFO_STORED_HASH_FV_PPI *StoredHashFvPpi;
FV_HASH_INFO *HashInfo;
UINTN FvIndex;
//
// Check pre-hashed FV list
//
StoredHashFvPpi = NULL;
Status = PeiServicesLocatePpi (
&gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid,
0,
NULL,
(VOID**)&StoredHashFvPpi
);
if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber > 0) {
HashInfo = GetHashInfo (StoredHashFvPpi, BootMode);
Status = VerifyHashedFv (HashInfo, StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo,
StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber, BootMode);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// Report the FVs to PEI core and/or DXE core.
//
for (FvIndex = 0; FvIndex < StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber; ++FvIndex) {
if ((StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo[FvIndex].Flag
& HASHED_FV_FLAG_SKIP_BOOT_MODE (BootMode)) == 0) {
ReportHashedFv (&StoredHashFvPpi->FvInfo[FvIndex]);
}
}
REPORT_STATUS_CODE (
EFI_PROGRESS_CODE,
PcdGet32 (PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationPass)
);
} else {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ERROR: Failed to verify OBB FVs (%r)\r\n", Status));
REPORT_STATUS_CODE_EX (
EFI_PROGRESS_CODE,
PcdGet32 (PcdStatusCodeFvVerificationFail),
0,
NULL,
&gEdkiiPeiFirmwareVolumeInfoStoredHashFvPpiGuid,
StoredHashFvPpi,
sizeof (*StoredHashFvPpi)
);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
}
} else {
DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "ERROR: No/invalid StoredHashFvPpi located\r\n"));
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
ASSERT (StoredHashFvPpi != NULL && StoredHashFvPpi->FvNumber > 0);
Status = EFI_NOT_FOUND;
}
return Status;
}
/**
Main entry for FvReport PEIM.
@param[in] FileHandle Handle of the file being invoked.
@param[in] PeiServices Pointer to PEI Services table.
@retval EFI_SUCCESS If all FVs reported by StoredHashFvPpi are verified.
**/
EFI_STATUS
EFIAPI
FvReportEntryPoint (
IN EFI_PEI_FILE_HANDLE FileHandle,
IN CONST EFI_PEI_SERVICES **PeiServices
)
{
EFI_STATUS Status;
EFI_BOOT_MODE BootMode;
Status = PeiServicesGetBootMode (&BootMode);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
Status = CheckStoredHashFv (PeiServices, BootMode);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// Never pass control to left part of BIOS if any error.
//
CpuDeadLoop ();
}
return Status;
}