1. Remove extra attribute for SetupMode, SignatureSupport and SecureBoot variable.

2. Allow the PK owner to update db/dbx variable directly.

Signed-off-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dong Guo <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ye Ting <ting.ye@intel.com>

git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@13536 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
This commit is contained in:
sfu5 2012-07-17 08:38:58 +00:00
parent 876ac39540
commit 05a643f91d
2 changed files with 78 additions and 73 deletions

View File

@ -254,32 +254,20 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
}
//
// Check "SetupMode" variable's existence.
// If it doesn't exist, check PK database's existence to determine the value.
// Then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
// Create "SetupMode" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
);
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
FindVariable (EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
if (PkVariable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;
} else {
mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;
}
VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&mPlatformMode,
sizeof(UINT8),
VarAttr,
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
0,
0,
&Variable,
@ -288,34 +276,24 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
} else {
mPlatformMode = *(GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr));
}
//
// Check "SignatureSupport" variable's existence.
// If it doesn't exist, then create a new one with EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set.
//
Status = FindVariable (
EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&Variable,
&mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal,
FALSE
);
if (Variable.CurrPtr == NULL) {
VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
//
// Create "SignatureSupport" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
FindVariable (EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, &Variable, &mVariableModuleGlobal->VariableGlobal, FALSE);
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
mSignatureSupport,
sizeof(mSignatureSupport),
VarAttr,
EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
0,
0,
&Variable,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
@ -348,6 +326,9 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
}
}
//
// Create "SecureBoot" varable with BS+RT attribute set.
//
if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {
SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;
} else {
@ -359,7 +340,7 @@ AutenticatedVariableServiceInitialize (
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&SecureBootMode,
sizeof (UINT8),
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS,
EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
0,
0,
&Variable,
@ -660,22 +641,12 @@ UpdatePlatformMode (
return Status;
}
mPlatformMode = Mode;
VarAttr = EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS;
Status = UpdateVariable (
EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,
&gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
&mPlatformMode,
sizeof(UINT8),
VarAttr,
0,
0,
&Variable,
NULL
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
return Status;
}
//
// Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible
// variable storage reclaim at runtime.
//
mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;
CopyMem (GetVariableDataPtr (Variable.CurrPtr), &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));
if (AtRuntime ()) {
//
@ -912,7 +883,7 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||
(Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {
//
// PK and KEK should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
// PK, KEK and db/dbx should set EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE attribute and should be a time-based
// authenticated variable.
//
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

View File

@ -1955,6 +1955,33 @@ IsHwErrRecVariable (
return TRUE;
}
/**
This code checks if variable should be treated as read-only variable.
@param[in] VariableName Name of the Variable.
@param[in] VendorGuid GUID of the Variable.
@retval TRUE This variable is read-only variable.
@retval FALSE This variable is NOT read-only variable.
**/
BOOLEAN
IsReadOnlyVariable (
IN CHAR16 *VariableName,
IN EFI_GUID *VendorGuid
)
{
if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid)) {
if ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT_NAME) == 0) ||
(StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME) == 0)) {
return TRUE;
}
}
return FALSE;
}
/**
This code finds variable in storage blocks (Volatile or Non-Volatile).
@ -2232,6 +2259,10 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
if (IsReadOnlyVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid)) {
return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;
}
if (DataSize != 0 && Data == NULL) {
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
}
@ -2349,7 +2380,10 @@ VariableServiceSetVariable (
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, &Variable, Attributes, FALSE);
} else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&
((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE) == 0) || (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0))) {
Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, &Variable, Attributes, FALSE);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
Status = ProcessVarWithKek (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, &Variable, Attributes);
}
} else {
Status = ProcessVariable (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, &Variable, Attributes);
}