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ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION 

For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.

Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dandan Bi 2019-09-04 15:41:19 +08:00 committed by Hao A Wu
parent 2184ededd3
commit c671c9106c
3 changed files with 29 additions and 2 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

9
ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
View File

@ -645,6 +645,15 @@ ProcessManFile(
DevPath = ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
Status = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, &CmdFileImgHandle);
if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
}
*HelpText = NULL;
goto Done;
}

11
ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
(C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@ -334,6 +334,15 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
&ImageHandle
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
}
ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, ImageIndex);
// PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
} else {

11
ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
(C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
@ -112,6 +112,15 @@ LoadDriver(
&LoadedDriverHandle);
if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
}
ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
} else {
//