MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer
the execution of the image.

Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Dandan Bi 2019-09-05 15:06:13 +08:00 committed by Hao A Wu
parent 51a3985cbb
commit f7fdd620e8
3 changed files with 33 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -1861,6 +1861,15 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
}
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
}
//
// Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
//

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
(C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@ -1411,7 +1411,17 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
);
FreePool (FileBuffer);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
}
} else {
Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/** @file
Misc library functions.
Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
(C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
@ -493,7 +493,17 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
0,
&ImageHandle
);
if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
//
// With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
// with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
// If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
// unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
//
if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
}
} else {
LoadCount++;
//
// Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for