REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp()
mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable()
VariableExLibUpdateVariable()
UpdateVariable()
CopyMem()
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1214
This patch only updates comment and function description, so has
no functionality impact.
This patch fixes comment typo 'end' to 'start' in GetStartPointer.
GetStartPointer for PEI and DXE has aligned function description,
but GetEndPointer does not.
This patch also aligns GetEndPointer's function description for
PEI and DXE.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Removing rules for Ipf sources file:
* Remove the source file which path with "ipf" and also listed in
[Sources.IPF] section of INF file.
* Remove the source file which listed in [Components.IPF] section
of DSC file and not listed in any other [Components] section.
* Remove the embedded Ipf code for MDE_CPU_IPF.
Removing rules for Inf file:
* Remove IPF from VALID_ARCHITECTURES comments.
* Remove DXE_SAL_DRIVER from LIBRARY_CLASS in [Defines] section.
* Remove the INF which only listed in [Components.IPF] section in DSC.
* Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags.
* Remove any IPF sepcific sections.
Removing rules for Dec file:
* Remove [Includes.IPF] section from Dec.
Removing rules for Dsc file:
* Remove IPF from SUPPORTED_ARCHITECTURES in [Defines] section of DSC.
* Remove any IPF specific sections.
* Remove statements from [BuildOptions] that provide IPF specific flags.
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Chen A Chen <chen.a.chen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Set the EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME attribute in FtwNotificationEvent() only if
the attribute is not already present. This will ensure that the attributes
set by the platform drivers (e.g Ovmf pflash) is not lost.
Cc: Dong Eric <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Justen Jordan L <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Zeng Star <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
It is caused by 09808bd39b.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
VariableHob may be built in PcdPeim (by PcdNvStoreDefaultValueBuffer)
or some platform module (by some tool).
The two solutions should not be co-exist.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
1. Do not use tab characters
2. No trailing white space in one line
3. All files must end with CRLF
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Commit 180ac200da changes the input parameter
from BOOLEAN to UINTN. Its comparison logic should be updated.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
If Fvb is a NULL, return EFI_UNSUPPORTED.
If the remaining size is not enough, return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: cinnamon shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Ansen Huang <ansen.huang@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Fix the issue that failed to update or add a UEFI variable if the remaining size is equal to the data size
of the variable.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: cinnamon shia <cinnamon.shia@hpe.com>
Signed-off-by: Ansen Huang <ansen.huang@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
The variable driver doesn't distinguish "non-volatile non-authenticated"
variables from "volatile non-authenticated" variables, when checking
individual variable sizes against the permitted maximum.
PcdMaxVariableSize covers both kinds.
This prevents volatile non-authenticated variables from carrying large
data between UEFI drivers, despite having no flash impact. One example is
EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE, which platforms might want to create as
volatile on every boot: the certificate list can be several hundred KB in
size.
Introduce PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize to represent the limit on individual
volatile non-authenticated variables. The default value is zero, which
makes Variable/RuntimeDxe fall back to PcdMaxVariableSize (i.e. the
current behavior). This is similar to the PcdMaxAuthVariableSize fallback.
Whenever the size limit is enforced, consult MaxVolatileVariableSize as
the last option, after checking
- MaxAuthVariableSize for VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_AT_AW,
- and MaxVariableSize for EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE.
EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD is always handled separately; it always
takes priority over the three cases listed above.
Introduce the GetMaxVariableSize() helper to consider
PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize, in addition to
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize(). GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize() is
currently called at three sites, and two of those need to start using
GetMaxVariableSize() instead:
- VariableServiceInitialize() [VariableSmm.c]: the SMM comms buffer must
accommodate all kinds of variables,
- VariableCommonInitialize() [Variable.c]: the preallocated scratch space
must also accommodate all kinds of variables,
- InitNonVolatileVariableStore() [Variable.c] can continue using
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize().
Don't modify the ReclaimForOS() function as it is specific to non-volatile
variables and should ignore PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: set MaxVolatileVariableSize where Star suggested]
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
VariableRuntimeDxe will have OnEndOfDxe() callback function at
TPL_NOTIFY level on EndOfDxe event when DXE variable solution is
used.
Status = gBS->CreateEventEx (
EVT_NOTIFY_SIGNAL,
TPL_NOTIFY,
OnEndOfDxe,
NULL,
&gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid,
&EndOfDxeEvent
);
VariableSmm will have SmmEndOfDxeCallback() callback function at
TPL_CALLBACK level on SmmEndOfDxe event when SMM variable solution
is used.
SmmIplGuidedEventNotify() - PiSmmIpl.c TPL_CALLBACK on EndOfDxe
->
SmmEndOfDxeHandler() - PiSmmCore.c install SmmEndOfDxe protocol
->
SmmEndOfDxeCallback() - VariableSmm.c
The TPL level for (Smm)EndOfDxe callback between VariableRuntimeDxe
and VariableSmm is inconsistent, it will make the unified platform
code could not make sure its TPL_NOTIFY EndOfDxe callback function
(to use variable lock/check) executed before (Smm)EndOfDxe callback
function in variable driver. The variable lock/check will start to
protect after (Smm)EndOfDxe callback function in variable driver is
executed.
This patch is to algin the TPL level to TPL_CALLBACK for (Smm)EndOfDxe
callback between VariableRuntimeDxe and VariableSmm.
Cc: Chasel Chiu <chasel.chiu@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chasel Chiu <chasel.chiu@intel.com>
PEI may report the normal format variable storage HOB for the default
EFI variable. VariableDxe needs to support it and set them into NV variable
region.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
In CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistencyInternal, one of the return paths leaves a loose
VA_COPY with no matching VA_END.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Zenith432 <zenith432@users.sourceforge.net>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Mark EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS as deprecated.
1. Make SetVariable/QueryVariableInfo return EFI_UNSUPPORTED with this
attribute
2. No change to GetVariable/GetNextVariableName
Also update several function descriptors accordingly
Cc: Long Qin <qin.long@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Long Qin <qin.long@intel.com>
VariableRuntimeDxe deletes and locks the MorLock variable in
MorLockInit(), with the argument that any protection provided by MorLock
can be circumvented if MorLock can be overwritten by unprivileged code
(i.e., outside of SMM).
Extend the argument and the logic to the MOR variable, which is supposed
to be protected by MorLock. Pass Attributes=0 when deleting MorLock and
MOR both.
This change was suggested by Star; it is inspired by earlier VariableSmm
commit fda8f631ed ("MdeModulePkg/Variable/RuntimeDxe: delete and lock
OS-created MOR variable", 2017-10-03).
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
According to the TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation Specification (May
15, 2008):
> 5 Interface for UEFI
> 5.1 UEFI Variable
> 5.1.1 The MemoryOverwriteRequestControl
>
> Start of informative comment:
>
> [...] The OS loader should not create the variable. Rather, the firmware
> is required to create it and must support the semantics described here.
>
> End of informative comment.
However, some OS kernels create the MOR variable even if the platform
firmware does not support it (see one Bugzilla reference below). This OS
issue breaks the logic added in the last patch.
Strengthen the MOR check by searching for the TCG or TCG2 protocols, as
edk2's implementation of MOR depends on (one of) those protocols.
The protocols are defined under MdePkg, thus there's no inter-package
dependency issue. In addition, calling UEFI services in
MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() is safe, due to the following order of events /
actions:
- platform BDS signals the EndOfDxe event group,
- the SMM core installs the SmmEndOfDxe protocol,
- MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() is invoked, and it calls UEFI services,
- some time later, platform BDS installs the DxeSmmReadyToLock protocol,
- SMM / SMRAM is locked down and UEFI services become unavailable to SMM
drivers.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1498159
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
The "MemoryOverwriteRequestControl" (a.k.a. MOR) variable comes from the
"TCG Platform Reset Attack Mitigation Specification":
https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/Platform-Reset-Attack-Mitigation-Specification.pdf
The "MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock" variable (a.k.a. MORL) is a
Microsoft extension, called "Secure MOR implementation":
https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/drivers/bringup/device-guard-requirements
Currently the VariableSmm driver creates MORL without regard to MOR. This
can lead to a situation where a platform does not support MOR from the
prerequisite spec (because it does not include the
"SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.inf" driver), but appears
to support MORL from the dependent Microsoft spec.
"winload.efi" notices this inconsistency, and disables the Device Guard
Virtualization Based Security in Windows Server 2016 and Windows 10 64-bit
Enterprise.
If the platform includes
"SecurityPkg/Tcg/MemoryOverwriteControl/TcgMor.inf", then MOR will exist
by the time EndOfDxe is reached, and VariableSmm can safely create MORL.
Otherwise, do not create MORL (delete it if it exists), and also prevent
other modules from creating it.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=727
Ref: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1496170
Reported-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
The SetMorLockVariable() function sets "mMorLockPassThru" to TRUE
temporarily, so that it can set the MOR Control Lock variable to
well-formed values without permission checks.
In the next patch, we'll need the same override for deleting the MOR
Control Lock variable; hence obey "mMorLockPassThru" in the deletion
branch of SetVariableCheckHandlerMorLock() as well.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Introduce the MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() hook, in order to allow
MorLockInit() to delay / queue operations until EndOfDxe. (Or, if the
platform never signals EndOfDxe, until ReadyToBoot.)
Call MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() whenever we set "mEndOfDxe" to TRUE:
- in VariableRuntimeDxe:
- in the OnReadyToBoot() function,
- in the OnEndOfDxe() function;
- in VariableSmm:
- on the SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_READY_TO_BOOT SMI request,
- in the SmmEndOfDxeCallback() function.
For now, implement MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() as a no-op in both
VariableRuntimeDxe and VariableSmm.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
The MorLockInit() and SetVariableCheckHandlerMor() functions have separate
implementations for VariableRuntimeDxe (= unprivileged, unified
DXE_RUNTIME driver) and VariableSmm (= privileged, DXE_SMM back-end of the
split variable driver).
Move their declarations from "Variable.c" to "PrivilegePolymorphic.h", so
that the compiler enforce that the declarations and the definitions match.
(All C source files with the call sites and the function definitions
already include "PrivilegePolymorphic.h" via "Variable.h".)
At the same time:
- replace two typos in the MorLockInit() description:
- replace "EFI_SUCEESS" with "EFI_SUCCESS",
- replace "MOR Lock Control" with "MOR Control Lock";
- in the SetVariableCheckHandlerMor() description:
- replace @param with @param[in],
- correct the description of the Attributes parameter (suggested by Star
Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>),
- rewrap the comment to 80 columns.
This change cleans up commit 2f6aa774fe ("MdeModulePkg: Add MorLock to
variable driver.", 2016-01-19).
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
If the platform supports SMM, a gRT->SetVariable() call at boot time
results in the following call tree to SecureBootHook():
RuntimeServiceSetVariable() [VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c, unprivileged]
SmmVariableHandler() [VariableSmm.c, PRIVILEGED]
VariableServiceSetVariable() [Variable.c, PRIVILEGED]
SecureBootHook() [VariableSmm.c, PRIVILEGED]
//
// do nothing
//
SecureBootHook() [Measurement.c, unprivileged]
//
// measure variable if it
// is related to SB policy
//
And if the platform does not support SMM:
VariableServiceSetVariable() [Variable.c, unprivileged]
SecureBootHook() [Measurement.c, unprivileged]
//
// measure variable if it
// is related to SB policy
//
In other words, the measurement always happens outside of SMM.
Because there are two implementations of the SecureBootHook() API, one
that is called from SMM and does nothing, and another that is called
outside of SMM and measures variables, the function declaration should be
in a header file. This way the compiler can enforce that the function
declaration and all function definitions match.
"Variable.h" is used for "including common header files, defining internal
structures and functions used by Variable modules". Technically, we could
declare SecureBootHook() in "Variable.h". However, "Measurement.c" and
"VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c" themselves do not include "Variable.h", and that
is likely intentional -- "Variable.h" exposes so much of the privileged
variable implementation that it is likely excluded from these C source
files on purpose.
Therefore introduce a new header file called "PrivilegePolymorphic.h".
"Variable.h" includes this header (so that all C source files that have
been allowed to see the variable internals learn about the new
SecureBootHook() declaration immediately). In "Measurement.c" and
"VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c", include *only* the new header.
This change cleans up commit fa0737a839 ("MdeModulePkg Variable: Merge
from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg", 2015-07-01).
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
"The size must be large enough to fit input string supplied in
VariableName buffer" is added in the description for VariableNameSize.
And two cases of EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER are added.
1. The input values of VariableName and VendorGuid are not a name and
GUID of an existing variable.
2. Null-terminator is not found in the first VariableNameSize bytes of
the input VariableName buffer.
This patch is to update code to follow them.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
PI 1.5 spec has minor update to the Data parameter for PEI
GetVariable(), and no real functional behavior change.
The modifier of Data parameter:
OUT VOID *Data
->
OUT VOID *Data OPTIONAL
The comments of Data parameter:
Data Points to the buffer which will hold the returned variable value.
->
Data Points to the buffer which will hold the returned variable value.
May be NULL with a zero DataSize in order to determine the size of the buffer needed.
The patch is to follow the spec to update the implementation.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
There are cases that the operands of an expression are all with rank less
than UINT64/INT64 and the result of the expression is explicitly cast to
UINT64/INT64 to fit the target size.
An example will be:
UINT32 a,b;
// a and b can be any unsigned int type with rank less than UINT64, like
// UINT8, UINT16, etc.
UINT64 c;
c = (UINT64) (a + b);
Some static code checkers may warn that the expression result might
overflow within the rank of "int" (integer promotions) and the result is
then cast to a bigger size.
The commit refines codes by the following rules:
1). When the expression is possible to overflow the range of unsigned int/
int:
c = (UINT64)a + b;
2). When the expression will not overflow within the rank of "int", remove
the explicit type casts:
c = a + b;
3). When the expression will be cast to pointer of possible greater size:
UINT32 a,b;
VOID *c;
c = (VOID *)(UINTN)(a + b); --> c = (VOID *)((UINTN)a + b);
4). When one side of a comparison expression contains only operands with
rank less than UINT32:
UINT8 a;
UINT16 b;
UINTN c;
if ((UINTN)(a + b) > c) {...} --> if (((UINT32)a + b) > c) {...}
For rule 4), if we remove the 'UINTN' type cast like:
if (a + b > c) {...}
The VS compiler will complain with warning C4018 (signed/unsigned
mismatch, level 3 warning) due to promoting 'a + b' to type 'int'.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
For pointer subtraction, the result is of type "ptrdiff_t". According to
the C11 standard (Committee Draft - April 12, 2011):
"When two pointers are subtracted, both shall point to elements of the
same array object, or one past the last element of the array object; the
result is the difference of the subscripts of the two array elements. The
size of the result is implementation-defined, and its type (a signed
integer type) is ptrdiff_t defined in the <stddef.h> header. If the result
is not representable in an object of that type, the behavior is
undefined."
In our codes, there are cases that the pointer subtraction is not
performed by pointers to elements of the same array object. This might
lead to potential issues, since the behavior is undefined according to C11
standard.
Also, since the size of type "ptrdiff_t" is implementation-defined. Some
static code checkers may warn that the pointer subtraction might underflow
first and then being cast to a bigger size. For example:
UINT8 *Ptr1, *Ptr2;
UINTN PtrDiff;
...
PtrDiff = (UINTN) (Ptr1 - Ptr2);
The commit will refine the pointer subtraction expressions by casting each
pointer to UINTN first and then perform the subtraction:
PtrDiff = (UINTN) Ptr1 - (UINTN) Ptr2;
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Measure DBT into PCR[7] when it is updated between initial measure
if present and not empty. by following TCG PC Client PFP 00.49
Previous patch for PCR[7] DBT part is overrode.
dc9bd6ed28
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Use UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA data structure according to TCG PC-Client PFP Spec
00.21.
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v21.pdf
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Measure DBT into PCR[7] when it is updated between initial measure and
ExitBootService. Measure "SecureBoot" change after PK update.
Spec version : TCG PC Client PFP 00.37. http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v21.pdf
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=290
Current SmmVariableGetStatistics() in VariableSmm.c is always
checking input InfoSize against the first variable info,
it is incorrect.
For instance, there are three variables.
BootOrder
Boot0000
Boot0001
If the input InfoEntry is holding the second variable info (Boot0000)
and InfoSize is sizeof (VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY) + StrSize (L"Boot0000"),
current code will return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, but it should return
the third variable info (Boot0001).
This patch is to refine the code logic.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Current code in SmmVariableHandler() checks CommBufferSize
buffer to make sure it points to outside SMRAM in
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_STATISTICS".
But after eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer points to SMRAM that was used by
SMM core to cache CommSize from SmmCommunication protocol,
then the check will fail definitely and GET_STATISTICS
feature breaks.
In fact, do not need check CommBufferSize buffer at all
even before eaae7b33b1.
Before eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer pointed to gSmmCorePrivate->BufferSize
that is outside SMRAM, the check will success definitely;
after eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer points to local variable BufferSize
(in SMRAM) in SmmEntryPoint(), the check is not needed
definitely.
The patch is to remove the check.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Instead of comparing a GUID with gZeroGuid via the CompareGuid API, the
commit uses the IsZeroGuid API to check if the given GUID is a zero GUID.
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Feng Tian <feng.tian@Intel.com>
Current GetVariable implementation will return the first variable for
empty str VariableName, it is because GetVariable and GetNextVariablename
are sharing same function FindVariable.
But UEFI sepc defines SetVariable that If VariableName is an empty string,
then EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER is returned, that means an empty string variable
could never be set successfully, so GetVariable should return error for
empty string VariableName.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
UEFI 2.6 spec has minor update to the Data parameter for GetVariable(),
and no real functional behavior change.
The modifier of Data parameter:
OUT VOID *Data
->
OUT VOID *Data OPTIONAL
The comments of Data parameter:
Data The buffer to return the contents of the variable.
->
Data The buffer to return the contents of the variable. May be NULL
with a zero DataSize in order to determine the size buffer needed.
The patch is to follow the spec to update the implementation.
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19771 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Per secure MOR implementation document, it is not proper to add MOR lock in non-SMM version, because DXE version can not provide protection.
This patch add standalone TcgMorLockDxe implementation.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: "Zhang, Chao B" <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: "Zeng, Star" <star.zeng@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19689 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Microsoft published secure MOR implementation at https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/hardware/mt270973(v=vs.85).aspx
with revision 2 update. See URL for tech detail.
Previous revision 1 is handled in SecurityPkg\Tcg\ MemoryOverwriteRequestControlLock.
But the VarCheck API can not satisfy revision 2 requirement.
So we decide include MOR lock control into variable driver directly.
This patch add standalone TcgMorLockSmm implementation.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: "Yao, Jiewen" <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: "Zhang, Chao B" <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: "Zeng, Star" <star.zeng@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19688 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Hao Wu
Star Zeng
Chen A Chen
Zhang, Chao B
Brijesh Singh
Liming Gao
cinnamon shia
Laszlo Ersek
Zenith432
Gary Lin
Yao, Jiewen