REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3479
Updates VariableRuntimeDxe, VariableSmm, and VariableStandaloneMm
to acquire variable flash information from the Variable Flash
Information library.
Note: This introduces a dependency on VariableFlashInfoLib in these
modules. Therefore, a platform building the variable modules must
specify an instance of VariableFlashInfoLib in their platform build.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Reviewed-by: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2522
Now that everything should be moved to
VariablePolicy, drop support for the
deprecated VarLock SMI interface and
associated functions from variable RuntimeDxe.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2522
These were previously using VarLock, which is
being deprecated.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2522
VariablePolicy is an updated interface to
replace VarLock and VarCheckProtocol.
Add connective code to publish the VariablePolicy protocol
and wire it to either the SMM communication interface
or directly into the VariablePolicyLib business logic.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2220
This change reduces SMIs for GetVariable () by maintaining a
UEFI variable cache in Runtime DXE in addition to the pre-
existing cache in SMRAM. When the Runtime Service GetVariable()
is invoked, a Runtime DXE cache is used instead of triggering an
SMI to VariableSmm. This can improve overall system performance
by servicing variable read requests without rendezvousing all
cores into SMM.
The runtime cache can be disabled with by setting the FeaturePCD
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEnableVariableRuntimeCache
to FALSE. If the PCD is set to FALSE, the runtime cache will not be
used and an SMI will be triggered for Runtime Service
GetVariable () and GetNextVariableName () invocations.
The following are important points regarding the behavior of the
variable drivers when the variable runtime cache is enabled.
1. All of the non-volatile storage contents are loaded into the
cache upon driver load. This one time load operation from storage
is preferred as opposed to building the cache on demand. An on-
demand cache would require a fallback SMI to load data into the
cache as variables are requested.
2. SetVariable () requests will continue to always trigger an SMI.
This occurs regardless of whether the variable is volatile or
non-volatile.
3. Both volatile and non-volatile variables are cached in a runtime
buffer. As is the case in the current EDK II variable driver, they
continue to be cached in separate buffers.
4. The cache in Runtime DXE and SMM are intended to be exact copies
of one another. All SMM variable accesses only return data from the
SMM cache. The runtime caches are only updated after the variable I/O
operation is successful in SMM. The runtime caches are only updated
from SMM.
5. Synchronization mechanisms are in place to ensure the runtime cache
content integrity with the SMM cache. These may result in updates to
runtime cache that are the same in content but different in offset and
size from updates to the SMM cache.
When using SMM variables with runtime cache enabled, two caches will now
be present.
1. "Runtime Cache" - Maintained in VariableSmmRuntimeDxe. Used to service
Runtime Services GetVariable () and GetNextVariableName () callers.
2. "SMM Cache" - Maintained in VariableSmm to service SMM GetVariable ()
and GetNextVariableName () callers.
a. This cache is retained so SMM modules do not operate on data outside
SMRAM.
Because a race condition can occur if an SMI occurs during the execution
of runtime code reading from the runtime cache, a runtime cache read lock
is introduced that explicitly moves pending updates from SMM to the runtime
cache if an SMM update occurs while the runtime cache is locked. Note that
it is not expected a Runtime services call will interrupt SMM processing
since all CPU cores rendezvous in SMM.
It is possible to view UEFI variable read and write statistics by setting
the gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVariableCollectStatistics FeaturePcd
to TRUE and using the VariableInfo UEFI application in MdeModulePkg to dump
variable statistics to the console. By doing so, a user can view the number
of GetVariable () hits from the Runtime DXE variable driver (Runtime Cache
hits) and the SMM variable driver (SMM Cache hits). SMM Cache hits for
GetVariable () will occur when SMM modules invoke GetVariable ().
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
This change adds a dedicated file for variable operations specific
to non-volatile variables. This decreases the overall length of the
relatively large Variable.c file.
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
This change moves the following functions into a dedicated file
so they may be used in other variable files as needed. These are
commonly needed for basic variable data structure parsing
operations. The functions are grouped together in VariableParsing.c
to support cohesiveness for these operations in the file.
Furthermore, it reduces the overall size of the common Variable.c
file.
* DataSizeOfVariable ()
* FindVariableEx ()
* GetEndPointer ()
* GetNextVariablePtr ()
* GetStartPointer ()
* GetVariableDataOffset ()
* GetVariableDataPtr ()
* GetVariableHeaderSize ()
* GetVariableNamePtr ()
* GetVariableStoreStatus ()
* GetVendorGuidPtr ()
* IsValidVariableHeader ()
* NameSizeOfVariable ()
* SetDataSizeOfVariable ()
* SetNameSizeOfVariable ()
* UpdateVariableInfo ()
* VariableCompareTimeStampInternal ()
* VariableServiceGetNextVariableInternal ()
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1323
Merge EmuVariable and Real variable driver.
Add emulated variable NV mode support in real variable driver.
Platform can configure PcdEmuVariableNvModeEnable statically
(build time) or dynamically (boot time) to support emulated
variable NV mode.
If PcdEmuVariableNvModeEnable is configured to dynamic, its
value should be set before Variable driver starts to work,
otherwise default value will take effect.
Then EmuVariableRuntimeDxe could be removed, the removal of
EmuVariableRuntimeDxe will be done after platforms are migrated
to use the merged variable driver.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1417
Since BaseLib API AsmLfence() is a x86 arch specific API and should be
avoided using in generic codes, this commit replaces the usage of
AsmLfence() with arch-generic API SpeculationBarrier().
Please note that speculation execution barriers are intended to be
asserted for SMM codes, hence, this commit still preserve an empty
implementation of the speculation execution barrier for the DXE codes.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp()
mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable()
VariableExLibUpdateVariable()
UpdateVariable()
CopyMem()
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The variable driver doesn't distinguish "non-volatile non-authenticated"
variables from "volatile non-authenticated" variables, when checking
individual variable sizes against the permitted maximum.
PcdMaxVariableSize covers both kinds.
This prevents volatile non-authenticated variables from carrying large
data between UEFI drivers, despite having no flash impact. One example is
EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE, which platforms might want to create as
volatile on every boot: the certificate list can be several hundred KB in
size.
Introduce PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize to represent the limit on individual
volatile non-authenticated variables. The default value is zero, which
makes Variable/RuntimeDxe fall back to PcdMaxVariableSize (i.e. the
current behavior). This is similar to the PcdMaxAuthVariableSize fallback.
Whenever the size limit is enforced, consult MaxVolatileVariableSize as
the last option, after checking
- MaxAuthVariableSize for VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_AT_AW,
- and MaxVariableSize for EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE.
EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD is always handled separately; it always
takes priority over the three cases listed above.
Introduce the GetMaxVariableSize() helper to consider
PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize, in addition to
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize(). GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize() is
currently called at three sites, and two of those need to start using
GetMaxVariableSize() instead:
- VariableServiceInitialize() [VariableSmm.c]: the SMM comms buffer must
accommodate all kinds of variables,
- VariableCommonInitialize() [Variable.c]: the preallocated scratch space
must also accommodate all kinds of variables,
- InitNonVolatileVariableStore() [Variable.c] can continue using
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize().
Don't modify the ReclaimForOS() function as it is specific to non-volatile
variables and should ignore PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: set MaxVolatileVariableSize where Star suggested]
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
If the platform supports SMM, a gRT->SetVariable() call at boot time
results in the following call tree to SecureBootHook():
RuntimeServiceSetVariable() [VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c, unprivileged]
SmmVariableHandler() [VariableSmm.c, PRIVILEGED]
VariableServiceSetVariable() [Variable.c, PRIVILEGED]
SecureBootHook() [VariableSmm.c, PRIVILEGED]
//
// do nothing
//
SecureBootHook() [Measurement.c, unprivileged]
//
// measure variable if it
// is related to SB policy
//
And if the platform does not support SMM:
VariableServiceSetVariable() [Variable.c, unprivileged]
SecureBootHook() [Measurement.c, unprivileged]
//
// measure variable if it
// is related to SB policy
//
In other words, the measurement always happens outside of SMM.
Because there are two implementations of the SecureBootHook() API, one
that is called from SMM and does nothing, and another that is called
outside of SMM and measures variables, the function declaration should be
in a header file. This way the compiler can enforce that the function
declaration and all function definitions match.
"Variable.h" is used for "including common header files, defining internal
structures and functions used by Variable modules". Technically, we could
declare SecureBootHook() in "Variable.h". However, "Measurement.c" and
"VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c" themselves do not include "Variable.h", and that
is likely intentional -- "Variable.h" exposes so much of the privileged
variable implementation that it is likely excluded from these C source
files on purpose.
Therefore introduce a new header file called "PrivilegePolymorphic.h".
"Variable.h" includes this header (so that all C source files that have
been allowed to see the variable internals learn about the new
SecureBootHook() declaration immediately). In "Measurement.c" and
"VariableSmmRuntimeDxe.c", include *only* the new header.
This change cleans up commit fa0737a839 ("MdeModulePkg Variable: Merge
from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg", 2015-07-01).
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Measure DBT into PCR[7] when it is updated between initial measure and
ExitBootService. Measure "SecureBoot" change after PK update.
Spec version : TCG PC Client PFP 00.37. http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/PC-ClientSpecific_Platform_Profile_for_TPM_2p0_Systems_v21.pdf
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Yao Jiewen <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Otherwise there will be build failure if without VarCheckUefiLib linked.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18612 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Since the variable check service has be separated to VarCheckLib
from Variable driver, so update Variable driver to consume the
separated VarCheckLib.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18286 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
What to do:
1. Merge from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg to Variable drive in
MdeModulePkg. Then the merged Variable driver in MdeModulePkg will
link to AuthVariableLib and TpmMeasurementLib.
AuthVariableLibNull and TpmMeasurementLibNull in MdeModulePkg
could be used for non auth variable support.
AuthVariableLib and DxeTpmMeasurementLib in SecurityPkg
may be used for auth variable support.
Why to do:
1. Remove code duplication and reduce maintenance effort.
After auth variable service separated from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg
to AuthVariableLib. The remaining code logic of Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg
will be almost same with Variable driver in MdeModulePkg. Now it is to
merge them.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17765 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
for trying to reclaim variable space at EndOfDxe.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16687 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
and follow UEFI spec to check UEFI defined variables.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16579 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
1. Usage information in INF file comment blocks are either incomplete or incorrect.
This includes usage information for Protocols/PPIs/GUIDs/PCDs/HOBs/Events/BootModes.
The syntax for usage information in comment blocks is defined in the EDK II Module Information (INF) Specification
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Zeng, Star <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gao, Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@15962 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
PEI variable implementation checks only the variable header signature for validity. This does not seem robust if system crash occurred during previous Reclaim() operation. If the crash occurred while FTW was rewriting the variable FV, the signature could be valid even though the rest of the FV isn't valid.
Solution: Add a FaultTolerantWritePei driver to check and provide the FTW last write status, then PEI variable and early phase(before FTW protocol ready) of DXE variable can check the status and determine if all or partial variable data has been backed up in spare block, and then use the backed up data.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@14454 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Add code in BdsDxe driver to call the protocol to mark the read-only variables defined in the UEFI Spec.
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14372 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
The Variable PEI and RuntimeDxe drivers were using the attribute 'HeaderLength' of
EFI_FIRMWARE_VOLUME_HEADER without checking if a Firmware Volume Header was existing at
the base address.
In case the Firmware Volume Header does not exist or is corrupted, the attribute 'HeaderLength'
is a non valid value that can lead to a non valid physical address when accessing produces an
access error.
Signed-off-by: oliviermartin
Reviewed-by: niruiyu
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@12836 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2. Boot time variable reclaim issue is caused by incorrect flash layout. Platform integrator should ensure that the size of variable region must less than FTW spare space size.
3. Per UEFI Specification, variables of attribute HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD are guaranteed to have its own storage space size.original implementation doesn’t meet this requirement
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@8029 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2. modify the method of getting right FVB protocol interface. move the notification event of FVB installation into variable driver. and also move ExitBootService event into variable driver.
3. use EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS flag to distinct whether the FVB protocol supports writing operation or not.Currently, DxeCore installs FVB which has ~EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS(that is, disable write) attrbiute. FvbRuntimeDxe driver should provide a full FVB protocol, which returns EFI_FVB2_WRITE_STATUS attribute to signify itself provide writable FVB protocol. So other modules which need write data by FVB protocol can locate it correctly.
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@7835 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2. move VariableFormat.h into GUID directory and change the “Signature” field of the VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER to gEfiVariableGuid value.
3. merging VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY structure into the new Include/Guid/VariableFormat.h
4. change gEfiVariableInfoGuid into gEfiVariableGuid.
5. modify FDF files to use new guid value instead of the original signature.
6. all code related to signature is changed to use guid value.
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@7728 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Michael Kubacki
Bret Barkelew
Michael Kubacki
Michael D Kinney
Star Zeng
Hao Wu
Laszlo Ersek
Zhang, Chao B
Liming Gao
Yao, Jiewen
niruiyu
lzeng14
oliviermartin
gdong1
andrewfish
hhtian
lgao4
eric_tian
jji4
mdkinney
xli24
gikidy
klu2
vanjeff
gtian