The SMM based FTW and variable drivers are going to depend on
MmServicesTableLib after a subsequent patch, so add a resolution
for it to various OvmfPkg .dsc files.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1405
The codes have been updated to not use PcdPeiCoreMaxFvSupported,
PcdPeiCoreMaxPeimPerFv and PcdPeiCoreMaxPpiSupported, so their
statement in platform DSC could be removed.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1355
XCODE doesn't support HII resource section. TftpDynamicCommand driver depends
on HII resource section. To let OvmfPkg boot to shell on XCODE5 tool chain,
don't include TftpDynamicCommand driver.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Remove EdkShellBinPkg in OvmfPkgIa32.fdf,
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgIa32X64.fdf amd OvmfPkg/OvmfPkgX64.fdf.
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1108
v2: Remove USE_OLD_SHELL in DSC and FDF because it will be
unnecessary to use it.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Shenglei Zhang <shenglei.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
V2:
Add missed library instance for NetworkPkg iSCSI driver.
This patch replaces the MdeModulePkg TCP, PXE and iSCSI driver with those
ones in NetworkPkg. These 3 drivers in MdeModulePkg are not being actively
maintained and will be removed from edk2 master soon.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Sha384 and Sha512 were added to HashInstanceLib recently. To make them
available in Tcg2Pei and Tcg2Dxe, we have to link both libraries.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Build-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
ResourcePublicationLib class name is ResourcePublicationLib.
INF and DSC files are updated to use the correct one.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dongao Guo <dongao.guo@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: insert empty line between commit msg body and tags]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Resolve the PciCapLib, PciCapPciSegmentLib, and PciCapPciIoLib classes to
their single respective instances. Later patches will use these lib
classes in OvmfPkg drivers.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cloned "SecurityPkg/Library/DxeTcg2PhysicalPresenceLib" and:
- removed all the functions that are unreachable from
Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest() [called from platform BDS],
or SubmitRequestToPreOSFunction() and
ReturnOperationResponseToOsFunction() [called from Tcg2Dxe].
- replaced everything that's related to the
TCG2_PHYSICAL_PRESENCE*_VARIABLE variables, with direct access to
the QEMU structures.
This commit is based on initial experimental work from Stefan Berger.
In particular, he wrote most of QEMU PPI support, and designed the
qemu/firmware interaction. Initially, Stefan tried to reuse the
existing SecurityPkg code, but we eventually decided to get rid of the
variables and simplify the ovmf/qemu version.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: clean up non-idiomatic coding style]
[lersek@redhat.com: null mPpi on invalid PPI address]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This NULL library will let us call
Tcg2PhysicalPresenceLibProcessRequest() unconditionally from
BdsPlatform when building without TPM2_ENABLE.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: replace MdeModulePkg.dec w/ MdePkg.dec]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
BLOCK_MMIO_PROTOCOL and BlockMmioToBlockIoDxe were introduced to OvmfPkg
in March 2010, in adjacent commits b0f5144676 and efd82c5794. In the
past eight years, no driver or application seems to have materialized that
produced BLOCK_MMIO_PROTOCOL instances. Meanwhile the UEFI spec has
developed the EFI_RAM_DISK_PROTOCOL, which edk2 implements (and OVMF
includes) as RamDiskDxe.
Rather than fixing issues in the unused BlockMmioToBlockIoDxe driver,
remove the driver, together with the BLOCK_MMIO_PROTOCOL definition that
now becomes unused too.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=926
Reported-by: Steven Shi <steven.shi@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Introduce TlsAuthConfigLib to read the list of trusted CA certificates
from fw_cfg and to store it to EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE.
The fw_cfg file is formatted by the "p11-kit" and "update-ca-trust"
utilities on the host side, so that the host settings take effect in guest
HTTPS boot as well. QEMU forwards the file intact to the firmware. The
contents are sanity-checked by NetworkPkg/HttpDxe code that was added in
commit 0fd13678a6.
Link TlsAuthConfigLib via NULL resolution into TlsAuthConfigDxe. This sets
EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE in time for both
NetworkPkg/TlsAuthConfigDxe (for possible HII interaction with the user)
and for NetworkPkg/HttpDxe (for the effective TLS configuration).
The file formatted by "p11-kit" can be large. On a RHEL-7 host, the the
Mozilla CA root certificate bundle -- installed with the "ca-certificates"
package -- is processed into a 182KB file. Thus, create
EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE as a volatile & boot-time only variable.
Also, in TLS_ENABLE builds, set the cumulative limit for volatile
variables (PcdVariableStoreSize) to 512KB, and the individual limit for
the same (PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize) to 256KB.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
As a continuation of the last patch, clarify in the DSC files that we set
PcdVariableStoreSize to the same value as PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize
just for convenience; the equality is not a technical requirement.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
The library registers a security management handler, to measure images
that are not measure in PEI phase. For example with the qemu PXE rom:
Loading driver at 0x0003E6C2000 EntryPoint=0x0003E6C9076 8086100e.efi
And the following binary_bios_measurements log entry seems to be
added:
PCR: 2 type: EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER size: 0x4e digest: 70a22475e9f18806d2ed9193b48d80d26779d9a4
The following order of operations ensures that 3rd party UEFI modules,
such as PCI option ROMs and other modules possibly loaded from outside
of firmware volumes, are measured into the TPM:
(1) Tcg2Dxe is included in DXEFV, therefore it produces the TCG2
protocol sometime in the DXE phase (assuming a TPM2 chip is present,
reported via PcdTpmInstanceGuid).
(2) The DXE core finds that no more drivers are left to dispatch from
DXEFV, and we enter the BDS phase.
(3) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib connects all PCI root bridges
non-recursively, producing PciIo instances and discovering PCI
oproms.
(4) The dispatching of images that don't originate from FVs is deferred
at this point, by
"MdeModulePkg/Universal/SecurityStubDxe/Defer3rdPartyImageLoad.c".
(5) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib signals EndOfDxe.
(6) OVMF's PlatformBootManagerLib calls
EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages() -- the images deferred in
step (4) are now dispatched.
(7) Image dispatch invokes the Security / Security2 Arch protocols
(produced by SecurityStubDxe). In this patch, we hook
DxeTpm2MeasureBootLib into SecurityStubDxe, therefore image dispatch
will try to locate the TCG2 protocol, and measure the image into the
TPM2 chip with the protocol. Because of step (1), the TCG2 protocol
will always be found and used (assuming a TPM2 chip is present).
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This module measures and log the boot environment. It also produces
the Tcg2 protocol, which allows for example to read the log from OS.
The linux kernel doesn't yet read the EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_2,
which is required for crypto-agile log. In fact, only upcoming 4.16
adds support EFI_TCG2_EVENT_LOG_FORMAT_TCG_1_2:
[ 0.000000] efi: EFI v2.70 by EDK II
[ 0.000000] efi: SMBIOS=0x3fa1f000 ACPI=0x3fbb6000 ACPI 2.0=0x3fbb6014 MEMATTR=0x3e7d4318 TPMEventLog=0x3db21018
$ python chipsec_util.py tpm parse_log binary_bios_measurements
[CHIPSEC] Version 1.3.5.dev2
[CHIPSEC] API mode: using OS native API (not using CHIPSEC kernel module)
[CHIPSEC] Executing command 'tpm' with args ['parse_log', '/tmp/binary_bios_measurements']
PCR: 0 type: EV_S_CRTM_VERSION size: 0x2 digest: 1489f923c4dca729178b3e3233458550d8dddf29
+ version:
PCR: 0 type: EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB size: 0x10 digest: fd39ced7c0d2a61f6830c78c7625f94826b05bcc
+ base: 0x820000 length: 0xe0000
PCR: 0 type: EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB size: 0x10 digest: 39ebc6783b72bc1e73c7d5bcfeb5f54a3f105d4c
+ base: 0x900000 length: 0xa00000
PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x35 digest: 57cd4dc19442475aa82743484f3b1caa88e142b8
PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x24 digest: 9b1387306ebb7ff8e795e7be77563666bbf4516e
PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x26 digest: 9afa86c507419b8570c62167cb9486d9fc809758
PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x24 digest: 5bf8faa078d40ffbd03317c93398b01229a0e1e0
PCR: 7 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG size: 0x26 digest: 734424c9fe8fc71716c42096f4b74c88733b175e
PCR: 7 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x3e digest: 252f8ebb85340290b64f4b06a001742be8e5cab6
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x6e digest: 22a4f6ee9af6dba01d3528deb64b74b582fc182b
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x80 digest: b7811d5bf30a7efd4e385c6179fe10d9290bb9e8
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x84 digest: 425e502c24fc924e231e0a62327b6b7d1f704573
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x9a digest: 0b5d2c98ac5de6148a4a1490ff9d5df69039f04e
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0xbd digest: 20bd5f402271d57a88ea314fe35c1705956b1f74
PCR: 1 type: EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT size: 0x88 digest: df5d6605cb8f4366d745a8464cfb26c1efdc305c
PCR: 4 type: EV_EFI_ACTION size: 0x28 digest: cd0fdb4531a6ec41be2753ba042637d6e5f7f256
PCR: 0 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 1 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 2 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 3 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 4 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
PCR: 5 type: EV_SEPARATOR size: 0x4 digest: 9069ca78e7450a285173431b3e52c5c25299e473
$ tpm2_pcrlist
sha1 :
0 : 35bd1786b6909daad610d7598b1d620352d33b8a
1 : ec0511e860206e0af13c31da2f9e943fb6ca353d
2 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
3 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
4 : 45a323382bd933f08e7f0e256bc8249e4095b1ec
5 : d16d7e629fd8d08ca256f9ad3a3a1587c9e6cc1b
6 : b2a83b0ebf2f8374299a5b2bdfc31ea955ad7236
7 : 518bd167271fbb64589c61e43d8c0165861431d8
8 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
9 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
10 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
11 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
12 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
13 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
14 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
15 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
16 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
17 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
18 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
19 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
20 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
21 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
22 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
23 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
sha256 :
0 : 9ae903dbae3357ac00d223660bac19ea5c021499a56201104332ab966631ce2c
1 : acc611d90245cf04e77b0ca94901f90e7fa54770f0426f53c3049b532243d1b8
2 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969
3 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969
4 : 7a94ffe8a7729a566d3d3c577fcb4b6b1e671f31540375f80eae6382ab785e35
5 : a5ceb755d043f32431d63e39f5161464620a3437280494b5850dc1b47cc074e0
6 : 3d458cfe55cc03ea1f443f1562beec8df51c75e14a9fcf9a7234a13f198e7969
7 : 65caf8dd1e0ea7a6347b635d2b379c93b9a1351edc2afc3ecda700e534eb3068
8 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
9 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
10 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
11 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
12 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
13 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
14 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
15 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
16 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
17 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
18 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
19 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
20 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
21 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
22 : ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
23 : 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
sha384 :
The PhysicalPresenceLib is required, it sets some variables, but the
firmware doesn't act on it yet.
Laszlo Ersek explained on the list why Tpm2DeviceLib has to be
resolved differently for DXE_DRIVER modules in general and for
"Tcg2Dxe.inf" specifically:
* We have a library class called Tpm2DeviceLib -- this is basically the
set of APIs declared in "SecurityPkg/Include/Library/Tpm2DeviceLib.h".
Its leading comment says "This library abstract how to access TPM2
hardware device".
There are two *sets* of APIs in "Tpm2DeviceLib.h":
(a) functions that deal with the TPM2 device:
- Tpm2RequestUseTpm(),
- Tpm2SubmitCommand()
This set of APIs is supposed to be used by clients that *consume*
the TPM2 device abstraction.
(b) the function Tpm2RegisterTpm2DeviceLib(), which is supposed to be
used by *providers* of various TPM2 device abstractions.
* Then, we have two implementations (instances) of the Tpm2DeviceLib class:
(1) SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2/Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.inf
(2) SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibRouter/Tpm2DeviceLibRouterDxe.inf
(1) The first library instance ("Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2.inf") implements the
APIs listed under (a), and it does not implement (b) -- see
EFI_UNSUPPORTED. In other words, this lib instance is strictly meant for
drivers that *consume* the TPM2 device abstraction. And, the (a) group
of APIs is implemented by forwarding the requests to the TCG2 protocol.
The idea here is that all the drivers that consume the TPM2 abstraction
do not have to be statically linked with a large TPM2 device library
instance; instead they are only linked (statically) with this "thin"
library instance, and all the actual work is delegated to whichever
driver that provides the singleton TCG2 protocol.
(2) The second library instance ("Tpm2DeviceLibRouterDxe.inf") is meant
for the driver that offers (produces) the TCG2 protocol. This lib
instance implements both (a) and (b) API groups.
* Here's how things fit together:
(i) The "SecurityPkg/Library/Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm/Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm.inf"
library instance (which has no lib class) is linked into "Tcg2Dxe.inf"
via NULL class resolution. This simply means that before the
"Tcg2Dxe.inf" entry point function is entered, the constructor function
of "Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm.inf" will be called.
(ii) This Tpm2InstanceLibDTpmConstructor() function calls API (b), and
registers its own actual TPM2 command implementation with the
"Tpm2DeviceLibRouter" library instance (also linked into the Tcg2Dxe
driver). This provides the back-end for the API set (a).
TCG2 protocol provider (Tcg2Dxe.inf driver) launches
|
v
NULL class: Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm instance construction
|
v
Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibRouter instance
backend registration for API set (a)
(iii) The Tcg2Dxe driver exposes the TCG2 protocol.
(iv) A TPM2 consumer calls API set (a) via lib instance (1). Such calls
land in Tcg2Dxe, via the protocol.
(v) Tcg2Dxe serves the protocol request by forwarding it to API set (a)
from lib instance (2).
(vi) Those functions call the "backend" functions registered by
Tpm2DeviceLibDTpm in step (ii).
TPM 2 consumer driver
|
v
Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibTcg2 instance
|
v
TCG2 protocol interface
|
v
TCG2 protocol provider: Tcg2Dxe.inf driver
|
v
Tpm2DeviceLib class: Tpm2DeviceLibRouter instance
|
v
NULL class: Tpm2InstanceLibDTpm instance
(via earlier registration)
|
v
TPM2 chip (actual hardware)
* So that is the "router" pattern in edk2. Namely,
- Consumers of an abstraction use a thin library instance.
- The thin library instance calls a firmware-global (singleton) service,
i.e. a PPI (in the PEI phase) or protocol (in the DXE phase).
- The PEIM providing the PPI, or the DXE driver providing the protocol,
don't themselves implement the actual service either. Instead they
offer a "registration" service too, and they only connect the incoming
"consumer" calls to the earlier registered back-end(s).
- The "registration service", for back-ends to use, may take various
forms.
It can be exposed globally to the rest of the firmware, as
another member function of the PPI / protocol structure. Then backends
can be provided by separate PEIMs / DXE drivers.
Or else, the registration service can be exposed as just another
library API. In this case, the backends are provided as NULL class
library instances, and a platform DSC file links them into the PEIM /
DXE driver via NULL class resolutions. The backend lib instances call
the registration service in their own respective constructor
functions.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This module will initialize TPM device, measure reported FVs and BIOS
version. We keep both SHA-1 and SHA-256 for the TCG 1.2 log format
compatibility, but the SHA-256 measurements and TCG 2 log format are
now recommended.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The Tcg2ConfigPei module informs the firmware globally about the TPM
device type, by setting the PcdTpmInstanceGuid PCD to the appropriate
GUID value. The original module under SecurityPkg can perform device
detection, or read a cached value from a non-volatile UEFI variable.
OvmfPkg's clone of the module only performs the TPM2 hardware detection.
This is what the module does:
- Check the QEMU hardware for TPM2 availability only
- If found, set the dynamic PCD "PcdTpmInstanceGuid" to
&gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid. This is what informs the rest of
the firmware about the TPM type.
- Install the gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid PPI. This action permits the
PEI_CORE to dispatch the Tcg2Pei module, which consumes the above PCD.
In effect, the gEfiTpmDeviceSelectedGuid PPI serializes the setting
and the consumption of the "TPM type" PCD.
- If no TPM2 was found, install gPeiTpmInitializationDonePpiGuid.
(Normally this is performed by Tcg2Pei, but Tcg2Pei doesn't do it if
no TPM2 is available. So in that case our Tcg2ConfigPei must do it.)
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
These are listed under "ShellPkg/Application/Shell/Shell.inf", but they
have been commented out ever since commit 345a0c8fce ("OvmfPkg: Add
support for UEFI shell", 2011-06-26). No such lib classes exist in edk2.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Jaben Carsey <jaben.carsey@intel.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=800
Based on content from the following branch/commits:
https://github.com/Microsoft/MS_UEFI/tree/share/MsCapsuleSupport33bab4031aca516b1a612b9f111f2e
The BootGraphicsResourceTableDxe module uses the BmpSupportLib
and SafeIntLib to convert a GOP BLT buffer to a BMP graphics image.
Add library mappings for these new library classes.
Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bret Barkelew <Bret.Barkelew@microsoft.com>
Ovmf appended option -mno-mmx -mno-sse, but these two options were enabled
in Openssl. The compiler option becomes -mmmx ?msse -mno-mmx -mno-sse. It
trig mac clang compiler hang when compile one source file in openssl.
This issue is found when SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE is TRUE. This may be the compiler
issue. To work around it, don't add these two options for XCODE5 tool chain.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The TFTP command was converted from a NULL class library instance
to a dynamic shell command in commit 0961002352.
This patch complements commit f9bc2f8763, which only removed the
old library, but didn't add the new dynamic command。
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@linaro.org>
The next patch will want to add a global variable to
PlatformDebugLibIoPort, but this is not suitable for the SEC
phase, because SEC runs from read-only flash. The solution is
to have two library instances, one for SEC and another
for all other firmware phases. This patch adds the "plumbing"
for the SEC library instance, separating the INF files and
moving the constructor to a separate C source file.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen (Intel address) <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
I missed the following, both while reviewing and while testing commit
6041ac65ae ("OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION
when SEV is active", 2017-10-05):
If "-D SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE" is not passed on the "build" command line, then
OVMF has no dynamic default at all for
"PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy". This means that the PcdSet32S()
call added in the subject commit doesn't even compile:
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c: In function 'AmdSevInitialize':
> OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c:67:3: error: implicit declaration of
> function '_PCD_SET_MODE_32_S_PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy'
> [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
> PcdStatus = PcdSet32S (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy, 0x4);
> ^
> cc1: all warnings being treated as errors
Make the current, SB-only, 0x00 dynamic default unconditional.
This is the simplest approach, and it reflects the intent of original
commit 1fea9ddb4e ("OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of
Secure Boot", 2016-01-07). Without SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE,
"SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib" is not used anyway, so the
PCD is never read.
This issue was first caught and reported by Gerd Hoffmann
<kraxel@redhat.com>'s Jenkins CI. Later it was also reported in
<https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=737>.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Fixes: 6041ac65ae
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: trim commit message as suggested by Jordan]
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: add reference to TianoCore BZ#737]
The following commit:
1fea9ddb4e OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot
sets the OptionRomImageVerificationPolicy to ALWAYS_EXECUTE the expansion
ROMs attached to the emulated PCI devices. A expansion ROM constitute
another channel through which a cloud provider (i.e hypervisor) can
inject a code in guest boot flow to compromise it.
When SEV is enabled, the bios code has been verified by the guest owner
via the SEV guest launch sequence before its executed. When secure boot,
is enabled, lets make sure that we do not allow guest bios to execute a
code which is not signed by the guest owner.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728
Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
This patch enables UDF file system support by default.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pcacjr@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
This patch enables PciHostBridgeDxe driver to use Platform IoMMU detection
library to ensure that PciHostBridgeDxe is run after platform IoMmuDxe
driver has checked whether platform need to install IOMMU protocol provider.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Suggested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Current QemuFwCfgLib.inf is used in both Pei and Dxe phases. Add Pei
and Dxe inf file to provide a seperate QemuFwCfgLib instances for Pei
and Dxe phases.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The IOMMU protocol driver provides capabilities to set a DMA access
attribute and methods to allocate, free, map and unmap the DMA memory
for the PCI Bus devices.
Due to security reasons all DMA operations inside the SEV guest must
be performed on shared (i.e unencrypted) pages. The IOMMU protocol
driver for the SEV guest uses a bounce buffer to map guest DMA buffer
to shared pages inorder to provide the support for DMA operations inside
SEV guest.
IoMmuDxe driver looks for SEV capabilities, if present then it installs
the real IOMMU protocol otherwise it installs placeholder protocol.
Currently, PciHostBridgeDxe and QemuFWCfgLib need to know the existance
of IOMMU protocol. The modules needing to know the existance of IOMMU
support should add
gEdkiiIoMmuProtocolGuid OR gIoMmuAbsentProtocolGuid
in their depex to ensure that platform IOMMU detection has been performed.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Leo Duran <leo.duran@amd.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) guest VMs have the concept of
private and shared memory. Private memory is encrypted with the
guest-specific key, while shared memory may be encrypted with hypervisor
key. Certain types of memory (namely instruction pages and guest page
tables) are always treated as private memory by the hardware.
For data memory, SEV guest VMs can choose which pages they would like
to be private. The choice is done using the standard CPU page tables
using the C-bit. When building the initial page table we mark all the
memory as private.
The patch sets the memory encryption PCD. The PCD is consumed by the
following edk2 modules, which manipulate page tables:
- PEI phase modules: CapsulePei, DxeIplPeim, S3Resume2Pei.
CapsulePei is not used by OVMF. DxeIplPeim consumes the PCD at the
end of the PEI phase, when it builds the initial page tables for the
DXE core / DXE phase. S3Resume2Pei does not consume the PCD in its
entry point function, only when DxeIplPeim branches to the S3 resume
path at the end of the PEI phase, and calls S3Resume2Pei's
EFI_PEI_S3_RESUME2_PPI.S3RestoreConfig2() member function.
Therefore it is safe to set the PCD for these modules in PlatformPei.
- DXE phase modules: BootScriptExecutorDxe, CpuDxe, PiSmmCpuDxeSmm.
They are all dispatched after the PEI phase, so setting the PCD for
them in PlatformPei is safe. (BootScriptExecutorDxe is launched "for
real" in the PEI phase during S3 resume, but it caches the PCD into a
static variable when its entry point is originally invoked in DXE.)
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Add Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) helper library.
The library provides the routines to:
- set or clear memory encryption bit for a given memory region.
- query whether SEV is enabled.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
When SEV is enabled then we must unroll the rep String I/O instructions.
The patch updates dsc file to use SEV version of IoLib inf. The main
difference between BaseIoLibIntrinsic.inf and BaseIoLibIntrinsicSev.inf
is, SEV version checks if its running under SEV enabled guest, If so
then it unroll the String I/O (REP INS/OUTS) otherwise fallbacks to
rep ins/outs.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
We can now make PcdQ35TsegMbytes dynamic, in preparation for the extended
TSEG size feature. At the moment we only move the declaration in
OvmfPkg.dec from [PcdsFixedAtBuild] to [PcdsDynamic, PcdsDynamicEx], and
provide the dynamic defaults (with the same value, 8) in the DSC files if
SMM_REQUIRE is TRUE.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Xen gained support for the 4MB flash image in Xen commit 0d6968635ce5
("hvmloader: avoid tests when they would clobber used memory",
2017-05-19), which is part of Xen 4.9.0-rc6.
The previously default 2MB can be explicitly selected with
-D FD_SIZE_2MB
or
-D FD_SIZE_IN_KB=2048
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bba8dfbec3)
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: reference Xen commit in commit message]
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=559
The XCODE5 tool chain has a FAMILY of GCC. The
GCC statements in the [BuildOptions] section add
flags that are not compatible with XCODE5. Add
empty XCODE5 statements in [BuildOptions] sections
to prevent the use of the GCC flags in XCODE5
builds.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In the previous patch we had to add two explicit Null resolutions, but
here we can remove five PeiPcdLib ones, after setting the default to it.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Currently the default (module type independent) PcdLib resolution is to
BasePcdLibNull.inf, which is inherited by all PEIMs. In the next patch,
we'll flip the PEIM default resolution to PeiPcdLib.inf, but in order to
keep that patch both correct and simple to review, we should spell out the
Null resolution for those two PEIMs (ReportStatusCodeRouterPei and
StatusCodeHandlerPei) that are now the only ones that don't specify an
explicit resolution.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
For the emulated variable store, PlatformPei allocates reserved memory (as
early as possible, so that the address remains the same during reboot),
and PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved carries the address to
EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe.
However, EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe is excluded from the SMM_REQUIRE build,
and then noone consumes PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved. Don't waste
reserved memory whenever that's the case.
(Even a dynamic default for PcdEmuVariableNvStoreReserved would be
unnecessary; but that way the PcdSet64S() call in the
ReserveEmuVariableNvStore() function doesn't compile.)
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
"MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec" declares PcdVariableStoreSize like this:
> The size of volatile buffer. This buffer is used to store VOLATILE
> attribute variables.
There is no inherent reason why the size of the volatile variable store
should match the same of the non-volatile variable store. Indeed flash
variables in the 4MB build work fine without this equality.
However, OvmfPkg/EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe uses PcdVariableStoreSize to
initialize the non-volatile VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER too. (Presumably based
on the fact that ultimately that storage will not be permanent.) When
using EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe in the 4MB build, the mismatch between the
two mentioned PCDs (which is apparent through EmuVariableFvbRuntimeDxe's
VARIABLE_STORE_HEADER) triggers an assertion in the variable driver:
> ASSERT MdeModulePkg/Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe/Variable.c(3772):
> mNvVariableCache->Size == VariableStoreLength
Bringing PcdVariableStoreSize in sync with PcdFlashNvStorageVariableSize
fixes this. It also happens to ensure a volatile store size in the 4MB
build that equals the non-volatile store size, which likely doesn't hurt
for symmetry.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Fixes: b24fca0575
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
This PCD is no longer used.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
This reverts commit bba8dfbec3.
The 264KB size introduced for the NV spare area in commit b24fca0575
("OvmfPkg: introduce 4MB flash image (mainly) for Windows HCK",
2017-04-29) breaks the "-bios" (emulated varstore) use case. Until we sort
that out, revert the default build to the 2MB image.
Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The previously default 2MB can be explicitly selected with
-D FD_SIZE_2MB
or
-D FD_SIZE_IN_KB=2048
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The "ConfirmSetOfLargeVariable" test case of the Secure Boot Logo Test
("Microsoft.UefiSecureBootLogo.Tests") suite in the Microsoft Hardware
Certification Kit sets a 32 KB large non-authenticated variable.
In the FD_SIZE_4MB build, our live varstore is now 256 KB big, so we can
accommodate this. Set both PcdMaxVariableSize and PcdMaxAuthVariableSize
to 0x8400 -- beyond DataSize=0x8000 from the HCK test, we need some room
for the variable name and attributes as well.
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The "Confirm64KilobytesOfUnauthenticatedVariableStorage" test case of the
Secure Boot Logo Test ("Microsoft.UefiSecureBootLogo.Tests") suite in the
Microsoft Hardware Certification Kit expects to be able to populate the
variable store up to roughly 64 KB, with a series of 1 KB sized,
unauthenticated variables. OVMF's current live varstore area is too small
for this: 56 KB.
Introduce the FD_SIZE_4MB build macro (equivalently, FD_SIZE_IN_KB=4096),
which
- enlarges the full flash image to 4MB -- QEMU supports up to 8MB, see
FLASH_MAP_BASE_MIN in "hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c" --,
- inside that, grows the varstore area / pflash chip to 528 KB, and within
it, the live area from 56 KB to 256 KB.
Importantly, a firmware binary built with -D FD_SIZE_4MB will *not* be
compatible with a variable store that originates from a variable store
template built *without* -D FD_SIZE_4MB. This is the reason for the large
increase, as every such change breaks compatibility between a new firmware
binary and old varstore files.
Enlarging the varstore does not impact the performance of normal
operations, as we keep the varstore block size 4KB. The performance of
reclaim is affected, but that is expected (since reclaim has to rework the
full live area). And, reclaim occurs proportionally less frequently.
While at it, the FVMAIN_COMPACT volume (with the compressed FFS file in
it) is also enlarged significantly, so that we have plenty of room for
future DXEFV (and perhaps PEIFV) increments -- DXEFV has been growing
steadily, and that increase shows through compression too. Right now the
PEIFV and DXEFV volumes need no resizing.
Here's a summary:
Description Compression type Size [KB]
------------------------- ----------------- ----------------------
Non-volatile data storage open-coded binary 128 -> 528 ( +400)
data
Variable store 56 -> 256 ( +200)
Event log 4 -> 4 ( +0)
Working block 4 -> 4 ( +0)
Spare area 64 -> 264 ( +200)
FVMAIN_COMPACT uncompressed 1712 -> 3360 (+1648)
FV FFS file LZMA compressed
PEIFV uncompressed 896 -> 896 ( +0)
individual PEI uncompressed
modules
DXEFV uncompressed 10240 -> 10240 ( +0)
individual DXE uncompressed
modules
SECFV uncompressed 208 -> 208 ( +0)
SEC driver
reset vector code
For now, the 2MB flash image remains the default.
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
FD_SIZE_xMB defines have existed for flash size selection. They can be
passed as "-D FD_SIZE_xMB" on the command line. Passing multiple of them
at the same time has never been supported; earlier settings on the command
line cannot be overridden.
Introduce the integer valued FD_SIZE_IN_KB macro, which provides the
following improvements:
- several instances of it are permitted on the command line, with the last
one taking effect,
- conditional statements in the DSC and FDF files need only check a single
macro, and multiple values can be checked in a single !if with the ||
operator,
- nested !ifdef / !else ladders can be replaced with flat equality tests,
- in the future, flash sizes can be expressed with a finer than MB
granularity, if necessary.
For now, we're going to preserve the FD_SIZE_xMB defines as convenience
wrappers for FD_SIZE_IN_KB.
FD_SIZE_IN_KB is being added to the DSC files because this way we can
depend on it in both the DSC and FDF files.
Cc: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
QemuFwCfgS3Enabled() in "OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgLib/QemuFwCfgLib.c"
queries the "etc/system-states" fw_cfg file.
The same implementation is now available factored-out in
"OvmfPkg/Library/QemuFwCfgS3Lib/QemuFwCfgS3PeiDxe.c". It is available to
PEIMs through the PeiQemuFwCfgS3LibFwCfg instance, and to DXE_DRIVER and
DXE_RUNTIME_DRIVER modules through the DxeQemuFwCfgS3LibFwCfg instance.
Resolve QemuFwCfgS3Lib accordingly.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=394
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
The OpensslLibCrypto library instance (which does not contain libssl
functions) is sufficient for the Secure Boot feature.
Ease security analysis by excluding libssl functionality from the
OpensslLib instance we use with TLS_ENABLE=FALSE.
Cc: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Move the platform-specific default values for these PCDs from the
[PcdsFixedAtBuild] / [PcdsFixedAtBuild.X64] sections to the
[PcdsDynamicDefault] section.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=230
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Ard Biesheuvel
Star Zeng
Liming Gao
shenglei
Fu Siyuan
Gary Lin
Gerd Hoffmann
Laszlo Ersek
Marc-André Lureau
Michael D Kinney
Ruiyu Ni
Paolo Bonzini
Brijesh Singh
Paulo Alcantara