https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2522
VariablePolicy is an updated interface to
replace VarLock and VarCheckProtocol.
Add connective code to publish the VariablePolicy protocol
and wire it to either the SMM communication interface
or directly into the VariablePolicyLib business logic.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Bret Barkelew <brbarkel@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Acked-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2220
This change reduces SMIs for GetVariable () by maintaining a
UEFI variable cache in Runtime DXE in addition to the pre-
existing cache in SMRAM. When the Runtime Service GetVariable()
is invoked, a Runtime DXE cache is used instead of triggering an
SMI to VariableSmm. This can improve overall system performance
by servicing variable read requests without rendezvousing all
cores into SMM.
The runtime cache can be disabled with by setting the FeaturePCD
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdEnableVariableRuntimeCache
to FALSE. If the PCD is set to FALSE, the runtime cache will not be
used and an SMI will be triggered for Runtime Service
GetVariable () and GetNextVariableName () invocations.
The following are important points regarding the behavior of the
variable drivers when the variable runtime cache is enabled.
1. All of the non-volatile storage contents are loaded into the
cache upon driver load. This one time load operation from storage
is preferred as opposed to building the cache on demand. An on-
demand cache would require a fallback SMI to load data into the
cache as variables are requested.
2. SetVariable () requests will continue to always trigger an SMI.
This occurs regardless of whether the variable is volatile or
non-volatile.
3. Both volatile and non-volatile variables are cached in a runtime
buffer. As is the case in the current EDK II variable driver, they
continue to be cached in separate buffers.
4. The cache in Runtime DXE and SMM are intended to be exact copies
of one another. All SMM variable accesses only return data from the
SMM cache. The runtime caches are only updated after the variable I/O
operation is successful in SMM. The runtime caches are only updated
from SMM.
5. Synchronization mechanisms are in place to ensure the runtime cache
content integrity with the SMM cache. These may result in updates to
runtime cache that are the same in content but different in offset and
size from updates to the SMM cache.
When using SMM variables with runtime cache enabled, two caches will now
be present.
1. "Runtime Cache" - Maintained in VariableSmmRuntimeDxe. Used to service
Runtime Services GetVariable () and GetNextVariableName () callers.
2. "SMM Cache" - Maintained in VariableSmm to service SMM GetVariable ()
and GetNextVariableName () callers.
a. This cache is retained so SMM modules do not operate on data outside
SMRAM.
Because a race condition can occur if an SMI occurs during the execution
of runtime code reading from the runtime cache, a runtime cache read lock
is introduced that explicitly moves pending updates from SMM to the runtime
cache if an SMM update occurs while the runtime cache is locked. Note that
it is not expected a Runtime services call will interrupt SMM processing
since all CPU cores rendezvous in SMM.
It is possible to view UEFI variable read and write statistics by setting
the gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdVariableCollectStatistics FeaturePcd
to TRUE and using the VariableInfo UEFI application in MdeModulePkg to dump
variable statistics to the console. By doing so, a user can view the number
of GetVariable () hits from the Runtime DXE variable driver (Runtime Cache
hits) and the SMM variable driver (SMM Cache hits). SMM Cache hits for
GetVariable () will occur when SMM modules invoke GetVariable ().
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
The file VariableParsing.c provides generic functionality related
to parsing variable related structures and information. In order to
calculate offsets for certain operations, the functions must know if
authenticated variables are enabled as this increases the size of
variable headers.
This change removes linking against a global variable in an external file
in favor of passing the authenticated variable status as a parameter to
the variable parsing functions.
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
This change moves the following functions into a dedicated file
so they may be used in other variable files as needed. These are
commonly needed for basic variable data structure parsing
operations. The functions are grouped together in VariableParsing.c
to support cohesiveness for these operations in the file.
Furthermore, it reduces the overall size of the common Variable.c
file.
* DataSizeOfVariable ()
* FindVariableEx ()
* GetEndPointer ()
* GetNextVariablePtr ()
* GetStartPointer ()
* GetVariableDataOffset ()
* GetVariableDataPtr ()
* GetVariableHeaderSize ()
* GetVariableNamePtr ()
* GetVariableStoreStatus ()
* GetVendorGuidPtr ()
* IsValidVariableHeader ()
* NameSizeOfVariable ()
* SetDataSizeOfVariable ()
* SetNameSizeOfVariable ()
* UpdateVariableInfo ()
* VariableCompareTimeStampInternal ()
* VariableServiceGetNextVariableInternal ()
Cc: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.a.kubacki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1323
Merge EmuVariable and Real variable driver.
Add emulated variable NV mode support in real variable driver.
Platform can configure PcdEmuVariableNvModeEnable statically
(build time) or dynamically (boot time) to support emulated
variable NV mode.
If PcdEmuVariableNvModeEnable is configured to dynamic, its
value should be set before Variable driver starts to work,
otherwise default value will take effect.
Then EmuVariableRuntimeDxe could be removed, the removal of
EmuVariableRuntimeDxe will be done after platforms are migrated
to use the merged variable driver.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1323
Merge EmuVariable and Real variable driver.
Abstract VariableWriteServiceInitializeDxe/Smm from
FtwNotificationEvent/SmmFtwNotificationEvent, then
VariableWriteServiceInitializeDxe/Smm could be not aware
the NV storage is real or emulated.
This patch prepares for adding emulated variable NV mode
support in VariableRuntimeDxe.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1323
Merge EmuVariable and Real variable driver.
Add macro NV_STORAGE_VARIABLE_BASE.
Not get NV PCD in VariableWriteServiceInitialize, but in
FtwNotificationEvent/SmmFtwNotificationEvent, then
VariableWriteServiceInitialize could be not aware the NV
storage is real or emulated.
This patch prepares for adding emulated variable NV mode
support in VariableRuntimeDxe.
Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Tested-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Acked-by: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
In preparation of providing a standalone MM based variable runtime
driver, move the existing SMM driver to the new MM services table,
and factor out some pieces that are specific to the traditional
driver, mainly related to the use of UEFI boot services, which are
not accessible to standalone MM drivers.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1417
Since BaseLib API AsmLfence() is a x86 arch specific API and should be
avoided using in generic codes, this commit replaces the usage of
AsmLfence() with arch-generic API SpeculationBarrier().
Please note that speculation execution barriers are intended to be
asserted for SMM codes, hence, this commit still preserve an empty
implementation of the speculation execution barrier for the DXE codes.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
REF:https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1194
Speculative execution is used by processor to avoid having to wait for
data to arrive from memory, or for previous operations to finish, the
processor may speculate as to what will be executed.
If the speculation is incorrect, the speculatively executed instructions
might leave hints such as which memory locations have been brought into
cache. Malicious actors can use the bounds check bypass method (code
gadgets with controlled external inputs) to infer data values that have
been used in speculative operations to reveal secrets which should not
otherwise be accessed.
This commit will focus on the SMI handler(s) registered within the
Variable\RuntimeDxe driver and insert AsmLfence API to mitigate the
bounds check bypass issue.
For SMI handler SmmVariableHandler():
Under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_VARIABLE:",
'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' can be a potential cross boundary access of
the 'CommBuffer' (controlled external input) during speculative execution.
This cross boundary access is later used as the index to access array
'SmmVariableHeader->Name' by code:
"SmmVariableHeader->Name[SmmVariableHeader->NameSize/sizeof (CHAR16) - 1]"
One can observe which part of the content within array was brought into
cache to possibly reveal the value of 'SmmVariableHeader->NameSize'.
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the boundary/range checks of
'CommBuffer' to prevent the speculative execution.
And there are 2 similar cases under
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:" and
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_GET:" as well.
This commits also handles them.
Also, under "case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_SET_VARIABLE:",
'(UINT8 *)SmmVariableHeader->Name + SmmVariableHeader->NameSize' points to
the 'CommBuffer' (with some offset) and then passed as parameter 'Data' to
function VariableServiceSetVariable().
Within function VariableServiceSetVariable(), there is a sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor for the data pointed by 'Data'.
If this check is speculatively bypassed, potential cross-boundary data
access for 'Data' is possible to be revealed via the below function calls
sequence during speculative execution:
AuthVariableLibProcessVariable()
ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek()
Within function ProcessVarWithPk() or ProcessVarWithKek(), for the code
"PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);", 'AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data)'
can be a cross boundary access during speculative execution.
Then, 'PayloadSize' is possible to be revealed by the function call
sequence:
AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp()
mAuthVarLibContextIn->UpdateVariable()
VariableExLibUpdateVariable()
UpdateVariable()
CopyMem()
Hence, this commit adds a AsmLfence() after the sanity check for
EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor upon 'Data' within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() to prevent the speculative execution.
Also, please note that the change made within function
VariableServiceSetVariable() will affect DXE as well. However, since we
only focuses on the SMM codes, the commit will introduce a new module
internal function called VariableLoadFence() to handle this. This internal
function will have 2 implementations (1 for SMM, 1 for DXE). For the SMM
implementation, it is a wrapper to call the AsmLfence() API; for the DXE
implementation, it is empty.
A more detailed explanation of the purpose of commit is under the
'Bounds check bypass mitigation' section of the below link:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/insights/host-firmware-speculative-execution-side-channel-mitigation
And the document at:
https://software.intel.com/security-software-guidance/api-app/sites/default/files/337879-analyzing-potential-bounds-Check-bypass-vulnerabilities.pdf
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Regression-tested-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
The variable driver doesn't distinguish "non-volatile non-authenticated"
variables from "volatile non-authenticated" variables, when checking
individual variable sizes against the permitted maximum.
PcdMaxVariableSize covers both kinds.
This prevents volatile non-authenticated variables from carrying large
data between UEFI drivers, despite having no flash impact. One example is
EFI_TLS_CA_CERTIFICATE_VARIABLE, which platforms might want to create as
volatile on every boot: the certificate list can be several hundred KB in
size.
Introduce PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize to represent the limit on individual
volatile non-authenticated variables. The default value is zero, which
makes Variable/RuntimeDxe fall back to PcdMaxVariableSize (i.e. the
current behavior). This is similar to the PcdMaxAuthVariableSize fallback.
Whenever the size limit is enforced, consult MaxVolatileVariableSize as
the last option, after checking
- MaxAuthVariableSize for VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_AT_AW,
- and MaxVariableSize for EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE.
EFI_VARIABLE_HARDWARE_ERROR_RECORD is always handled separately; it always
takes priority over the three cases listed above.
Introduce the GetMaxVariableSize() helper to consider
PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize, in addition to
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize(). GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize() is
currently called at three sites, and two of those need to start using
GetMaxVariableSize() instead:
- VariableServiceInitialize() [VariableSmm.c]: the SMM comms buffer must
accommodate all kinds of variables,
- VariableCommonInitialize() [Variable.c]: the preallocated scratch space
must also accommodate all kinds of variables,
- InitNonVolatileVariableStore() [Variable.c] can continue using
GetNonVolatileMaxVariableSize().
Don't modify the ReclaimForOS() function as it is specific to non-volatile
variables and should ignore PcdMaxVolatileVariableSize.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
Tested-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: set MaxVolatileVariableSize where Star suggested]
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Introduce the MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() hook, in order to allow
MorLockInit() to delay / queue operations until EndOfDxe. (Or, if the
platform never signals EndOfDxe, until ReadyToBoot.)
Call MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() whenever we set "mEndOfDxe" to TRUE:
- in VariableRuntimeDxe:
- in the OnReadyToBoot() function,
- in the OnEndOfDxe() function;
- in VariableSmm:
- on the SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_READY_TO_BOOT SMI request,
- in the SmmEndOfDxeCallback() function.
For now, implement MorLockInitAtEndOfDxe() as a no-op in both
VariableRuntimeDxe and VariableSmm.
Cc: Eric Dong <eric.dong@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Tested-by: Ladi Prosek <lprosek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=290
Current SmmVariableGetStatistics() in VariableSmm.c is always
checking input InfoSize against the first variable info,
it is incorrect.
For instance, there are three variables.
BootOrder
Boot0000
Boot0001
If the input InfoEntry is holding the second variable info (Boot0000)
and InfoSize is sizeof (VARIABLE_INFO_ENTRY) + StrSize (L"Boot0000"),
current code will return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, but it should return
the third variable info (Boot0001).
This patch is to refine the code logic.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Current code in SmmVariableHandler() checks CommBufferSize
buffer to make sure it points to outside SMRAM in
"case SMM_VARIABLE_FUNCTION_GET_STATISTICS".
But after eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer points to SMRAM that was used by
SMM core to cache CommSize from SmmCommunication protocol,
then the check will fail definitely and GET_STATISTICS
feature breaks.
In fact, do not need check CommBufferSize buffer at all
even before eaae7b33b1.
Before eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer pointed to gSmmCorePrivate->BufferSize
that is outside SMRAM, the check will success definitely;
after eaae7b33b1,
CommBufferSize buffer points to local variable BufferSize
(in SMRAM) in SmmEntryPoint(), the check is not needed
definitely.
The patch is to remove the check.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jeff Fan <jeff.fan@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Instead of comparing a GUID with gZeroGuid via the CompareGuid API, the
commit uses the IsZeroGuid API to check if the given GUID is a zero GUID.
Cc: Feng Tian <feng.tian@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Feng Tian <feng.tian@Intel.com>
Since the variable check service has be separated to VarCheckLib
from Variable driver, so update Variable driver to consume the
separated VarCheckLib.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@18286 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
MdeModulePkg has defined gZeroGuid in 'Guid/ZeroGuid.h', therefore, the
mZeroGuid defined in Universal/Variable/RuntimeDxe is redundant.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Hao Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jaben Carsey <jaben.carsey@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17840 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
What to do:
1. Merge from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg to Variable drive in
MdeModulePkg. Then the merged Variable driver in MdeModulePkg will
link to AuthVariableLib and TpmMeasurementLib.
AuthVariableLibNull and TpmMeasurementLibNull in MdeModulePkg
could be used for non auth variable support.
AuthVariableLib and DxeTpmMeasurementLib in SecurityPkg
may be used for auth variable support.
Why to do:
1. Remove code duplication and reduce maintenance effort.
After auth variable service separated from Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg
to AuthVariableLib. The remaining code logic of Auth Variable driver in SecurityPkg
will be almost same with Variable driver in MdeModulePkg. Now it is to
merge them.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@17765 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
As the drivers and library do not reference gEfiSmmAccess2ProtocolGuid explicitly now
after SmmMemLib introduced.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16760 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
for trying to reclaim variable space at EndOfDxe.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16687 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
and follow UEFI spec to check UEFI defined variables.
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@16579 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Add the variable name size check in the RequestToLock wrapper.
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14377 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
Add code in BdsDxe driver to call the protocol to mark the read-only variables defined in the UEFI Spec.
Signed-off-by: Ruiyu Ni <ruiyu.ni@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14372 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2. Add check to ensure CommBufferPayloadSize not exceed mVariableBufferPayloadSize or is enough to hold function structure in VariableSmm and FtwSmm.
3. Align FtwGetLastWrite() in FaultTolerantWriteSmmDxe.c to FtwGetLastWrite() in FaultTolerantWrite.c.
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14325 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524
2. Refine the debug message.
3. Add check to make sure the input VariableName is A Null-terminated string.
4. Use local variable to hold StrSize (VariableName) to avoid duplicated StrSize calculation.
Signed-off-by: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
git-svn-id: https://edk2.svn.sourceforge.net/svnroot/edk2/trunk/edk2@14317 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524