tyler.durden
/
audk
mirror of https://github.com/acidanthera/audk.git
1
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity
29,738 Commits 14 Branches 0 Tags 318 MiB
Commit Graph

2 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Min Xu 8b76f23534 OvmfPkg: Enable TDX in ResetVector 
RFC： https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3429

Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) refers to an Intel technology
that extends Virtual Machines Extensions (VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory
Encryption (MKTME) with a new kind of virutal machines guest called a
Trust Domain (TD). A TD is desinged to run in a CPU mode that protects the
confidentiality of TD memory contents and the TD's CPU state from other
software, including the hosting Virtual-Machine Monitor (VMM), unless
explicitly shared by the TD itself.

Note: Intel TDX is only available on X64, so the Tdx related changes are
in X64 path. In IA32 path, there may be null stub to make the build
success.

This patch includes below major changes.

1. Ia32/IntelTdx.asm
IntelTdx.asm includes below routines used in ResetVector
 - IsTdx
   Check if the running system is Tdx guest.

 - InitTdxWorkarea
   It initialize the TDX_WORK_AREA. Because it is called by both BSP and
   APs and to avoid the race condition, only BSP can initialize the
   WORK_AREA. AP will wait until the field of TDX_WORK_AREA_PGTBL_READY
   is set.

 - ReloadFlat32
   After reset all CPUs in TDX are initialized to 32-bit protected mode.
   But GDT register is not set. So this routine loads the GDT then jump
   to Flat 32 protected mode again.

 - InitTdx
   This routine wrap above 3 routines together to do Tdx initialization
   in ResetVector phase.

 - IsTdxEnabled
   It is a OneTimeCall to probe if TDX is enabled by checking the
   CC_WORK_AREA.

 - CheckTdxFeaturesBeforeBuildPagetables
   This routine is called to check if it is Non-TDX guest, TDX-Bsp or
   TDX-APs. Because in TDX guest all the initialization is done by BSP
   (including the page tables). APs should not build the tables.

 - TdxPostBuildPageTables
   It is called after Page Tables are built by BSP.
   byte[TDX_WORK_AREA_PGTBL_READY] is set by BSP to indicate APs can
   leave spin and go.

2. Ia32/PageTables64.asm
As described above only the TDX BSP build the page tables. So
PageTables64.asm is updated to make sure only TDX BSP build the
PageTables. TDX APs will skip the page table building and set Cr3
directly.

3. Ia16/ResetVectorVtf0.asm
In Tdx all CPUs "reset" to run on 32-bit protected mode with flat
descriptor (paging disabled). But in Non-Td guest the initial state of
CPUs is 16-bit real mode. To resolve this conflict, BITS 16/32 is used
in the ResetVectorVtf0.asm. It checks the 32-bit protected mode or 16-bit
real mode, then jump to the corresponding entry point.

Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
 2021-10-24 02:09:27 +00:00
Tom Lendacky 7cb96c47a9 OvmfPkg/ResetVector: Validate the encryption bit position for SEV/SEV-ES 
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108

To help mitigate against ROP attacks, add some checks to validate the
encryption bit position that is reported by the hypervisor.

The first check is to ensure that the hypervisor reports a bit position
above bit 31. After extracting the encryption bit position from the CPUID
information, the code checks that the value is above 31. If the value is
not above 31, then the bit position is not valid, so the code enters a
HLT loop.

The second check is specific to SEV-ES guests and is a two step process.
The first step will obtain random data using RDRAND and store that data to
memory before paging is enabled. When paging is not enabled, all writes to
memory are encrypted. The random data is maintained in registers, which
are protected. The second step is that, after enabling paging, the random
data in memory is compared to the register contents. If they don't match,
then the reported bit position is not valid, so the code enters a HLT
loop.

The third check is after switching to 64-bit long mode. Use the fact that
instruction fetches are automatically decrypted, while a memory fetch is
decrypted only if the encryption bit is set in the page table. By
comparing the bytes of an instruction fetch against a memory read of that
same instruction, the encryption bit position can be validated. If the
compare is not equal, then SEV/SEV-ES is active but the reported bit
position is not valid, so the code enters a HLT loop.

To keep the changes local to the OvmfPkg, an OvmfPkg version of the
Flat32ToFlat64.asm file has been created based on the UefiCpuPkg file
UefiCpuPkg/ResetVector/Vtf0/Ia32/Flat32ToFlat64.asm.

Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <cb9c5ab23ab02096cd964ed64115046cc706ce67.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
 2021-01-07 19:34:39 +00:00