BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
When SEV-ES is active, and MMIO operation will trigger a #VC and the
VmgExitLib exception handler will process this MMIO operation.
A malicious hypervisor could try to extract information from encrypted
memory by setting a reserved bit in the guests nested page tables for
a non-MMIO area. This can result in the encrypted data being copied into
the GHCB shared buffer area and accessed by the hypervisor.
Prevent this by ensuring that the MMIO source/destination is un-encrypted
memory. For the APIC register space, access is allowed in general.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <0cf28470ad5e694af45f7f0b35296628f819567d.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
Update the MemEncryptSevLib library to include an interface that can
report the encryption state on a range of memory. The values will
represent the range as being unencrypted, encrypted, a mix of unencrypted
and encrypted, and error (e.g. ranges that aren't mapped).
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <0d98f4d42a2b67310c29bac7bcdcf1eda6835847.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In preparation for a new interface to be added to the MemEncryptSevLib
library that will be used in SEC, create an SEC version of the library.
This requires the creation of SEC specific files.
Some of the current MemEncryptSevLib functions perform memory allocations
which cannot be performed in SEC, so these interfaces will return an error
during SEC. Also, the current MemEncryptSevLib library uses some static
variables to optimize access to variables, which cannot be used in SEC.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <bc7fa76cc23784ab3f37356b6c10dfec61942c38.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
To ensure that we always use a validated encryption mask for an SEV-ES
guest, create a new interface in the MemEncryptSevLib library to return
the encryption mask. This can be used in place of the multiple locations
where CPUID is used to retrieve the value (which would require validation
again) and allows the validated mask to be returned.
The PEI phase will use the value from the SEV-ES work area. Since the
SEV-ES work area isn't valid in the DXE phase, the DXE phase will use the
PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask PCD which is set during PEI.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e12044dc01b21e6fc2e9535760ddf3a38a142a71.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Tom Lendacky