BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
Now that both the secrets and cpuid pages are reserved in the HOB,
extract the location details through fixed PCD and make it available
to the guest OS through the configuration table.
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3737
Apply uncrustify changes to .c/.h files in the OvmfPkg package
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3275
The Flush parameter is used to provide a hint whether the specified range
is Mmio address. Now that we have a dedicated helper to clear the
memory encryption mask for the Mmio address range, its safe to remove the
Flush parameter from MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask().
Since the address specified in the MemEncryptSev{Set,Clear}PageEncMask()
points to a system RAM, thus a cache flush is required during the
encryption mask update.
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Message-Id: <20210519181949.6574-14-brijesh.singh@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
The PCIe MMCONFIG range should be treated as an MMIO range. However,
there is a comment in the code explaining why AddIoMemoryBaseSizeHob()
is not called. The AmdSevDxe walks the GCD map looking for MemoryMappedIo
or NonExistent type memory and will clear the encryption bit for these
ranges.
Since the MMCONFIG range does not have one of these types, the encryption
bit is not cleared for this range. Add support to detect the presence of
the MMCONFIG range and clear the encryption bit. This will be needed for
follow-on support that will validate that MMIO is not being performed to
an encrypted address range under SEV-ES.
Even though the encryption bit was set for this range, this still worked
under both SEV and SEV-ES because the address range is marked by the
hypervisor as MMIO in the nested page tables:
- For SEV, access to this address range triggers a nested page fault (NPF)
and the hardware supplies the guest physical address (GPA) in the VMCB's
EXITINFO2 field as part of the exit information. However, the encryption
bit is not set in the GPA, so the hypervisor can process the request
without any issues.
- For SEV-ES, access to this address range triggers a #VC. Since OVMF runs
identity mapped (VA == PA), the virtual address is used to avoid the
lookup of the physical address. The virtual address does not have the
encryption bit set, so the hypervisor can process the request without
any issues.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <711ae2dcb6cb29e4c60862c18330cff627269b81.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Based on the following patch from Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>:
[PATCH v2 1/2] OvmfPkg/AmdSevDxe: Clear the C-bit from SMM Saved State
http://mid.mail-archive.com/20180228161415.28723-2-brijesh.singh@amd.comhttps://lists.01.org/pipermail/edk2-devel/2018-February/022016.html
Original commit message from Brijesh:
> When OVMF is built with SMM, SMMSaved State area (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE +
> SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET) contains data which need to be accessed by
> both guest and hypervisor. Since the data need to be accessed by both
> hence we must map the SMMSaved State area as unencrypted (i.e C-bit
> cleared).
>
> This patch clears the SavedStateArea address before SMBASE relocation.
> Currently, we do not clear the SavedStateArea address after SMBASE is
> relocated due to the following reasons:
>
> 1) Guest BIOS never access the relocated SavedStateArea.
>
> 2) The C-bit works on page-aligned address, but the SavedStateArea
> address is not a page-aligned. Theoretically, we could roundup the
> address and clear the C-bit of aligned address but looking carefully we
> found that some portion of the page contains code -- which will causes a
> bigger issue for the SEV guest. When SEV is enabled, all the code must
> be encrypted otherwise hardware will cause trap.
Changes by Laszlo:
- separate AmdSevDxe bits from SmmCpuFeaturesLib bits;
- spell out PcdLib dependency with #include and in LibraryClasses;
- replace (SMM_DEFAULT_SMBASE + SMRAM_SAVE_STATE_MAP_OFFSET) calculation
with call to new MemEncryptSevLocateInitialSmramSaveStateMapPages()
function;
- consequently, pass page-aligned BaseAddress to
MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask();
- zero the pages before clearing the C-bit;
- pass Flush=TRUE to MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask();
- harden the treatment of MemEncryptSevClearPageEncMask() failure.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
List those and only those libraries that are used.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
There are many overlong lines; it's hard to work with the module like
this. Rewrap all files to 79 columns.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
When SEV is enabled, the MMIO memory range must be mapped as unencrypted
(i.e C-bit cleared).
We need to clear the C-bit for MMIO GCD entries in order to cover the
ranges that were added during the PEI phase (through memory resource
descriptor HOBs). Additionally, the NonExistent ranges are processed
in order to cover, in advance, MMIO ranges added later in the DXE phase
by various device drivers, via the appropriate DXE memory space services.
The approach is not transparent for later addition of system memory ranges
to the GCD memory space map. (Such ranges should be encrypted.) OVMF does
not do such a thing at the moment, so this approach should be OK.
The driver is being added to the APRIORI DXE file so that, we clear the
C-bit from MMIO regions before any driver accesses it.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Leo Duran <leo.duran@amd.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Suggested-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Brijesh Singh
Michael Kubacki
Tom Lendacky
Michael D Kinney
Laszlo Ersek