Compile the Tcg2PlatformPei related code now to support TPM 2 platform
hierachy disablement if the TPM state cannot be resumed upon S3 resume.
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
In the AmdSevX64 build, use BlobVerifierLibSevHashes to enforce
verification of hashes of the kernel/initrd/cmdline blobs fetched from
firmware config.
This allows for secure (measured) boot of SEV guests with QEMU's
-kernel/-initrd/-append switches (with the corresponding QEMU support
for injecting the hashes table into initial measured guest memory).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add an implementation for BlobVerifierLib that locates the SEV hashes
table and verifies that the calculated hashes of the kernel, initrd, and
cmdline blobs indeed match the expected hashes stated in the hashes
table.
If there's a missing hash or a hash mismatch then EFI_ACCESS_DENIED is
returned which will cause a failure to load a kernel image.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Co-developed-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
[ardb: add CryptoPkg to accepted dependencies list for CI]
Split the existing 4KB page reserved for SEV launch secrets into two
parts: first 3KB for SEV launch secrets and last 1KB for firmware
config hashes.
The area of the firmware config hashes will be attested (measured) by
the PSP and thus the untrusted VMM can't pass in different files from
what the guest owner allows.
Declare this in the Reset Vector table using GUID
7255371f-3a3b-4b04-927b-1da6efa8d454 and a uint32_t table of a base
and size value (similar to the structure used to declare the launch
secret block).
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Co-developed-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Round up the size of the SEV launch secret area to a whole page, as
required by BuildMemoryAllocationHob. This will allow the secret
area defined in the MEMFD to take less than a whole 4KB page.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Support QEMU's -kernel option.
Create a QemuKernel.c for PlatformBootManagerLibGrub
which is an exact copy of the file
PlatformBootManagerLib/QemuKernel.c .
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Newer kernels support efistub and therefore don't need all the legacy
stuff in X86QemuLoadImageLib, which are harder to secure. Specifically
the verification of kernel/initrd/cmdline blobs will be added only to
the GenericQemuLoadImageLib implementation, so use that for SEV builds.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Commit 96201ae7bf ("OvmfPkg/AmdSev/SecretDxe: make secret location
naming generic", 2020-12-15) replaced references to SEV with the generic
term Confidential Computing, but missed the file header comment. Fix
the naming in that header.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3457
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
With the Xen-dependent PcdSetBoolS() call removed from
OvmfPkg/PlatformPei, the "AmdSevX64.dsc" platform never writes
"PcdPciDisableBusEnumeration". This means we don't need a dynamic default
for the PCD in the DSC file; it could be declared Fixed-at-Build.
However, because the PCD's default value in "MdeModulePkg.dec" is FALSE,
remove the (same-value) platform default altogether.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-24-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
For consistency with the historical OvmfPkg* platforms, switch the
remotely attested, QEMU/KVM-only, AmdSev platform from the AcpiPlatformDxe
driver to the QemuFwCfgAcpiPlatformDxe driver.
No module remains dependent on XenPlatformLib, so remove the
XenPlatformLib class resolution too, from the DSC file.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-5-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
For symmetry with the historical OvmfPkg* platforms, remove the three Xen
drivers from the remotely attested, QEMU/KVM-only, AmdSev platform. Xen
(HVM and PVH) guests are supported by the dedicated OvmfXen platform.
No module remains dependent on XenHypercallLib, so remove the
XenHypercallLib class resolution too, from the DSC file.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2122
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20210526201446.12554-3-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3345
During PEI, the MMIO range for the TPM is marked as encrypted when running
as an SEV guest. While this isn't an issue for an SEV guest because of
the way the nested page fault is handled, it does result in an SEV-ES
guest terminating because of a mitigation check in the #VC handler to
prevent MMIO to an encrypted address. For an SEV-ES guest, this range
must be marked as unencrypted.
Create a new x86 PEIM for TPM support that will map the TPM MMIO range as
unencrypted when SEV-ES is active. The gOvmfTpmMmioAccessiblePpiGuid PPI
will be unconditionally installed before exiting. The PEIM will exit with
the EFI_ABORTED status so that the PEIM does not stay resident. This new
PEIM will depend on the installation of the permanent PEI RAM, by
PlatformPei, so that in case page table splitting is required during the
clearing of the encryption bit, the new page table(s) will be allocated
from permanent PEI RAM.
Update all OVMF Ia32 and X64 build packages to include this new PEIM.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Marc-André Lureau <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>
Cc: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <42794cec1f9d5bc24cbfb9dcdbe5e281ef259ef5.1619716333.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: refresh subject line]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3246
MdeLibs.dsc.inc was added for some basic/default library
instances provided by MdePkg and RegisterFilterLibNull Library
was also added into it as the first version of MdeLibs.dsc.inc.
So update platform dsc to consume MdeLibs.dsc.inc for
RegisterFilterLibNull which will be consumed by IoLib and BaseLib.
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
GenFw will embed a NB10 section which contains the path to the input file,
which means the output files have build paths embedded in them. To reduce
information leakage and ensure reproducible builds, pass --zero in release
builds to remove this information.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3256
Signed-off-by: Ross Burton <ross.burton@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210324115819.605436-1-ross.burton@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
In NOOPT and DEBUG builds, if "PcdMaximumLinkedListLength" is nonzero,
then several LIST_ENTRY *node* APIs in BaseLib compare the *full* list
length against the PCD.
This turns the time complexity of node-level APIs from constant to linear,
and that of full-list manipulations from linear to quadratic.
As an example, consider the EFI_SHELL_FILE_INFO list, which is a data
structure that's widely used in the UEFI shell. I randomly extracted 5000
files from "/usr/include" on my laptop, spanning 1095 subdirectories out
of 1538, and then ran "DIR -R" in the UEFI shell on this tree. These are
the wall-clock times:
PcdMaximumLinkedListLength PcdMaximumLinkedListLength
=1,000,000 =0
-------------------------- ---------------------------
FAT 4 min 31 s 18 s
virtio-fs 5 min 13 s 1 min 33 s
Checking list lengths against an arbitrary maximum (default: 1,000,000)
seems useless even in NOOPT and DEBUG builds, while the cost is
significant; so set the PCD to 0.
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif@nuviainc.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sami Mujawar <sami.mujawar@arm.com>
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3152
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Message-Id: <20210113085453.10168-10-lersek@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
When SEV-ES is active, and MMIO operation will trigger a #VC and the
VmgExitLib exception handler will process this MMIO operation.
A malicious hypervisor could try to extract information from encrypted
memory by setting a reserved bit in the guests nested page tables for
a non-MMIO area. This can result in the encrypted data being copied into
the GHCB shared buffer area and accessed by the hypervisor.
Prevent this by ensuring that the MMIO source/destination is un-encrypted
memory. For the APIC register space, access is allowed in general.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <0cf28470ad5e694af45f7f0b35296628f819567d.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
In order to be able to issue messages or make interface calls that cause
another #VC (e.g. GetLocalApicBaseAddress () issues RDMSR), add support
for nested #VCs.
In order to support nested #VCs, GHCB backup pages are required. If a #VC
is received while currently processing a #VC, a backup of the current GHCB
content is made. This allows the #VC handler to continue processing the
new #VC. Upon completion of the new #VC, the GHCB is restored from the
backup page. The #VC recursion level is tracked in the per-vCPU variable
area.
Support is added to handle up to one nested #VC (or two #VCs total). If
a second nested #VC is encountered, an ASSERT will be issued and the vCPU
will enter CpuDeadLoop ().
For SEC, the GHCB backup pages are reserved in the OvmfPkgX64.fdf memory
layout, with two new fixed PCDs to provide the address and size of the
backup area.
For PEI/DXE, the GHCB backup pages are allocated as boot services pages
using the memory allocation library.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <ac2e8203fc41a351b43f60d68bdad6b57c4fb106.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3108
To ensure that we always use a validated encryption mask for an SEV-ES
guest, create a new interface in the MemEncryptSevLib library to return
the encryption mask. This can be used in place of the multiple locations
where CPUID is used to retrieve the value (which would require validation
again) and allows the validated mask to be returned.
The PEI phase will use the value from the SEV-ES work area. Since the
SEV-ES work area isn't valid in the DXE phase, the DXE phase will use the
PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask PCD which is set during PEI.
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Peter Grehan <grehan@freebsd.org>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Acked-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Message-Id: <e12044dc01b21e6fc2e9535760ddf3a38a142a71.1610045305.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
It is anticipated that this part of the code will work for both Intel
TDX and AMD SEV, so remove the SEV specific naming and change to
ConfidentialComputing as a more architecture neutral prefix. Apart
from the symbol rename, there are no code changes.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
Message-Id: <20201216014146.2229-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Now that the secret area is protected by a boot time HOB, extract its
location details into a configuration table referenced by
gSevLaunchSecretGuid so the boot loader or OS can locate it before a
call to ExitBootServices().
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-7-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: fix indentation of InstallConfigurationTable() args]
Create a one page secret area in the MEMFD and reserve the area with a
boot time HOB.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-6-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: s/protect/reserve/g in the commit message, at Ard's
and James's suggestion]
This is used to package up the grub bootloader into a firmware volume
where it can be executed as a shell like the UEFI Shell. Grub itself
is built as a minimal entity into a Fv and then added as a boot
option. By default the UEFI shell isn't built but for debugging
purposes it can be enabled and will then be presented as a boot option
(This should never be allowed for secure boot in an external data
centre but may be useful for local debugging). Finally all other boot
options except grub and possibly the shell are stripped and the boot
timeout forced to 0 so the system will not enter a setup menu and will
only boot to grub. This is done by copying the
Library/PlatformBootManagerLib into Library/PlatformBootManagerLibGrub
and then customizing it.
Boot failure is fatal to try to prevent secret theft.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-4-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: replace local variable initialization with assignment]
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
[lersek@redhat.com: squash 'OvmfPkg: add "gGrubFileGuid=Grub" to
GuidCheck.IgnoreDuplicates', reviewed stand-alone by Phil (msgid
<e6eae551-8563-ccfb-5547-7a97da6d46e5@redhat.com>) and Ard (msgid
<10aeda37-def6-d9a4-6e02-4c66c1492f57@arm.com>)]
This commit represents the file copied from OvmfPkgX64 with minor
changes to change the build name.
This package will form the basis for adding Sev specific features.
Since everything must go into a single rom file for attestation, the
separated build of code and variables is eliminated.
Ref: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3077
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20201130202819.3910-3-jejb@linux.ibm.com>
Acked-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Stefan Berger
Dov Murik
James Bottomley
Laszlo Ersek
Lendacky, Thomas
Ray Ni
Dandan Bi
Ross Burton
Jiahui Cen via groups.io