libspdm is submodule, which will be used in DeviceSecurity.
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenxing Hou <wenxing.hou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
This patch implement the SpdmSecurityLib,
which is the core of DeviceSecurity.
And the SpdmSecurityLib include Device Authentication and Measurement.
The other library is to support SpdmSecurityLib.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenxing Hou <wenxing.hou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add new api Tpm2ExtendNvIndex.
It is uesd in HashCompleteAndExtend when PcrIndex > MAX_PCR_INDEX.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenxing Hou <wenxing.hou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Add support for
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification 1.06.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenxing Hou <wenxing.hou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Update Spdm.h to support 1.2 new features, such as:
Authentication and measurement. It wil be used in DeviceSecurity.
The DeviceSecurity feature is from
TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification 1.06.
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Wenxing Hou <wenxing.hou@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4516
1) Add CXL 3.0 header file to comply with CXL 3.0 specification
2) CXL 3.0 header will embed Cxl20.h
3) Updated Cxl.h to point to 3.0 header file
Signed-off-by: Foster Nong <foster.nong@intel.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Chris Li <chrisli@os.amperecomputing.com>
Acked-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
The VirtHstiDxe does not work in confidential guests. There also isn't
anything we can reasonably test, neither flash storage nor SMM mode will
be used in that case. So just skip driver load when running in a
confidential guest.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Fixes: 506740982b ("OvmfPkg/VirtHstiDxe: add code flash check")
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Srikanth Aithal <sraithal@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Updates CodeQL to work with the latest queries. Includes functional
and security fixes within the CodeQL CLI binary.
For more information on release details see:
https://github.com/github/codeql-cli-binaries/releases
For changes between the previous version (2.14.5) and 2.16.1 see:
https://github.com/github/codeql-cli-binaries/compare/v2.14.5...v2.16.1
Cc: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Joey Vagedes <joey.vagedes@gmail.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Sean Brogan <sean.brogan@microsoft.com>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Kubacki <michael.kubacki@microsoft.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Joey Vagedes <joey.vagedes@gmail.com>
Ref to https://docs.python.org/3/whatsnew/3.12.html
A backslash-character pair that is not a valid
escape sequence now generates
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Bob Feng <bob.c.feng@intel.com>
Cc: Yuwei Chen <yuwei.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Ensure that when a #VC exception happens, the instruction at the
instruction pointer matches the instruction that is expected given the
error code. This is to mitigate the ahoi WeSee attack [1] that could
allow hypervisors to breach integrity and confidentiality of the
firmware by maliciously injecting interrupts. This change is a
translated version of a linux patch e3ef461af35a ("x86/sev: Harden #VC
instruction emulation somewhat")
[1] https://ahoi-attacks.github.io/wesee/
Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Adam Dunlap <acdunlap@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Ref to https://docs.python.org/3/whatsnew/3.12.html
A backslash-character pair that is not a valid
escape sequence now generates
Cc: Chasel Chiu <chasel.chiu@intel.com>
Cc: Nate DeSimone <nathaniel.l.desimone@intel.com>
Cc: Duggapu Chinni B <chinni.b.duggapu@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Ted Kuo <ted.kuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashraf Ali S <ashraf.ali.s@intel.com>
Cc: Susovan Mohapatra <susovan.mohapatra@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Ref to https://docs.python.org/3/whatsnew/3.12.html
A backslash-character pair that is not a valid
escape sequence now generates
Cc: Chasel Chiu <chasel.chiu@intel.com>
Cc: Nate DeSimone <nathaniel.l.desimone@intel.com>
Cc: Duggapu Chinni B <chinni.b.duggapu@intel.com>
Cc: Star Zeng <star.zeng@intel.com>
Cc: Ted Kuo <ted.kuo@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Ashraf Ali S <ashraf.ali.s@intel.com>
Cc: Susovan Mohapatra <susovan.mohapatra@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
The optimization that enabled entry with MMU and caches enabled at EL1
removed the strict alignment requirement for XIP code (roughly, any code
that might execute with the MMU and caches off, which means SEC and PEI
phase modules but also *all* BASE libraries), on the basis that QEMU can
only run guest payloads at EL2 in TCG emulation, which used to ignore
alignment violations, and execution at EL1 would always occur with the
MMU enabled.
This assumption no longer holds: not only does QEMU now enforce strict
alignment for memory accesses with device semantics, there are also
cases where this code might execute at EL2 under virtualization (i.e.,
under NV2 nested virtualization) where the strict alignment is required
too.
The latter case could be optimized too, by enabling VHE and pretending
execution is occurring at EL1, which would allow the existing logic for
entry with the MMU enabled to be reused. However, this would leave
non-VHE CPUs behind.
So in summary, strict alignment needs to be enforced for any code that
may execute with the MMU off, so drop the override that sets the XIP
flags to the empty string.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Detects qemu config issue: code pflash is writable.
Checked for both PC and Q35.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Detects qemu config issue: vars pflash is not in secure mode (write
access restricted to smm). Applies to Q35 with SMM only.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
The driver supports qemu machine types 'pc' and 'q35'.
This patch adds some helper functions to manage the bitmasks.
The implemented features depend on both OVMF build configuration
and qemu VM configuration.
For q35 a single security feature is supported and checked: In
SMM-enabled builds the driver will verify smram is properly locked.
That test should never fail.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Initial-patch-by: Konstantin Kostiuk <kkostiuk@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <Jiewen.yao@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4756
There are below updates in this patch:
1. Rename README to README.md so that it can be show as markdown
document.
2. Update some information about TDVF.
2. Fix some typo.
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@amd.com>
Cc: Andrew Fish <afish@apple.com>
Cc: Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
BZ#: 4471
Update definitions according to PI spec 1.8 errata A
Signed-off-by: Abner Chang <abner.chang@amd.com>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Cc: Abdul Lateef Attar <abdattar@amd.com>
Cc: Brit Chesley <brit.chesley@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Abdul Lateef Attar <abdattar@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
Currently, an SEV-SNP guest will terminate if it is not running at VMPL0.
The requirement for running at VMPL0 is removed if an SVSM is present.
Update the current VMPL0 check to additionally check for the presence of
an SVSM is the guest is not running at VMPL0.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SVSM specification documents an alternative method of discovery for
the SVSM using a reserved CPUID bit and a reserved MSR.
For the CPUID support, the #VC handler of an SEV-SNP guest should modify
the returned value in the EAX register for the 0x8000001f CPUID function
by setting bit 28 when an SVSM is present.
For the MSR support, new reserved MSR 0xc001f000 has been defined. A #VC
should be generated when accessing this MSR. The #VC handler is expected
to ignore writes to this MSR and return the physical calling area address
(CAA) on reads of this MSR.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
When running under an SVSM, the VMPL level of the APs that are started
must match the VMPL level provided by the SVSM. Additionally, each AP
must have a Calling Area for use with the SVSM protocol. Update the AP
creation to properly support running under an SVSM.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The RMPADJUST instruction is used to alter the VMSA attribute of a page,
but the VMSA attribute can only be changed when running at VMPL0. When
an SVSM is present, use the SVSM_CORE_CREATE_VCPU and SVSM_CORE_DELTE_VCPU
calls to add or remove the VMSA attribute on a page instead of issuing
the RMPADJUST instruction directly.
Implement the AmdSvsmSnpVmsaRmpAdjust() API to perform the proper operation
to update the VMSA attribute.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
Similar to the Page State Change optimization added previously, also take
into account the possiblity of using the SVSM for PVALIDATE instructions.
Conditionally adjust the maximum number of entries based on how many
entries the SVSM calling area can support.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The PVALIDATE instruction can only be performed at VMPL0. An SVSM will
be present when running at VMPL1 or higher.
When an SVSM is present, use the SVSM_CORE_PVALIDATE call to perform
memory validation instead of issuing the PVALIDATE instruction directly.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
An SVSM requires a calling area page whose address (CAA) is used by the
SVSM to communicate and process the SVSM request.
Add a pre-defined page area to the OvmfPkg and AmdSev packages and define
corresponding PCDs used to communicate the location and size of the area.
Keep the AmdSev package in sync with the OvmfPkg and adjust the AmdSev
launch and hash area memory locations.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The PVALIDATE instruction is used to change the SNP validation of a page,
but that can only be done when running at VMPL0. To prepare for running at
a less priviledged VMPL, use the AmdSvsmLib library API to perform the
PVALIDATE. The AmdSvsmLib library will perform the proper operation on
behalf of the caller.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The RMPADJUST instruction is used to change the VMSA attribute of a page,
but the VMSA attribute can only be changed when running at VMPL0. To
prepare for running at a less priviledged VMPL, use the AmdSvsmLib library
API to perform the RMPADJUST. The AmdSvsmLib library will perform the
proper operation on behalf of the caller.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
Add initial support for the new AmdSvsmLib library to OvmfPkg. The initial
implementation fully implements the library interfaces.
The SVSM presence check, AmdSvsmIsSvsmPresent(), determines the presence
of an SVSM by checking if an SVSM has been advertised in the SEV-SNP
Secrets Page.
The VMPL API, AmdSvsmSnpGetVmpl(), returns the VMPL level at which OVMF is
currently running.
The CAA API, AmdSvsmSnpGetCaa(), returns the Calling Area Address when an
SVSM is present, 0 otherwise.
The PVALIDATE API, AmdSvsmSnpPvalidate(), copies the PVALIDATE logic from
the BaseMemEncryptSevLib library for the initial implementation. The
BaseMemEncryptSevLib library will be changed to use this new API so that
the decision as to whether the SVSM is needed to perform the operation
can be isolated to this library.
The VMSA API, AmdSvsmSnpVmsaRmpAdjust(), copies the RMPUPDATE logic from
the MpInitLib library for the initial implementation. The MpInitLib
library will be changed to use this new API so that the decision as to
whether the SVSM is needed to perform the operation can be isolated to
this library.
Cc: Anatol Belski <anbelski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The MpInitLib library will be updated to use the new AmdSvsmLib library.
To prevent any build breakage, update the OvmfPkg DSCs file to include
the AmdSvsmLib NULL library.
Cc: Anatol Belski <anbelski@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Corvin Köhne <corvink@freebsd.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jianyong Wu <jianyong.wu@arm.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Rebecca Cran <rebecca@bsdio.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The MpInitLib library will be updated to use the new AmdSvsmLib library.
To prevent any build breakage, update the UefiPayloadPkg DSC file to
include the AmdSvsmLib NULL library.
Cc: Gua Guo <gua.guo@intel.com>
Cc: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
Cc: James Lu <james.lu@intel.com>
Cc: Sean Rhodes <sean@starlabs.systems>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Guo Dong <guo.dong@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
In order to support an SEV-SNP guest running under an SVSM at VMPL1 or
lower, a new library must be created.
This library includes an interface to detect if running under an SVSM, an
interface to return the current VMPL, an interface to perform memory
validation and an interface to set or clear the attribute that allows a
page to be used as a VMSA.
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Rahul Kumar <rahul1.kumar@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SVSM specification relies on a specific register calling convention to
hold the parameters that are associated with the SVSM request. The SVSM is
invoked by requesting the hypervisor to run the VMPL0 VMSA of the guest
using the GHCB MSR Protocol or a GHCB NAE event.
Create a new version of the VMGEXIT instruction that will adhere to this
calling convention and load the SVSM function arguments into the proper
register before invoking the VMGEXIT instruction. On return, perform the
atomic exchange on the SVSM call pending value as specified in the SVSM
specification.
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The Secure VM Service Module specification defines the interfaces needed
to allow multi-VMPL level execution of an SEV-SNP guest.
Define the SVSM related structures for the SVSM Calling Area as well as
the SVSM CAA MSR. The SVSM CAA MSR is an MSR register that is reserved for
software use and will not be implemented in hardware.
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
When building the Page State Change entries for a range of memory, it can
happen that multiple calls to BuildPageStateBuffer() need to be made. If
the size of the input work area passed to BuildPageStateBuffer() exceeds
the number of entries that can be passed to the hypervisor using the GHCB
shared buffer, the Page State Change VMGEXIT support will issue multiple
VMGEXITs to process all entries in the buffer.
However, it could be that the final VMGEXIT for each round of Page State
Changes is only for a small number of entries and subsequent VMGEXITs may
still be issued to handle the full range of memory requested. To maximize
the number of entries processed during the Page State Change VMGEXIT,
limit BuildPageStateBuffer() to not build entries that exceed the maximum
number of entries that can be handled in a single Page State Change
VMGEXIT.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
In preparation for running under an SVSM at VMPL1 or higher (higher
numerically, lower privilege), re-organize the way a page state change
is performed in order to free up the GHCB for use by the SVSM support.
Currently, the page state change logic directly uses the GHCB shared
buffer to build the page state change structures. However, this will be
in conflict with the use of the GHCB should an SVSM call be required.
Instead, use a separate buffer (an area in the workarea during SEC and
an allocated page during PEI/DXE) to hold the page state change request
and only update the GHCB shared buffer as needed.
Since the information is copied to, and operated on, in the GHCB shared
buffer this has the added benefit of not requiring to save the start and
end entries for use when validating the memory during the page state
change sequence.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
The SNP_PAGE_STATE_MAX_ENTRY is based on the number of entries that can
fit in the GHCB shared buffer. As a result, the SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_INFO
structure maps the full GHCB shared buffer based on the shared buffer size
being 2032 bytes.
Instead of using a hardcoded value for SNP_PAGE_STATE_MAX_ENTRY, use a
build calculated value. Since the SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_INFO is used as a
mapping, eliminate the hardcoded array size so that the structure can be
used based on any size buffer.
Cc: Liming Gao <gaoliming@byosoft.com.cn>
Cc: Michael D Kinney <michael.d.kinney@intel.com>
Cc: Zhiguang Liu <zhiguang.liu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Acked-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
Calculate the amount of memory that can be use to build the Page State
Change data (SNP_PAGE_STATE_CHANGE_INFO) instead of using a hard-coded
size. This allows for changes to the GHCB shared buffer size without
having to make changes to the page state change code.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
In prep for follow-on patches, fix an area of the code that does not meet
the uncrustify coding standards.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
BZ: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4654
If the hypervisor supports retrieval of the vCPU APIC IDs, retrieve
them before any APs are actually started. The APIC IDs can be used
to start the APs for any SEV-SNP guest, but is a requirement for an
SEV-SNP guest that is running under an SVSM.
After retrieving the APIC IDs, save the address of the APIC ID data
structure in a GUIDed HOB.
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+tianocore@kernel.org>
Cc: Erdem Aktas <erdemaktas@google.com>
Cc: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiewen Yao <jiewen.yao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
Cc: Min Xu <min.m.xu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Wenxing Hou
Foster Nong
Gua Guo
Gerd Hoffmann
Michael Kubacki
Adam Dunlap
Ard Biesheuvel
Konstantin Kostiuk
Min M Xu
Abner Chang
abnchang
Tom Lendacky