;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ; @file ; Provide the functions to check whether SEV and SEV-ES is enabled. ; ; Copyright (c) 2017 - 2021, Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. All rights reserved.
; SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent ; ;------------------------------------------------------------------------------ BITS 32 ; ; SEV-ES #VC exception handler support ; ; #VC handler local variable locations ; %define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX 0 %define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX 4 %define VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX 8 %define VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX 12 %define VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX 16 %define VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX 20 %define VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER 24 %define VC_CPUID_FUNCTION 28 ; #VC handler total local variable size ; %define VC_VARIABLE_SIZE 32 ; #VC handler GHCB CPUID request/response protocol values ; %define GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST 4 %define GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE 5 %define GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT 30 %define CPUID_INSN_LEN 2 ; #VC handler offsets/sizes for accessing SNP CPUID page ; %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_SZ 48 %define SNP_CPUID_COUNT 0 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY 16 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX_IN 0 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX_IN 4 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX 24 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EBX 28 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX 32 %define SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EDX 36 %define SEV_GHCB_MSR 0xc0010130 %define SEV_STATUS_MSR 0xc0010131 ; The #VC was not for CPUID %define TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID 1 ; The unexpected response code %define TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE 2 %define PAGE_PRESENT 0x01 %define PAGE_READ_WRITE 0x02 %define PAGE_USER_SUPERVISOR 0x04 %define PAGE_WRITE_THROUGH 0x08 %define PAGE_CACHE_DISABLE 0x010 %define PAGE_ACCESSED 0x020 %define PAGE_DIRTY 0x040 %define PAGE_PAT 0x080 %define PAGE_GLOBAL 0x0100 %define PAGE_2M_MBO 0x080 %define PAGE_2M_PAT 0x01000 %define PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \ PAGE_DIRTY + \ PAGE_READ_WRITE + \ PAGE_PRESENT) %define PAGE_PDP_ATTR (PAGE_ACCESSED + \ PAGE_READ_WRITE + \ PAGE_PRESENT) ; Macro is used to issue the MSR protocol based VMGEXIT. The caller is ; responsible to populate values in the EDX:EAX registers. After the vmmcall ; returns, it verifies that the response code matches with the expected ; code. If it does not match then terminate the guest. The result of request ; is returned in the EDX:EAX. ; ; args 1:Request code, 2: Response code %macro VmgExit 2 ; ; Add request code: ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Request code or eax, %1 mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR wrmsr ; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit ; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode. ; BITS 64 rep vmmcall BITS 32 mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR rdmsr ; ; Verify the reponse code, if it does not match then request to terminate ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = Response code mov ecx, eax and ecx, 0xfff cmp ecx, %2 jne SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate %endmacro ; Macro to terminate the guest using the VMGEXIT. ; arg 1: reason code %macro TerminateVmgExit 1 mov eax, %1 ; ; Use VMGEXIT to request termination. At this point the reason code is ; located in EAX, so shift it left 16 bits to the proper location. ; ; EAX[11:0] => 0x100 - request termination ; EAX[15:12] => 0x1 - OVMF ; EAX[23:16] => 0xXX - REASON CODE ; shl eax, 16 or eax, 0x1100 xor edx, edx mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR wrmsr ; ; Issue VMGEXIT - NASM doesn't support the vmmcall instruction in 32-bit ; mode, so work around this by temporarily switching to 64-bit mode. ; BITS 64 rep vmmcall BITS 32 ; ; We shouldn't come back from the VMGEXIT, but if we do, just loop. ; %%TerminateHlt: hlt jmp %%TerminateHlt %endmacro ; Terminate the guest due to unexpected response code. SevEsUnexpectedRespTerminate: TerminateVmgExit TERM_UNEXPECTED_RESP_CODE %ifdef ARCH_X64 ; If SEV-ES is enabled then initialize and make the GHCB page shared SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage: ; Check if SEV-ES is enabled mov ecx, 1 bt [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR], ecx jnc SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit ; ; The initial GHCB will live at GHCB_BASE and needs to be un-encrypted. ; This requires the 2MB page for this range be broken down into 512 4KB ; pages. All will be marked encrypted, except for the GHCB. Since the ; original PMD entry is no longer a leaf entry, remove the encryption ; bit when pointing to the PTE page. ; mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE >> 21) mov eax, GHCB_PT_ADDR + PAGE_PDP_ATTR mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000)], eax mov [ecx * 8 + PT_ADDR (0x2000) + 4], strict dword 0 ; ; Page Table Entries (512 * 4KB entries => 2MB) ; mov ecx, 512 pageTableEntries4kLoop: mov eax, ecx dec eax shl eax, 12 add eax, GHCB_BASE & 0xFFE0_0000 add eax, PAGE_4K_PDE_ATTR mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8], eax mov [(ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR - 8) + 4], edx loop pageTableEntries4kLoop ; ; Clear the encryption bit from the GHCB entry ; mov ecx, (GHCB_BASE & 0x1F_FFFF) >> 12 mov [ecx * 8 + GHCB_PT_ADDR + 4], strict dword 0 SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPageExit: OneTimeCallRet SevClearPageEncMaskForGhcbPage ; Get the C-bit mask above 31. ; Modified: EDX ; ; The value is returned in the EDX GetSevCBitMaskAbove31: mov edx, dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4] OneTimeCallRet GetSevCBitMaskAbove31 %endif ; Check if Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) features are enabled. ; ; Register usage is tight in this routine, so multiple calls for the ; same CPUID and MSR data are performed to keep things simple. ; ; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX, ESP ; ; If SEV is enabled then EAX will be at least 32. ; If SEV is disabled then EAX will be zero. ; CheckSevFeatures: ; ; Clear the workarea, if SEV is enabled then later part of routine ; will populate the workarea fields. ; mov ecx, SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_SIZE mov eax, SEV_ES_WORK_AREA ClearSevEsWorkArea: mov byte [eax], 0 inc eax loop ClearSevEsWorkArea ; ; Set up exception handlers to check for SEV-ES ; Load temporary RAM stack based on PCDs (see SevEsIdtVmmComm for ; stack usage) ; Establish exception handlers ; mov esp, SEV_ES_VC_TOP_OF_STACK mov eax, ADDR_OF(Idtr) lidt [cs:eax] ; Check if we have a valid (0x8000_001F) CPUID leaf ; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest mov eax, 0x80000000 cpuid ; This check should fail on Intel or Non SEV AMD CPUs. In future if ; Intel CPUs supports this CPUID leaf then we are guranteed to have exact ; same bit definition. cmp eax, 0x8000001f jl NoSev ; Check for SEV memory encryption feature: ; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EAX] - Bit 1 ; CPUID raises a #VC exception if running as an SEV-ES guest mov eax, 0x8000001f cpuid bt eax, 1 jnc NoSev ; Check if SEV memory encryption is enabled ; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 0 (SEV enabled) mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR rdmsr bt eax, 0 jnc NoSev ; Set the work area header to indicate that the SEV is enabled mov byte[WORK_AREA_GUEST_TYPE], 1 ; Save the SevStatus MSR value in the workarea mov [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR], eax mov [SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_STATUS_MSR + 4], edx ; Check if SEV-ES is enabled ; MSR_0xC0010131 - Bit 1 (SEV-ES enabled) mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR rdmsr bt eax, 1 jnc GetSevEncBit GetSevEncBit: ; Get pte bit position to enable memory encryption ; CPUID Fn8000_001F[EBX] - Bits 5:0 ; and ebx, 0x3f mov eax, ebx ; The encryption bit position is always above 31 sub ebx, 32 jns SevSaveMask ; Encryption bit was reported as 31 or below, enter a HLT loop SevEncBitLowHlt: cli hlt jmp SevEncBitLowHlt SevSaveMask: xor edx, edx bts edx, ebx mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK], 0 mov dword[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_ENC_MASK + 4], edx jmp SevExit NoSev: ; ; Perform an SEV-ES sanity check by seeing if a #VC exception occurred. ; ; If SEV-ES is enabled, the CPUID instruction will trigger a #VC exception ; where the RECEIVED_VC offset in the workarea will be set to one. ; cmp byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_RECEIVED_VC], 0 jz NoSevPass ; ; A #VC was received, yet CPUID indicates no SEV-ES support, something ; isn't right. ; NoSevEsVcHlt: cli hlt jmp NoSevEsVcHlt NoSevPass: xor eax, eax SevExit: ; ; Clear exception handlers and stack ; push eax mov eax, ADDR_OF(IdtrClear) lidt [cs:eax] pop eax mov esp, 0 OneTimeCallRet CheckSevFeatures ; Start of #VC exception handling routines ; SevEsIdtNotCpuid: TerminateVmgExit TERM_VC_NOT_CPUID iret ; Use the SNP CPUID page to handle the cpuid lookup ; ; Modified: EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX ; ; Relies on the stack setup/usage in #VC handler: ; ; On entry, ; [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION] contains EAX input to cpuid instruction ; ; On return, stores corresponding results of CPUID lookup in: ; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX] ; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX] ; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX] ; [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX] ; SnpCpuidLookup: mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION] mov ebx, [CPUID_BASE + SNP_CPUID_COUNT] mov ecx, CPUID_BASE + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY ; Zero these out now so we can simply return if lookup fails mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX], 0 mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX], 0 mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX], 0 mov dword[esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX], 0 SnpCpuidCheckEntry: cmp ebx, 0 je VmmDoneSnpCpuid cmp dword[ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX_IN], eax jne SnpCpuidCheckEntryNext ; As with SEV-ES handler we assume requested CPUID sub-leaf/index is 0 cmp dword[ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX_IN], 0 je SnpCpuidEntryFound SnpCpuidCheckEntryNext: dec ebx add ecx, SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_SZ jmp SnpCpuidCheckEntry SnpCpuidEntryFound: mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EAX] mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX], eax mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EBX] mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX], eax mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_ECX] mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX], eax mov eax, [ecx + SNP_CPUID_ENTRY_EDX] mov [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX], eax jmp VmmDoneSnpCpuid ; ; Total stack usage for the #VC handler is 44 bytes: ; - 12 bytes for the exception IRET (after popping error code) ; - 32 bytes for the local variables. ; SevEsIdtVmmComm: ; ; If we're here, then we are an SEV-ES guest and this ; was triggered by a CPUID instruction ; ; Set the recievedVc field in the workarea to communicate that ; a #VC was taken. mov byte[SEV_ES_WORK_AREA_RECEIVED_VC], 1 pop ecx ; Error code cmp ecx, 0x72 ; Be sure it was CPUID jne SevEsIdtNotCpuid ; Set up local variable room on the stack ; CPUID function : + 28 ; CPUID request register : + 24 ; GHCB MSR (EAX) : + 20 ; GHCB MSR (EDX) : + 16 ; CPUID result (EDX) : + 12 ; CPUID result (ECX) : + 8 ; CPUID result (EBX) : + 4 ; CPUID result (EAX) : + 0 sub esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE ; Save the CPUID function being requested mov [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION], eax ; If SEV-SNP is enabled, use the CPUID page to handle the CPUID ; instruction. mov ecx, SEV_STATUS_MSR rdmsr bt eax, 2 jc SnpCpuidLookup ; The GHCB CPUID protocol uses the following mapping to request ; a specific register: ; 0 => EAX, 1 => EBX, 2 => ECX, 3 => EDX ; ; Set EAX as the first register to request. This will also be used as a ; loop variable to request all register values (EAX to EDX). xor eax, eax mov [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER], eax ; Save current GHCB MSR value mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR rdmsr mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX], eax mov [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX], edx NextReg: ; ; Setup GHCB MSR ; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID function ; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID request protocol ; mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER] cmp eax, 4 jge VmmDone shl eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_FUNCTION] VmgExit GHCB_CPUID_REQUEST, GHCB_CPUID_RESPONSE ; ; Response GHCB MSR ; GHCB_MSR[63:32] = CPUID register value ; GHCB_MSR[31:30] = CPUID register ; GHCB_MSR[11:0] = CPUID response protocol ; ; Save returned value shr eax, GHCB_CPUID_REGISTER_SHIFT mov [esp + eax * 4], edx ; Next register inc word [esp + VC_CPUID_REQUEST_REGISTER] jmp NextReg VmmDone: ; ; At this point we have all CPUID register values. Restore the GHCB MSR, ; set the return register values and return. ; mov eax, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EAX] mov edx, [esp + VC_GHCB_MSR_EDX] mov ecx, SEV_GHCB_MSR wrmsr VmmDoneSnpCpuid: mov eax, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EAX] mov ebx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EBX] mov ecx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_ECX] mov edx, [esp + VC_CPUID_RESULT_EDX] add esp, VC_VARIABLE_SIZE ; Update the EIP value to skip over the now handled CPUID instruction ; (the CPUID instruction has a length of 2) add word [esp], CPUID_INSN_LEN iret ALIGN 2 Idtr: dw IDT_END - IDT_BASE - 1 ; Limit dd ADDR_OF(IDT_BASE) ; Base IdtrClear: dw 0 ; Limit dd 0 ; Base ALIGN 16 ; ; The Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT) ; This will be used to determine if SEV-ES is enabled. Upon execution ; of the CPUID instruction, a VMM Communication Exception will occur. ; This will tell us if SEV-ES is enabled. We can use the current value ; of the GHCB MSR to determine the SEV attributes. ; IDT_BASE: ; ; Vectors 0 - 28 (No handlers) ; %rep 29 dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0 dw 0x10 ; Selector db 0 ; Reserved db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32) dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16 %endrep ; ; Vector 29 (VMM Communication Exception) ; dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) & 0xffff) ; Offset low bits 15..0 dw 0x10 ; Selector db 0 ; Reserved db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32) dw (ADDR_OF(SevEsIdtVmmComm) >> 16) ; Offset high bits 31..16 ; ; Vectors 30 - 31 (No handlers) ; %rep 2 dw 0 ; Offset low bits 15..0 dw 0x10 ; Selector db 0 ; Reserved db 0x8E ; Gate Type (IA32_IDT_GATE_TYPE_INTERRUPT_32) dw 0 ; Offset high bits 31..16 %endrep IDT_END: