openssh-portable/servconf.h

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/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.165 2024/06/12 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
*
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 04:29:08 +02:00
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
#define PERMIT_NO 0
#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
#define PERMIT_YES 3
/* PermitOpen */
#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0
#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2
/* IgnoreRhosts */
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO 0
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES 1
#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS 2
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
/* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */
#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED (1)
#define PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED (1<<1)
struct ssh;
/*
* Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be
* incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged
* with any ports requested by ListenPort.
*/
struct queued_listenaddr {
char *addr;
int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */
char *rdomain;
};
/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */
struct listenaddr {
char *rdomain;
struct addrinfo *addrs;
};
upstream: Add a facility to sshd(8) to penalise particular problematic client behaviours, controlled by two new sshd_config(5) options: PerSourcePenalties and PerSourcePenaltyExemptList. When PerSourcePenalties are enabled, sshd(8) will monitor the exit status of its child pre-auth session processes. Through the exit status, it can observe situations where the session did not authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly indicating attempts to exploit sshd). When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If this time is above a minimum threshold specified by the PerSourcePenalties, then connections from the client address will be refused (along with any others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range). Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. A PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option allows certain address ranges to be exempt from all penalties. We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. PerSourcePenalties is off by default, but we expect to enable it automatically in the near future. much feedback markus@ and others, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89ded70eccb2b4926ef0366a4d58a693de366cca
2024-06-06 19:15:25 +02:00
#define PER_SOURCE_PENALTY_OVERFLOW_DENY_ALL 1
#define PER_SOURCE_PENALTY_OVERFLOW_PERMISSIVE 2
struct per_source_penalty {
int enabled;
int max_sources4;
int max_sources6;
upstream: Add a facility to sshd(8) to penalise particular problematic client behaviours, controlled by two new sshd_config(5) options: PerSourcePenalties and PerSourcePenaltyExemptList. When PerSourcePenalties are enabled, sshd(8) will monitor the exit status of its child pre-auth session processes. Through the exit status, it can observe situations where the session did not authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly indicating attempts to exploit sshd). When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If this time is above a minimum threshold specified by the PerSourcePenalties, then connections from the client address will be refused (along with any others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range). Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. A PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option allows certain address ranges to be exempt from all penalties. We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. PerSourcePenalties is off by default, but we expect to enable it automatically in the near future. much feedback markus@ and others, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89ded70eccb2b4926ef0366a4d58a693de366cca
2024-06-06 19:15:25 +02:00
int overflow_mode;
int overflow_mode6;
upstream: Add a facility to sshd(8) to penalise particular problematic client behaviours, controlled by two new sshd_config(5) options: PerSourcePenalties and PerSourcePenaltyExemptList. When PerSourcePenalties are enabled, sshd(8) will monitor the exit status of its child pre-auth session processes. Through the exit status, it can observe situations where the session did not authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly indicating attempts to exploit sshd). When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If this time is above a minimum threshold specified by the PerSourcePenalties, then connections from the client address will be refused (along with any others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range). Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. A PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option allows certain address ranges to be exempt from all penalties. We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. PerSourcePenalties is off by default, but we expect to enable it automatically in the near future. much feedback markus@ and others, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89ded70eccb2b4926ef0366a4d58a693de366cca
2024-06-06 19:15:25 +02:00
int penalty_crash;
int penalty_grace;
int penalty_authfail;
int penalty_noauth;
int penalty_max;
int penalty_min;
};
typedef struct {
u_int num_ports;
u_int ports_from_cmdline;
int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs;
u_int num_queued_listens;
struct listenaddr *listen_addrs;
u_int num_listen_addrs;
int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */
char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */
int *host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */
u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */
u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
char *moduli_file; /* moduli file for DH-GEX */
int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
* (sec). */
int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
* for RhostsRsaAuth */
int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
* searching at */
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
u_int num_log_verbose; /* Verbose log overrides */
char **log_verbose;
int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
char *hostbased_accepted_algos; /* Algos allowed for hostbased */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:04:56 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c nchan.c serverloop.c] [session.c ssh.c] agent forwarding and -R for ssh2, based on work from jhuuskon@messi.uku.fi - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:13:27 [ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] do not disabled rhosts(rsa) if server port > 1024; from pekkas@netcore.fi - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/06 16:16:35 [sshconnect.c] downgrade client to 1.3 if server is 1.4; help from mdb@juniper.net - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/09 18:04:40 [auth1.c] typo; from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:03:28 [ssh-agent.c] off-by-one when removing a key from the agent - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/11/12 12:50:39 [auth-rh-rsa.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h] [authfile.c hostfile.c kex.c kex.h key.c key.h myproposal.h] [readconf.c readconf.h rsa.c rsa.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config] [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config ssh-dss.c] [ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.c ssh-rsa.h dsa.c dsa.h] add support for RSA to SSH2. please test. there are now 3 types of keys: RSA1 is used by ssh-1 only, RSA and DSA are used by SSH2. you can use 'ssh-keygen -t rsa -f ssh2_rsa_file' to generate RSA keys for SSH2 and use the RSA keys for hostkeys or for user keys. SSH2 RSA or DSA keys are added to .ssh/authorised_keys2 as before. - (djm) Fix up Makefile and Redhat init script to create RSA host keys - (djm) Change to interim version
2000-11-13 12:57:25 +01:00
int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
char *pubkey_accepted_algos; /* Signature algos allowed for pubkey */
int pubkey_auth_options; /* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */
int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
* authentication. */
int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
* and any other password
* authentication mechanism,
* such as SecurID or
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
- (djm) Big OpenBSD sync: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/30 10:27:44 [log.c] allow loglevel debug - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 11:59:57 [packet.c] hmac->mac - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:03:03 [auth-krb4.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c] move fake-auth from auth1.c to individual auth methods, disables s/key in debug-msg - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/03 12:16:48 ssh.c do not resolve canonname, i have no idea why this was added oin ossh - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:30:44 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c -X now reads private ssh.com DSA keys, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:32:34 auth-options.c clear options on every call. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/09 15:51:00 authfd.c authfd.h interop with ssh-agent2, from <res@shore.net> - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 14:20:45 compat.c use rexexp for version string matching - provos@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/10 22:02:18 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c dh.c dh.h] First rough implementation of the diffie-hellman group exchange. The client can ask the server for bigger groups to perform the diffie-hellman in, thus increasing the attack complexity when using ciphers with longer keys. University of Windsor provided network, T the company. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 13:59:52 [auth-rsa.c auth2.c] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:00:27 [auth-options.h] clear auth options unless auth sucessfull - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:03:27 [scp.1 scp.c] support 'scp -o' with help from mouring@pconline.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:11:35 [dh.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:14:40 [auth.h auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h readpass.c servconf.c servconf.h] [ssh.h sshconnect2.c sshd_config auth2-skey.c cli.c cli.h] add support for s/key (kbd-interactive) to ssh2, based on work by mkiernan@avantgo.com and me - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:27:24 [auth.c auth1.c auth2.c authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h] [myproposal.h packet.c readconf.c session.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c] new cipher framework - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/11 14:45:21 [cipher.c] remove DES - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 03:59:20 [cipher.c cipher.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] enable DES in SSH-1 clients only - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/12 08:21:13 [kex.h packet.c] remove unused - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:34:46 [sshd.c] Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2; appro@fy.chalmers.se - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 12:59:15 [cipher.c cipher.h myproposal.h rijndael.c rijndael.h] rijndael/aes support - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:10:54 [sshd.8] more info about -V - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/10/13 13:12:02 [myproposal.h] prefer no compression
2000-10-14 07:23:11 +02:00
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
* passwords. */
int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
char *permit_user_env_allowlist; /* pattern-list of allowed env names */
int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_agent_forwarding;
int disable_forwarding;
u_int num_allow_users;
char **allow_users;
u_int num_deny_users;
char **deny_users;
u_int num_allow_groups;
char **allow_groups;
u_int num_deny_groups;
char **deny_groups;
u_int num_subsystems;
char **subsystem_name;
char **subsystem_command;
char **subsystem_args;
u_int num_accept_env;
char **accept_env;
u_int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
int max_startups_begin;
int max_startups_rate;
int max_startups;
int per_source_max_startups;
int per_source_masklen_ipv4;
int per_source_masklen_ipv6;
upstream: Add a facility to sshd(8) to penalise particular problematic client behaviours, controlled by two new sshd_config(5) options: PerSourcePenalties and PerSourcePenaltyExemptList. When PerSourcePenalties are enabled, sshd(8) will monitor the exit status of its child pre-auth session processes. Through the exit status, it can observe situations where the session did not authenticate as expected. These conditions include when the client repeatedly attempted authentication unsucessfully (possibly indicating an attack against one or more accounts, e.g. password guessing), or when client behaviour caused sshd to crash (possibly indicating attempts to exploit sshd). When such a condition is observed, sshd will record a penalty of some duration (e.g. 30 seconds) against the client's address. If this time is above a minimum threshold specified by the PerSourcePenalties, then connections from the client address will be refused (along with any others in the same PerSourceNetBlockSize CIDR range). Repeated offenses by the same client address will accrue greater penalties, up to a configurable maximum. A PerSourcePenaltyExemptList option allows certain address ranges to be exempt from all penalties. We hope these options will make it significantly more difficult for attackers to find accounts with weak/guessable passwords or exploit bugs in sshd(8) itself. PerSourcePenalties is off by default, but we expect to enable it automatically in the near future. much feedback markus@ and others, ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89ded70eccb2b4926ef0366a4d58a693de366cca
2024-06-06 19:15:25 +02:00
char *per_source_penalty_exempt;
struct per_source_penalty per_source_penalty;
int max_authtries;
int max_sessions;
char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
int use_dns;
int client_alive_interval; /*
* poke the client this often to
* see if it's still there
*/
int client_alive_count_max; /*
* If the client is unresponsive
* for this many intervals above,
* disconnect the session
*/
2001-07-04 20:37:20 +02:00
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char **authorized_keys_files;
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
char *pam_service_name;
int permit_tun;
char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_opens;
char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_listens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_keys_command;
char *authorized_keys_command_user;
char *authorized_principals_file;
char *authorized_principals_command;
char *authorized_principals_command_user;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
u_int num_auth_methods;
char **auth_methods;
int fingerprint_hash;
int expose_userauth_info;
u_int64_t timing_secret;
char *sk_provider;
int required_rsa_size; /* minimum size of RSA keys */
char **channel_timeouts; /* inactivity timeout by channel type */
u_int num_channel_timeouts;
int unused_connection_timeout;
char *sshd_session_path;
} ServerOptions;
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/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
struct connection_info {
const char *user;
const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
const char *address; /* remote address */
const char *laddress; /* local address */
int lport; /* local port */
const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */
int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be
* unspecified */
};
/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
struct include_item {
char *selector;
char *filename;
struct sshbuf *contents;
TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
/*
* These are string config options that must be copied between the
* Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
* privsep child to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
* the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
*
* NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
* COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
*/
#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_accepted_algos); \
M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_accepted_algos); \
M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \
M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(setenv, num_setenv); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(channel_timeouts, num_channel_timeouts); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(log_verbose, num_log_verbose); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(subsystem_name, num_subsystems); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(subsystem_command, num_subsystems); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(subsystem_args, num_subsystems); \
} while (0)
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *, int);
void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
void servconf_merge_subsystems(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *);
void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
char *derelativise_path(const char *);
void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path, int);
void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path);
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#endif /* SERVCONF_H */