openssh-portable/gss-serv.c

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/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
{ GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
{ NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
#if defined(KRB5) || defined (GSSAPI_SSPI)
extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
#endif
ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
#if defined (KRB5) || defined (GSSAPI_SSPI)
&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
#endif
&gssapi_null_mech,
};
/*
* ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
* list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
*/
static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
void
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
{
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
}
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
{
if (supported_oids == NULL)
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
}
/*
* Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
* Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
*/
/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
{
OM_uint32 status;
char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
gss_OID_set oidset;
if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
if (gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset) == GSS_S_FAILURE) // fix CodeQL SM02313
{
error("ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred: gss_create_empty_oid_set failed");
return (-1);
}
gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
if (gethostname(lname, HOST_NAME_MAX)) {
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (-1);
}
if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
NULL, NULL)))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
return (ctx->major);
} else {
ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
}
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
{
if (*ctx)
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
}
/* Unprivileged */
void
ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
{
int i = 0;
OM_uint32 min_status;
int present;
gss_OID_set supported;
gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
if (gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported) == GSS_S_FAILURE) // fix CodeQL SM02313
{
error("ssh_gssapi_supported_oids: gss_indicate_mechs failed to \
determine which underlying security mechanisms are available");
return;
}
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
&supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
present = 0;
if (present)
gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
&supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
i++;
}
gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
}
/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
* Requires that the context contains:
* oid
* credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
*/
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
{
OM_uint32 status;
gss_OID mech;
ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
&ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
if (ctx->client_creds)
debug("Received some client credentials");
else
debug("Got no client credentials");
status = ctx->major;
/* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
* we flag the user as also having been authenticated
*/
if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
(*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
}
return (status);
}
/*
* This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
* to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
* originally selected.
*/
static OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
{
u_char *tok;
OM_uint32 offset;
OM_uint32 oidl;
tok = ename->value;
/*
* Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
* header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
*/
if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
/*
* Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
* and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
* there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
* second without.
*/
oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
/*
* Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
* string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
*/
if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
ename->length < oidl+6 ||
!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
offset = oidl+6;
if (ename->length < offset+4)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
offset += 4;
if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
* be called once for a context */
/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
{
int i = 0;
gss_buffer_desc ename;
client->mech = NULL;
while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
(memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
i++;
}
if (client->mech == NULL)
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&client->displayname, NULL))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
&ename))) {
ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
return (ctx->major);
}
if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
&client->exportedname))) {
return (ctx->major);
}
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
return (ctx->major);
}
/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
void
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
gssapi_client.store.filename);
unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
}
}
/* As user */
void
ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
} else
debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
}
/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
* on the passed authentication process and credentials.
*/
/* As user */
void
ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
{
if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
gssapi_client.store.envval);
child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
gssapi_client.store.envval);
}
}
/* Privileged */
int
ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
debug("No suitable client data");
return 0;
}
if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
return 1;
else {
/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
return 0;
}
else
debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
return (0);
}
/* Privileged */
OM_uint32
ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
return (ctx->major);
}
/* Privileged */
const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void)
{
if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 ||
gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL)
return NULL;
return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value;
}
#endif