openssh-portable/deattack.c

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- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
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/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.9 2000/09/07 20:27:51 deraadt Exp $ */
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/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
*
* Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
*
* All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
* forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
* this copyright notice is retained.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE.
*
* Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
* <http://www.core-sdi.com>
*/
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#include "includes.h"
#include "deattack.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "crc32.h"
#include "getput.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* SSH Constants */
#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
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/* Hashing constants */
#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2)
#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
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#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
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/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
#define HASH(x) GET_32BIT(x)
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#define CMP(a,b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
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void
crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
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{
b ^= *a;
- (djm) Pick up LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment or PATH if not set by headers - (djm) OpenBSD CVS updates: - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:07:23 [ssh.c] accept remsh as a valid name as well; roman@buildpoint.com - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:17:13 [deattack.c crc32.c packet.c] rename crc32() to ssh_crc32() to avoid zlib name clash. do not move to libz crc32 function yet, because it has ugly "long"'s in it; oneill@cs.sfu.ca - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:26:08 [scp.1 scp.c] -S prog support; tv@debian.org - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:50:07 [scp.c] knf - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/18 20:57:33 [log-client.c] shorten - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 12:48:11 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c ssh.h] support for ~. in ssh2 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:29:40 [crc32.h] proper prototype - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:34:44 [authfd.c authfd.h key.c key.h ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c ssh-agent.1] [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c Makefile] [fingerprint.c fingerprint.h] add SSH2/DSA support to the agent and some other DSA related cleanups. (note that we cannot talk to ssh.com's ssh2 agents) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 15:55:52 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] more ~ support for ssh2 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/19 16:21:19 [clientloop.c] oops - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:25:53 [session.c] We have to stash the result of get_remote_name_or_ip() before we close our socket or getpeername() will get EBADF and the process will exit. Only a problem for "UseLogin yes". - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:30:59 [session.c] Only check /etc/nologin if "UseLogin no" since login(1) may have its own policy on determining who is allowed to login when /etc/nologin is present. Also use the _PATH_NOLOGIN define. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/20 12:42:43 [auth1.c auth2.c session.c ssh.c] Add calls to setusercontext() and login_get*(). We basically call setusercontext() in most places where previously we did a setlogin(). Add default login.conf file and put root in the "daemon" login class. - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/08/21 10:23:31 [session.c] Fix incorrect PATH setting; noted by Markus.
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*a = ssh_crc32((unsigned char *) &b, sizeof(b));
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}
/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
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int
check_crc(unsigned char *S, unsigned char *buf, u_int32_t len,
unsigned char *IV)
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{
u_int32_t crc;
unsigned char *c;
crc = 0;
if (IV && !CMP(S, IV)) {
crc_update(&crc, 1);
crc_update(&crc, 0);
}
for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!CMP(S, c)) {
crc_update(&crc, 1);
crc_update(&crc, 0);
} else {
crc_update(&crc, 0);
crc_update(&crc, 0);
}
}
return (crc == 0);
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}
/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
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int
detect_attack(unsigned char *buf, u_int32_t len, unsigned char *IV)
{
static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
static u_int16_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
register u_int32_t i, j;
u_int32_t l;
register unsigned char *c;
unsigned char *d;
if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
}
for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
;
if (h == NULL) {
debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
n = l;
h = (u_int16_t *) xmalloc(n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
} else {
if (l > n) {
n = l;
h = (u_int16_t *) xrealloc(h, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
}
}
if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (IV && (!CMP(c, IV))) {
if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!CMP(c, d)) {
if ((check_crc(c, buf, len, IV)))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
}
}
return (DEATTACK_OK);
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}
memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
if (IV)
h[HASH(IV) & (n - 1)] = HASH_IV;
for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
if (h[i] == HASH_IV) {
if (!CMP(c, IV)) {
if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
} else if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
if (check_crc(c, buf, len, IV))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
}
h[i] = j;
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}
return (DEATTACK_OK);
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}