openssh-portable/monitor_wrap.c

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/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.112 2019/01/21 09:54:11 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "dh.h"
#endif
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "monitor.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* Imports */
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *log_msg;
struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
int r;
size_t len;
if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len);
POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4);
if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd,
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(log_msg);
}
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
/*
* m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
* points to the unprivileged child.
*/
return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
}
void
mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
if (mlen >= 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen);
POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p = NULL;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len)
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char rtype;
int r;
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
mm_request_receive(sock, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rtype != type)
fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
rtype, type);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
BIGNUM *p, *g;
int r;
u_char success = 0;
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0)
fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
#endif
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg, u_int compat)
{
struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
struct passwd *
mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
struct passwd *pw;
size_t len;
u_int i;
ServerOptions *newopts;
int r;
u_char ok;
const u_char *p;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ok == 0) {
pw = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */
pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*pw))
fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
if (newopts->x != NULL) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
free(newopts);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (pw);
}
char *
mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *banner;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
free(banner);
banner = NULL;
}
return (banner);
}
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
void
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
u_int maxtries = 0;
#endif
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (maxtries > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries);
#endif
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
}
int
mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
}
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (authoptp != NULL)
*authoptp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) {
if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
if (authoptp != NULL) {
*authoptp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return allowed;
}
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int encoded_ret = 0;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
if (encoded_ret != 0)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
void
mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
int
mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *p, *msg;
int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r;
/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
if (tmp1 > 0)
close(tmp1);
if (tmp2 > 0)
close(tmp2);
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
close(tmp2);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
free(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
/* Success */
return (1);
}
void
mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* closed dup'ed master */
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
u_int
mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
size_t msglen;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(m);
2003-11-21 13:56:47 +01:00
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
void *
mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (NULL);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (authctxt);
}
int
mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int i, n;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
int
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int n, i;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = (int)n; /* XXX */
debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
void
mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Request process termination */
void
mm_terminate(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
int
mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authok;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
*ctx = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int flags;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (flagsp != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
*flagsp = flags;
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return(major);
}
int
mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */