openssh-portable/deattack.c

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/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.27 2006/03/30 09:58:15 djm Exp $ */
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/*
* Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code
*
* Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina.
*
* All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary
* forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that
* this copyright notice is retained.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
* WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE
* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR
* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS
* SOFTWARE.
*
* Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com>
* <http://www.core-sdi.com>
*/
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#include "includes.h"
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#include "deattack.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
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#include "log.h"
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#include "crc32.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
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/* SSH Constants */
#define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024)
#define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8)
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/* Hashing constants */
#define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024)
#define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2)
#define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2)
#define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff)
#define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff)
#define HASH_IV (0xfffe)
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#define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE)
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/* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */
#define HASH(x) get_u32(x)
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#define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE))
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static void
crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b)
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{
b ^= *a;
*a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b));
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}
/* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */
static int
check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
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{
u_int32_t crc;
u_char *c;
crc = 0;
for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!CMP(S, c)) {
crc_update(&crc, 1);
crc_update(&crc, 0);
} else {
crc_update(&crc, 0);
crc_update(&crc, 0);
}
}
return (crc == 0);
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}
/* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */
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int
detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len)
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{
static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL;
static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE;
u_int32_t i, j;
u_int32_t l;
u_char *c;
u_char *d;
if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) ||
len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) {
fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len);
}
for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2)
;
if (h == NULL) {
debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector.");
h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
n = l;
} else {
if (l > n) {
h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
n = l;
}
}
if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) {
for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) {
if (!CMP(c, d)) {
if ((check_crc(c, buf, len)))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
}
}
return (DEATTACK_OK);
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}
memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE);
for (c = buf, j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) {
for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED;
i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) {
if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) {
if (check_crc(c, buf, len))
return (DEATTACK_DETECTED);
else
break;
}
}
h[i] = j;
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}
return (DEATTACK_OK);
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}