openssh-portable/sshconnect.c

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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.297 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
* login (authentication) dialog.
- (djm) Merge OpenBSD changes: - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 02:59:57 [session.c] print hostname (not hushlogin) - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:18:48 [authfile.c ssh-add.c] enable ssh-add -d for DSA keys - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/05 13:20:49 [sftp-server.c] cleanup - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/06 03:46:41 [authfile.h] prototype - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:27:56 [ALL] cleanup copyright notices on all files. I have attempted to be accurate with the details. everything is now under Tatu's licence (which I copied from his readme), and/or the core-sdi bsd-ish thing for deattack, or various openbsd developers under a 2-term bsd licence. We're not changing any rules, just being accurate. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:40:30 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c ssh.c] cleanup window and packet sizes for ssh2 flow control; ok niels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 14:53:00 [scp.c] typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/07 15:13:37 [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rsa.c auth.c] [authfile.h canohost.c channels.h compat.c hostfile.h log.c match.h] [pty.c readconf.c] some more Copyright fixes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/08 03:02:51 [README.openssh2] bye bye - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/11 18:38:33 [LICENCE cipher.c] a few more comments about it being ARC4 not RC4 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/12 14:53:11 [log-client.c log-server.c log.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c] multiple debug levels - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/14 14:25:15 [clientloop.c] typo - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2000/09/15 01:13:51 [ssh-agent.c] check return value for setenv(3) for failure, and deal appropriately
2000-09-16 04:29:08 +02:00
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
# include <ifaddrs.h>
#endif
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
#include "xmalloc.h"
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42 [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 04:39:39 +02:00
#include "key.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "buffer.h"
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
#include "packet.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "key.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 06:34:40 +01:00
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
Hopefully things did not get mixed around too much. It compiles under Linux and works. So that is at least a good sign. =) 20010122 - (bal) OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 12:45:26 GMT 2001 by markus [servconf.c ssh.h sshd.c] only auth-chall.c needs #ifdef SKEY - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 15:55:10 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth1.c auth2.c channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dispatch.c nchan.c packet.c pathname.h readconf.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c ssh.h ssh1.h sshconnect1.c sshd.c ttymodes.c] move ssh1 definitions to ssh1.h, pathnames to pathnames.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:48:14 [sshd.8] fix typo; from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/19 16:50:58 [ssh-dss.c] clear and free digest, make consistent with other code (use dlen); from stevesk@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 15:55:20 GMT 2001 by markus [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c auth2.c] pass the filename to auth_parse_options() - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 17:59:40 GMT 2001 [readconf.c] fix SIGSEGV from -o ""; problem noted by jehsom@togetherweb.com - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 18:20:29 [sshconnect2.c] dh_new_group() does not return NULL. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 21:33:42 [ssh-add.c] do not loop forever if askpass does not exist; from andrew@pimlott.ne.mediaone.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:00:56 [servconf.c] Check for NULL return from strdelim; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/20 23:02:07 [readconf.c] KNF; ok markus - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 9:00:33 [ssh-keygen.1] remove -R flag; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/21 19:05:40 [atomicio.c automicio.h auth-chall.c auth-krb4.c auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufaux.h buffer.c canahost.c canahost.h channels.c cipher.c cli.c clientloop.c clientloop.h compat.c compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c groupaccess.c hmac.c hostfile.c kex.c key.c key.h log-client.c log-server.c log.c log.h login.c login.h match.c misc.c misc.h nchan.c packet.c pty.c radix.h readconf.c readpass.c readpass.h rsa.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c serverloop.h session.c sftp-server.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c tildexpand.c tildexpand.h ttysmodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] split ssh.h and try to cleanup the #include mess. remove unnecessary #includes. rename util.[ch] -> misc.[ch] - (bal) renamed 'PIDDIR' to '_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR' to match OpenBSD tree - (bal) Moved #ifdef KRB4 in auth-krb4.c above the #include to resolve conflict when compiling for non-kerb install - (bal) removed the #ifdef SKEY in auth1.c to match Markus' changes on 1/19.
2001-01-22 06:34:40 +01:00
#include "readconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfd.h"
char *client_version_string = NULL;
char *server_version_string = NULL;
struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL;
static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
/* import */
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
extern uid_t original_real_uid;
extern uid_t original_effective_uid;
static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
/* Expand a proxy command */
static char *
expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
const char *host, int port)
{
char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
"r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
* a connected fd back to us.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
const char *proxy_command)
{
2016-12-19 23:46:28 +01:00
#ifdef WINDOWS
fatal("proxy fdpass connect is not supported in Windows");
/*
* Unix logic relies on passing in ancillary data over domain sockets
* This concept does not exist in Windows.
* Possible implementation in Windows could have proxy_command return
* connection handle through IPC means
*/
return 0;
#else /* !WINDOWS */
char *command_string;
int sp[2], sock;
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0)
fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
"proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
host, port);
debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
/* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
close(sp[1]);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
if (sp[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0)
perror("dup2 stdin");
}
if (sp[0] != 1) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0)
perror("dup2 stdout");
}
if (sp[0] >= 2)
close(sp[0]);
/*
* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
* printed on the user's terminal.
*/
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/*
* Execute the proxy command.
* Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
*/
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid < 0)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sp[0]);
free(command_string);
if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
close(sp[1]);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
2016-12-19 23:46:28 +01:00
#endif /* !WINDOWS */
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
const char *proxy_command)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
char *command_string;
int pin[2], pout[2];
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0)
fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
host, port);
debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
#ifdef FORK_NOT_SUPPORTED
{
posix_spawn_file_actions_t actions;
char* spawn_argv[2];
/*
* expand_proxy_command prefixes cmdline with "exec "
*/
spawn_argv[0] = command_string + 5;
spawn_argv[1] = NULL;
pid = -1;
if (posix_spawn_file_actions_init(&actions) != 0 ||
posix_spawn_file_actions_adddup2(&actions, pin[0], STDIN_FILENO) != 0 ||
posix_spawn_file_actions_adddup2(&actions, pout[1], STDOUT_FILENO) != 0)
fatal("posix_spawn initialization failed");
else if (posix_spawn(&pid, spawn_argv[0], &actions, NULL, spawn_argv, NULL) != 0)
fatal("posix_spawn: %s", strerror(errno));
posix_spawn_file_actions_destroy(&actions);
}
#else
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
/* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */
permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
if (pin[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
}
close(pout[0]);
if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0)
perror("dup2 stdout");
/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
close(pout[1]);
/* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get
printed on the user's terminal. */
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
extra privileges above. */
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
2001-01-07 12:45:22 +01:00
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
#endif
/* Parent. */
if (pid < 0)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
/* Free the command name. */
free(command_string);
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
return 0;
}
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
void
ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
{
/*
* Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
* case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
*/
if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
}
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/*
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
* address that matches the desired address family on the specifed interface.
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
static int
check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs,
struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
struct in6_addr *v6addr;
const struct ifaddrs *ifa;
int allow_local;
/*
* Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them
* if nothing else matches.
*/
for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) {
for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL ||
(ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 ||
ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af ||
strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0)
continue;
switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr ==
htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr;
v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr;
if (!allow_local &&
(IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr)))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) {
error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp);
return 0;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection.
*/
static int
ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
int sock, r, oerrno;
struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr;
socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0;
struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL;
#endif
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL &&
!privileged)
return sock;
if (options.bind_address != NULL) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL,
&hints, &res)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (res == NULL) {
error("getaddrinfo: no addrs");
goto fail;
}
if (res->ai_addrlen > sizeof(bindaddr)) {
error("%s: addr doesn't fit", __func__);
goto fail;
}
memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen;
} else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) {
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) {
error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface,
strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr);
if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family,
ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) {
logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses",
options.bind_interface);
goto fail;
}
#else
error("BindInterface not supported on this platform.");
#endif
}
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
/*
* If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged
* port, bind our own socket to a privileged port.
*/
if (privileged) {
PRIV_START;
r = bindresvport_sa(sock,
bindaddrlen == 0 ? NULL : (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr);
oerrno = errno;
PRIV_END;
if (r < 0) {
error("bindresvport_sa %s: %s", ntop,
strerror(oerrno));
goto fail;
}
} else if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) {
error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop);
/* success */
goto out;
fail:
close(sock);
sock = -1;
out:
if (res != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(res);
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if (ifaddrs != NULL)
freeifaddrs(ifaddrs);
#endif
return sock;
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
/*
* Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
* *timeoutp with time remaining.
* Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
*/
static int
waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timeval t_start;
int oerrno, r;
monotime_tv(&t_start);
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
oerrno = errno;
ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
errno = oerrno;
if (r > 0)
return 0;
else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN)
return -1;
else if (r == 0)
break;
}
/* timeout */
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
}
static int
timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
{
int optval = 0;
socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
/* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
if (*timeoutp <= 0)
return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
set_nonblock(sockfd);
if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
/* Succeeded already? */
unset_nonblock(sockfd);
return 0;
} else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
return -1;
if (waitrfd(sockfd, timeoutp) == -1)
return -1;
/* Completed or failed */
if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (optval != 0) {
errno = optval;
return -1;
}
unset_nonblock(sockfd);
return 0;
}
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
* If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true,
* a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection.
* This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true.
* Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
*/
static int
ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
NOTE: This update changes the RSA key generation. *NEW RSA KEYS NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06" for more details. 20010118 - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus [sshd.c] maxfd+1 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 [ssh-keygen.1] small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 [ssh-keyscan.c] use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 [ssh-keyscan.c] free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 [ssh-add.c] typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 [packet.c packet.h] reorder, typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 [auth-options.c] fix comment - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 [session.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] move callback to headerfile - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 [ssh.c] use log() instead of stderr - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 [dh.c] use error() not stderr! - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 [sftp-server.c] rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 [sftp-server.c] readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 [key.c ssh-rsa.c] make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 [sftp-server.c] remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] indent - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may be missing such feature.
2001-01-18 03:04:35 +01:00
int on = 1;
int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo *ai;
debug2("%s: needpriv %d", __func__, needpriv);
memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
if (attempt > 0) {
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
debug("Trying again...");
}
/*
* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
* sequence until the connection succeeds.
*/
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) {
errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
continue;
}
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
errno = oerrno;
continue;
}
debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
host, ntop, strport);
/* Create a socket for connecting. */
sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai);
if (sock < 0) {
/* Any error is already output */
errno = 0;
continue;
}
if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
timeout_ms) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
oerrno = errno;
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
sock = -1;
errno = oerrno;
}
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
if (sock != -1)
break; /* Successful connection. */
}
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
if (sock == -1) {
error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
debug("Connection established.");
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (want_keepalive &&
NOTE: This update changes the RSA key generation. *NEW RSA KEYS NEED TO BE GENERATED* =) Refer to to entry "2001/01/16 19:20:06" for more details. 20010118 - (bal) Super Sized OpenBSD Resync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/11 22:14:20 GMT 2001 by markus [sshd.c] maxfd+1 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 17:59:18 [ssh-keygen.1] small ssh-keygen manpage cleanup; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:03:07 [scp.c ssh-keygen.c sshd.c] getopt() returns -1 not EOF; stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:06:54 [ssh-keyscan.c] use SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:12:47 [ssh-keyscan.c] free() -> xfree(); fix memory leak; from stevesk@pobox.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:14:13 [ssh-add.c] typo, from stevesk@sweden.hp.com - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:32:50 [packet.c session.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] split out keepalive from packet_interactive (from dale@accentre.com) set IPTOS_LOWDELAY TCP_NODELAY IPTOS_THROUGHPUT for ssh2, too. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:36:45 [packet.c packet.h] reorder, typo - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:38:00 [auth-options.c] fix comment - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 18:43:31 [session.c] Wall - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/13 19:14:08 [clientloop.h clientloop.c ssh.c] move callback to headerfile - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:40:10 [ssh.c] use log() instead of stderr - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:43:51 [dh.c] use error() not stderr! - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:45:29 [sftp-server.c] rename must fail if newpath exists, debug off by default - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/15 21:46:38 [sftp-server.c] readable long listing for sftp-server, ok deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 19:20:06 [key.c ssh-rsa.c] make "ssh-rsa" key format for ssh2 confirm to the ietf-drafts; from galb@vandyke.com. note that you have to delete older ssh2-rsa keys, since they are in the wrong format, too. they must be removed from .ssh/authorized_keys2 and .ssh/known_hosts2, etc. (cd; grep -v ssh-rsa .ssh/authorized_keys2 > TMP && mv TMP .ssh/authorized_keys2) additionally, we now check that BN_num_bits(rsa->n) >= 768. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 20:54:27 [sftp-server.c] remove some statics. simpler handles; idea from nisse@lysator.liu.se - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2001/01/16 23:58:08 [bufaux.c radix.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c] indent - (bal) Added bsd-strmode.[ch] since some non-OpenBSD platforms may be missing such feature.
2001-01-18 03:04:35 +01:00
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
sizeof(on)) < 0)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
/* Set the connection. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
return 0;
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
int
ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs,
struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
{
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port,
family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive,
needpriv);
} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh,
STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO)) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, port, options.proxy_command);
}
static void
send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
{
/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION);
if (atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string,
strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string))
fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
chop(client_version_string);
debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string);
}
/*
* Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own
* identification string.
*/
void
ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */
int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in();
int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out();
u_int i, n;
size_t len;
int rc;
send_client_banner(connection_out, 0);
/* Read other side's version identification. */
for (n = 0;;) {
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) {
if (timeout_ms > 0) {
rc = waitrfd(connection_in, &timeout_ms);
if (rc == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
fatal("Connection timed out during "
"banner exchange");
} else if (rc == -1) {
fatal("%s: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
}
len = atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1);
if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE)
fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
"Connection closed by remote host");
else if (len != 1)
fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
"read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (buf[i] == '\r') {
buf[i] = '\n';
buf[i + 1] = 0;
continue; /**XXX wait for \n */
}
if (buf[i] == '\n') {
buf[i + 1] = 0;
break;
}
if (++n > 65536)
fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: "
"No banner received");
}
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0;
if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf);
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
server_version_string = xstrdup(buf);
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3)
fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf);
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
mismatch = 0;
switch (remote_major) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remote_minor != 99)
mismatch = 1;
break;
default:
mismatch = 1;
break;
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
if (mismatch)
fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
chop(server_version_string);
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
/* defaults to 'no' */
static int
confirm(const char *prompt)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
char *p;
int ret = -1;
if (options.batch_mode)
return 0;
for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) {
p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
p[strcspn(p, "\n")] = '\0';
if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0)
ret = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
ret = 1;
free(p);
if (ret != -1)
return ret;
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
}
}
static int
check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *host_key)
{
const char *reason;
if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
if (buffer_len(host_key->cert->critical) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
"critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
{
switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
case AF_INET6:
return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
* host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
*/
void
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
{
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
socklen_t addrlen;
switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
case -1:
addrlen = 0;
break;
case AF_INET:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
case AF_INET6:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
break;
}
/*
* We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
* using a proxy command
*/
if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
} else {
*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
"command>");
}
}
/*
* Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
* differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
* tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
* sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
*/
if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
} else {
*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
}
}
}
/*
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
#define RDRW 0
#define RDONLY 1
#define ROQUIET 2
static int
check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
1999-10-27 05:42:43 +02:00
{
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL;
char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
char msg[1024];
const char *type;
const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0;
int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
u_int i;
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
* machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
* them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
* essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
* this is probably not a real problem.
*/
if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
"loopback/localhost.");
return 0;
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
* In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
*/
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
/*
* Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
* command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
options.check_host_ip = 0;
host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
ip_hostkeys = NULL;
if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
}
retry:
/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key);
type = sshkey_type(host_key);
/*
* Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
* hosts or in the systemwide list.
*/
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
&host_found);
/*
* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
* localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
* address to begin with.
*/
if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
&ip_found);
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
(ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
(ip_found != NULL &&
!sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
host_ip_differ = 1;
} else
ip_status = host_status;
switch (host_status) {
case HOST_OK:
/* The host is known and the key matches. */
debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
if (want_cert &&
!check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key))
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
if (readonly || want_cert)
2003-04-09 12:59:48 +02:00
logit("%s host key for IP address "
"'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
type, ip);
else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
2003-04-09 12:59:48 +02:00
logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
"address '%.128s' to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
user_hostfiles[0]);
else
2003-04-09 12:59:48 +02:00
logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
hostkey_trusted = 1;
break;
case HOST_NEW:
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
debug("checking without port identifier");
if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
debug("found matching key w/out port");
break;
}
}
if (readonly || want_cert)
goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) {
/*
* User has requested strict host key checking. We
* will not add the host key automatically. The only
* alternative left is to abort.
*/
error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
"have requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
"\nbut keys of different type are already"
" known for this host.");
else
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
msg2[0] = '\0';
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
if (matching_host_key_dns)
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"Matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
else
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"No matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
}
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
"established%s\n"
"%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
"(yes/no)? ",
host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
msg2);
free(ra);
free(fp);
if (!confirm(msg))
goto fail;
hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
}
/*
* If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically
* to the local known_hosts file.
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
hostp = hostline;
if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
} else {
/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
hostline, host_key,
options.hash_known_hosts);
}
} else {
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
hostp = host;
}
if (!r)
2003-04-09 12:59:48 +02:00
logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
else
2003-04-09 12:59:48 +02:00
logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
"list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_REVOKED:
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
error("impersonate this host.");
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
goto continue_unsafe;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (want_cert) {
/*
* This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
* CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
* all hosts that one might visit.
*/
debug("Host certificate authority does not "
"match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
host_found->file, host_found->line);
goto fail;
}
if (readonly == ROQUIET)
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- Remove references to SSLeay. - Big OpenBSD CVS update - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [clientloop.c] - typo [session.c] - update proctitle on pty alloc/dealloc, e.g. w/ windows client [session.c] - update proctitle for proto 1, too [channels.h nchan.c serverloop.c session.c sshd.c] - use c-style comments - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [scp.c] - more atomicio - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [channels.c] - set O_NONBLOCK [ssh.1] - update AUTHOR [readconf.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.h] - default DSA key file ~/.ssh/id_dsa [clientloop.c] - typo, rm verbose debug - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org [ssh-keygen.1] - document DSA use of ssh-keygen [sshd.8] - a start at describing what i understand of the DSA side [ssh-keygen.1] - document -X and -x [ssh-keygen.c] - simplify usage - markus@cvs.openbsd.org [sshd.8] - there is no rhosts_dsa [ssh-keygen.1] - document -y, update -X,-x [nchan.c] - fix close for non-open ssh1 channels [servconf.c servconf.h ssh.h sshd.8 sshd.c ] - s/DsaKey/HostDSAKey/, document option [sshconnect2.c] - respect number_of_password_prompts [channels.c channels.h servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8] - GatewayPorts for sshd, ok deraadt@ [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh.1] - more doc on: DSA, id_dsa, known_hosts2, authorized_keys2 [ssh.1] - more info on proto 2 [sshd.8] - sync AUTHOR w/ ssh.1 [key.c key.h sshconnect.c] - print key type when talking about host keys [packet.c] - clear padding in ssh2 [dsa.c key.c radix.c ssh.h sshconnect1.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] - replace broken uuencode w/ libc b64_ntop [auth2.c] - log failure before sending the reply [key.c radix.c uuencode.c] - remote trailing comments before calling __b64_pton [auth2.c readconf.c readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh.1] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8] - add DSAAuthetication option to ssh/sshd, document SSH2 in sshd.8 - Bring in b64_ntop and b64_pton from OpenBSD libc (bsd-base64.[ch])
2000-05-07 04:03:14 +02:00
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
sshkey_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
continue_unsafe:
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
* the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_agent) {
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_x11) {
error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_x11 = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.num_local_forwards =
options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
"check failure");
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
* identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
* by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
* accept the authentication.
*/
break;
case HOST_FOUND:
fatal("internal error");
break;
}
if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
"differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
"\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
len = strlen(msg);
snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
"\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
}
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
"to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
if (!confirm(msg))
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
logit("%s", msg);
error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
goto fail;
} else {
logit("%s", msg);
}
}
if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
"disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__);
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return 0;
fail:
if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
/*
* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
* search normally.
*/
debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
host_key = raw_key;
goto retry;
}
sshkey_free(raw_key);
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return -1;
}
/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
int
verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
{
u_int i;
int r = -1, flags = 0;
char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
"ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
(unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
host_key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
valid);
for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
host_key->cert->principals[i]);
}
} else {
debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp);
}
if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key",
__func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
options.revoked_host_keys);
r = -1;
goto out;
default:
error("Error checking host key %s %s in "
"revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
/*
* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
* them and try the plain key.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
matching_host_key_dns = 1;
} else {
warn_changed_key(plain);
error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
"with the new host key to get rid "
"of this message.");
}
}
}
}
r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
out:
sshkey_free(plain);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
* server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
* to the server must already have been established before this is called.
* If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
* This function does not require super-user privileges.
*/
void
ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
{
char *host;
char *server_user, *local_user;
local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
host = xstrdup(orighost);
lowercase(host);
/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);
/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
packet_set_nonblocking();
/* key exchange */
/* authenticate user */
debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port);
ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
free(local_user);
}
void
ssh_put_password(char *password)
{
int size;
char *padded;
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) {
packet_put_cstring(password);
return;
}
size = ROUNDUP(strlen(password) + 1, 32);
padded = xcalloc(1, size);
strlcpy(padded, password, size);
packet_put_string(padded, size);
explicit_bzero(padded, size);
free(padded);
}
/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
static int
show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int type[] = {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_XMSS,
-1
};
int i, ret = 0;
char *fp, *ra;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
if (type[i] == key->type)
continue;
if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
"%s key fingerprint %s.",
key_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
key_type(found->key), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
static void
warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key)
{
char *fp;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (fp == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
key_type(host_key), fp);
error("Please contact your system administrator.");
free(fp);
}
/*
* Execute a local command
*/
int
ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
{
2016-12-19 23:46:28 +01:00
#ifdef WINDOWS
fatal("executing local command is not supported in Windows yet");
return 0;
#else /* !WINDOWS */
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int status;
void (*osighand)(int);
if (!options.permit_local_command ||
args == NULL || !*args)
return (1);
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
shell, args, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
return (1);
return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
2016-12-19 23:46:28 +01:00
#endif /* !WINDOWS */
}
void
maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, const struct sshkey *private,
char *comment, char *passphrase)
{
int auth_sock = -1, r;
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
return;
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
return;
}
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
!ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
debug3("user denied adding this key");
close(auth_sock);
return;
}
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0,
(options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0)) == 0)
debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
else
debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
close(auth_sock);
}