upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss
after checking with codespell tool (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell) OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
This commit is contained in:
parent
260ede2787
commit
001aa55484
|
@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
|
|||
|
||||
valid after <= current time < valid before
|
||||
|
||||
criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
|
||||
critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
|
||||
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
|
||||
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -291,4 +291,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
|
|||
of this script will not be permitted if
|
||||
this option is not present.
|
||||
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.13 2017/11/03 02:32:19 djm Exp $
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.14 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
|
|||
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
|
||||
authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
|
||||
proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
|
||||
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
|
||||
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet
|
||||
lengths.
|
||||
|
||||
Negotiation
|
||||
|
@ -103,5 +103,5 @@ References
|
|||
[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
|
||||
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
|
||||
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.3 2016/05/03 13:10:24 djm Exp $
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ This section may appear multiple times.
|
|||
5. KRL signature sections
|
||||
|
||||
The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
|
||||
preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
|
||||
preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
|
||||
is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
|
||||
Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
|
||||
in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
|
||||
|
@ -166,4 +166,4 @@ Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
|
|||
signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
|
||||
trusted means.
|
||||
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $
|
||||
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
|
||||
|
|
4
auth.h
4
auth.h
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.95 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.96 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
|
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
|
|||
struct sshkey **prev_keys;
|
||||
u_int nprev_keys;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Last used key and ancilliary information from active auth method */
|
||||
/* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */
|
||||
struct sshkey *auth_method_key;
|
||||
char *auth_method_info;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
4
authfd.c
4
authfd.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.108 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.109 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
|
|||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
|
||||
/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
|
||||
static u_int
|
||||
agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.379 2018/02/05 05:36:49 tb Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.380 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
|
|||
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
|
||||
* with the newly allocated channel ID.
|
||||
* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
|
||||
* channels and procesed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
|
||||
* channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
|
||||
* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
|
||||
* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
|
||||
* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
|
||||
|
@ -2610,7 +2610,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
|
|||
* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
|
||||
* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
|
||||
* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
|
||||
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currenly
|
||||
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
|
||||
* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
|
||||
* easily.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
@ -2787,7 +2787,7 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
|
|||
/*
|
||||
* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
|
||||
* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
|
||||
* restore the orignal channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
|
||||
* restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
|
||||
* so we can cleanup the channel.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.311 2018/02/11 21:16:56 dtucker Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.312 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
|
|||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
|
||||
cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
|
||||
|
||||
/* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */
|
||||
/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
|
||||
tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
|
||||
c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
4
kexdhs.c
4
kexdhs.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.26 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.27 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
|
|||
|
||||
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
|
||||
|
||||
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
|
||||
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
|
||||
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
|
||||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
|
||||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.32 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.33 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
|
@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
|
|||
|
||||
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
|
||||
|
||||
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
|
||||
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
|
||||
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
|
||||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
|
||||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */
|
||||
|
|
4
scp.c
4
scp.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.195 2018/02/10 06:15:12 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.196 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
|
||||
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
|
||||
|
@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the
|
||||
* This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
|
||||
* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
|
||||
* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
|||
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.327 2018/04/04 15:12:17 job Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.328 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
* All rights reserved
|
||||
|
@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
|
|||
case sAuthenticationMethods:
|
||||
if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
|
||||
value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
|
||||
value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */
|
||||
value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
|
||||
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
|
||||
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
|
||||
if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
|
||||
|
@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
|
|||
*
|
||||
* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
|
||||
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
|
||||
* do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
|
||||
* do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void
|
||||
copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
|
||||
|
|
4
sftp.c
4
sftp.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.182 2017/11/03 03:46:52 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.183 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@ complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Complete ambigious command */
|
||||
/* Complete ambiguous command */
|
||||
tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
|
||||
if (count > 1)
|
||||
complete_display(list, 0);
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.229 2018/04/09 23:54:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.230 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)
|
|||
|
||||
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);
|
||||
|
||||
/* check wheter agent is locked */
|
||||
/* check whether agent is locked */
|
||||
if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
|
||||
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
|
|
4
ssh.c
4
ssh.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.475 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.476 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
|
|||
/* load options.identity_files */
|
||||
load_public_identity_files(pw);
|
||||
|
||||
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME varibale */
|
||||
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
|
||||
if (options.identity_agent &&
|
||||
strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
|
||||
if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.1 2015/01/19 20:30:23 markus Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
|
|||
* ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available.
|
||||
* in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing
|
||||
* the data received over network to ssh_input_append().
|
||||
* additinally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
|
||||
* additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
|
||||
* byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange
|
||||
* would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through
|
||||
* ssh_output_ptr().
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
|
|||
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
|
||||
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
||||
.\"
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.272 2018/04/07 13:50:10 jmc Exp $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 7 2018 $
|
||||
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.273 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
|
||||
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 10 2018 $
|
||||
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
|
||||
.Os
|
||||
.Sh NAME
|
||||
|
@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ section.
|
|||
.It Cm RemoteForward
|
||||
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
|
||||
the secure channel.
|
||||
The remote port may either be fowarded to a specified host and port
|
||||
The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
|
||||
from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
|
||||
client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
|
||||
The first argument must be
|
||||
|
|
4
sshbuf.h
4
sshbuf.h
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.9 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.10 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct sshbuf {
|
|||
#ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new()
|
||||
* instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is
|
||||
* instead. sshbuf_init() is deprecated and will go away soon (it is
|
||||
* only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf);
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.297 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.298 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
|
|||
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
|
||||
* address that matches the desired address family on the specifed interface.
|
||||
* address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
|
||||
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
|
|
4
sshd.c
4
sshd.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.506 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.507 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
|
||||
|
@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
|
|||
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
|
||||
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
|
||||
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
|
||||
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
|
||||
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
|
||||
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
|
||||
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
|
||||
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
|
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct ssh_xmss_state {
|
|||
treehash_inst *treehash;
|
||||
|
||||
u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */
|
||||
u_int32_t maxidx; /* resticted # of signatures */
|
||||
u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */
|
||||
int have_state; /* .state file exists */
|
||||
int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */
|
||||
int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
|
||||
|
@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
|
|||
}
|
||||
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
|
||||
if (idx == state->idx) {
|
||||
/* no signature happend, no need to update */
|
||||
/* no signature happened, no need to update */
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {
|
||||
|
|
14
umac.c
14
umac.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.16 2017/12/12 15:06:12 naddy Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
*
|
||||
* umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
|
||||
|
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
|
|||
/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
|
||||
/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
|
||||
/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
|
||||
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */
|
||||
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */
|
||||
|
||||
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
|
||||
/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
|
||||
|
@ -295,9 +295,9 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
|
|||
* Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
|
||||
* must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
|
||||
* the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
|
||||
* optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
|
||||
* optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface
|
||||
* is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
|
||||
* responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
|
||||
* responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
|
||||
* must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
|
||||
|
@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
|
|||
typedef struct {
|
||||
UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
|
||||
UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
|
||||
int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */
|
||||
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */
|
||||
int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */
|
||||
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */
|
||||
UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
|
||||
} nh_ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
|
|||
|
||||
|
||||
/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
|
||||
* produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
|
||||
* produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
|
||||
* product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
|
||||
* multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
wots.c version 20160722
|
||||
Andreas Hülsing
|
||||
|
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, co
|
|||
* Computes the chaining function.
|
||||
* out and in have to be n-byte arrays
|
||||
*
|
||||
* interpretes in as start-th value of the chain
|
||||
* interprets in as start-th value of the chain
|
||||
* addr has to contain the address of the chain
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue