upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss

after checking with codespell tool
(https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2018-04-10 00:10:49 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 260ede2787
commit 001aa55484
22 changed files with 54 additions and 54 deletions

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@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
valid after <= current time < valid before
criticial options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
@ -291,4 +291,4 @@ permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
of this script will not be permitted if
this option is not present.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.13 2017/11/03 02:32:19 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.14 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

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@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encyption of the packet
data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet
lengths.
Negotiation
@ -103,5 +103,5 @@ References
[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.3 2016/05/03 13:10:24 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

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@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ This section may appear multiple times.
5. KRL signature sections
The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
preceeding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
@ -166,4 +166,4 @@ Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
trusted means.
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.3 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $
$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.4 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $

4
auth.h
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.95 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.96 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
struct sshkey **prev_keys;
u_int nprev_keys;
/* Last used key and ancilliary information from active auth method */
/* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */
struct sshkey *auth_method_key;
char *auth_method_info;

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.108 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.109 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
*/
/* encode signature algoritm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
static u_int
agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
{

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.379 2018/02/05 05:36:49 tb Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.380 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
* with the newly allocated channel ID.
* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
* channels and procesed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
* channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
@ -2610,7 +2610,7 @@ channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currenly
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
* easily.
*/
@ -2787,7 +2787,7 @@ channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
/*
* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
* restore the orignal channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
* restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
* so we can cleanup the channel.
*/
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.311 2018/02/11 21:16:56 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.312 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -664,7 +664,7 @@ client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
/* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */
/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.26 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kexdhs.c,v 1.27 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ input_kex_dh_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.32 2018/02/07 02:06:51 jsing Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.33 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
/* destroy_sensitive_data(); */
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */
/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */

4
scp.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.195 2018/02/10 06:15:12 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.196 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@ -311,7 +311,7 @@ do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
}
/*
* This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the
* This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
*/

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.327 2018/04/04 15:12:17 job Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.328 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@ -1951,7 +1951,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
case sAuthenticationMethods:
if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
value2 = 0; /* sucessfully parsed any method */
value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
@ -2135,7 +2135,7 @@ int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
*
* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
* do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
* do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
*/
void
copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)

4
sftp.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.182 2017/11/03 03:46:52 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.183 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
@ -1844,7 +1844,7 @@ complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
return 0;
}
/* Complete ambigious command */
/* Complete ambiguous command */
tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
if (count > 1)
complete_display(list, 0);

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.229 2018/04/09 23:54:49 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.230 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ process_message(u_int socknum)
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);
/* check wheter agent is locked */
/* check whether agent is locked */
if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
switch (type) {

4
ssh.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.475 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.476 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1485,7 +1485,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* load options.identity_files */
load_public_identity_files(pw);
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME varibale */
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
if (options.identity_agent &&
strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.1 2015/01/19 20:30:23 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
* ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available.
* in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing
* the data received over network to ssh_input_append().
* additinally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
* additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
* byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange
* would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through
* ssh_output_ptr().

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@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.272 2018/04/07 13:50:10 jmc Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 7 2018 $
.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.273 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: April 10 2018 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -1308,7 +1308,7 @@ section.
.It Cm RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel.
The remote port may either be fowarded to a specified host and port
The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
The first argument must be

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.9 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.10 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct sshbuf {
#ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED
/*
* NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new()
* instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is
* instead. sshbuf_init() is deprecated and will go away soon (it is
* only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH)
*/
void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf);

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.297 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.298 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/*
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
* address that matches the desired address family on the specifed interface.
* address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
static int

4
sshd.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.506 2018/03/03 03:15:51 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.507 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1336,7 +1336,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.1 2018/02/23 15:58:38 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ struct ssh_xmss_state {
treehash_inst *treehash;
u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */
u_int32_t maxidx; /* resticted # of signatures */
u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */
int have_state; /* .state file exists */
int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */
int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
@ -583,7 +583,7 @@ sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
}
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
if (idx == state->idx) {
/* no signature happend, no need to update */
/* no signature happened, no need to update */
ret = 0;
goto done;
} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {

14
umac.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.16 2017/12/12 15:06:12 naddy Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
@ -295,9 +295,9 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
* Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
* must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
* the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
* optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface
* optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface
* is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
* responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
* responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
*
* The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
* must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
@ -319,8 +319,8 @@ static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
typedef struct {
UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */
int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */
UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
} nh_ctx;
@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
* produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
* produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
* product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
* multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
*/

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
/*
wots.c version 20160722
Andreas Hülsing
@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, co
* Computes the chaining function.
* out and in have to be n-byte arrays
*
* interpretes in as start-th value of the chain
* interprets in as start-th value of the chain
* addr has to contain the address of the chain
*/
static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])