pull updated OpenBSD BCrypt PBKDF implementation
Includes fix for 1 byte output overflow for large key length requests (not reachable in OpenSSH). Pointed out by Joshua Rogers
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.4 2013/07/29 00:55:53 tedu Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
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*
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@ -51,8 +51,8 @@
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*
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* One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
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* linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
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* generate (i.e.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
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* attacker can merely run once through the outer loop below, but the user
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* generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
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* attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
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* always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
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* entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
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* wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
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@ -97,9 +97,9 @@ bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out)
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}
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/* zap */
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memset(ciphertext, 0, sizeof(ciphertext));
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memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(cdata));
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memset(&state, 0, sizeof(state));
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explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
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explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
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explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
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}
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int
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@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt
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u_int8_t *countsalt;
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size_t i, j, amt, stride;
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uint32_t count;
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size_t origkeylen = keylen;
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/* nothing crazy */
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if (rounds < 1)
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@ -155,14 +156,17 @@ bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t salt
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* pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly.
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*/
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amt = MIN(amt, keylen);
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for (i = 0; i < amt; i++)
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key[i * stride + (count - 1)] = out[i];
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keylen -= amt;
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for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
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size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
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if (dest >= origkeylen)
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break;
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key[dest] = out[i];
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}
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keylen -= i;
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}
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/* zap */
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memset(out, 0, sizeof(out));
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memset(countsalt, 0, saltlen + 4);
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explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
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free(countsalt);
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return 0;
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