- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45
[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c] ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use (SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases. This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded client. ok naddy@
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13
ChangeLog
13
ChangeLog
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@ -49,6 +49,19 @@
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gcc, at least in earlier versions, but this does not forgive your current
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transgressions) seen between zlib and openssl
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ok djm
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- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/09/09 10:45:45
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[kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c key.c key.h monitor.c ssh-ecdsa.c]
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ECDH/ECDSA compliance fix: these methods vary the hash function they use
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(SHA256/384/512) depending on the length of the curve in use. The previous
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code incorrectly used SHA256 in all cases.
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This fix will cause authentication failure when using 384 or 521-bit curve
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keys if one peer hasn't been upgraded and the other has. (256-bit curve
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keys work ok). In particular you may need to specify HostkeyAlgorithms
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when connecting to a server that has not been upgraded from an upgraded
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client.
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ok naddy@
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20100831
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- OpenBSD CVS Sync
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8
kex.c
8
kex.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.84 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.85 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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*
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@ -325,10 +325,10 @@ choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server)
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} else if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_DHGEX_SHA256) == 0) {
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k->kex_type = KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256;
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k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
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} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_ECDH_SHA256,
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sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1) == 0) {
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} else if (strncmp(k->name, KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM,
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sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1) == 0) {
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k->kex_type = KEX_ECDH_SHA2;
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k->evp_md = evp_ssh_sha256();
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k->evp_md = kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(k->name);
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#endif
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} else
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fatal("bad kex alg %s", k->name);
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5
kex.h
5
kex.h
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.50 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.51 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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@ -39,7 +39,7 @@
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#define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
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#define KEX_RESUME "resume@appgate.com"
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/* The following represents the family of ECDH methods */
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#define KEX_ECDH_SHA256 "ecdh-sha2-"
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#define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM "ecdh-sha2-"
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#define COMP_NONE 0
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#define COMP_ZLIB 1
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@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ kex_ecdh_hash(const EVP_MD *, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int,
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const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
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int kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *);
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const EVP_MD *kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *);
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void
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derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]);
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14
kexecdh.c
14
kexecdh.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.1 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.2 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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@ -48,15 +48,23 @@ kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(const char *kexname)
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{
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int ret;
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if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1)
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if (strlen(kexname) < sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1)
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fatal("%s: kexname too short \"%s\"", __func__, kexname);
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ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA256) - 1);
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ret = key_curve_name_to_nid(kexname + sizeof(KEX_ECDH_SHA2_STEM) - 1);
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if (ret == -1)
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fatal("%s: unsupported curve negotiated \"%s\"", __func__,
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kexname);
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return ret;
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}
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const EVP_MD *
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kex_ecdh_name_to_evpmd(const char *kexname)
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{
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int nid = kex_ecdh_name_to_nid(kexname);
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return key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(nid);
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}
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void
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kex_ecdh_hash(
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const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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47
key.c
47
key.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.92 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.93 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* read_bignum():
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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@ -978,17 +978,7 @@ key_size(const Key *k)
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return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p);
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case KEY_ECDSA:
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case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
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switch (k->ecdsa_nid) {
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case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
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return 256;
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case NID_secp384r1:
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return 384;
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case NID_secp521r1:
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return 521;
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default:
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break;
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}
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break;
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return key_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
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}
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return 0;
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}
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@ -1961,6 +1951,7 @@ key_cert_is_legacy(Key *k)
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}
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}
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/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
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int
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key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
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{
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return -1;
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}
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u_int
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key_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
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{
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switch (nid) {
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case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
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return 256;
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case NID_secp384r1:
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return 384;
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case NID_secp521r1:
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return 521;
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default:
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error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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const char *
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key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
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{
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return NULL;
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}
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const EVP_MD *
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key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(int nid)
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{
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int kbits = key_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
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if (kbits == 0)
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fatal("%s: invalid nid %d", __func__, nid);
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/* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
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if (kbits <= 256)
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return EVP_sha256();
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else if (kbits <= 384)
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return EVP_sha384();
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else
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return EVP_sha512();
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}
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int
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key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
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{
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4
key.h
4
key.h
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.31 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.32 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
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int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
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const char * key_curve_nid_to_name(int);
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u_int key_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
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int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
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int key_ecdsa_group_to_nid(const EC_GROUP *);
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const EVP_MD * key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(int nid);
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int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
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int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.109 2010/08/31 11:54:45 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.110 2010/09/09 10:45:45 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
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* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
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p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen);
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/*
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* Supported KEX types will only return SHA1 (20 byte) or
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* SHA256 (32 byte) hashes
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* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
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* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
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*/
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if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32)
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if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64)
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fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen);
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/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
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10
ssh-ecdsa.c
10
ssh-ecdsa.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD$ */
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/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.4 2010/09/10 01:04:10 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
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{
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ECDSA_SIG *sig;
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const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
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const EVP_MD *evp_md;
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EVP_MD_CTX md;
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u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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u_int len, dlen;
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error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
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return -1;
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}
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evp_md = key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(key->ecdsa_nid);
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EVP_DigestInit(&md, evp_md);
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EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, data, datalen);
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EVP_DigestFinal(&md, digest, &dlen);
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const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
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{
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ECDSA_SIG *sig;
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const EVP_MD *evp_md = EVP_sha256();
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const EVP_MD *evp_md;
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EVP_MD_CTX md;
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u_char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *sigblob;
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u_int len, dlen;
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int rlen, ret;
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Buffer b, bb;
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char *ktype;
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if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
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(key->type != KEY_ECDSA && key->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)) {
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error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__);
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return -1;
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}
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evp_md = key_ec_nid_to_evpmd(key->ecdsa_nid);
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/* fetch signature */
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char *ktype;
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buffer_init(&b);
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buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen);
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ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL);
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