- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47

[readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
     [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
     Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit
     search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
     to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
     This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
     need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
     causes a number of problems).
     "looks fine" markus@

ChangeLog

@@ -3,6 +3,16 @@
    - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/15 14:10:25
      [ssh.1 ssh_config.5]
      tweak previous;
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47
+     [readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5]
+     [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h]
+     Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit
+     search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names
+     to fully-qualified ones for host key matching.
+     This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise
+     need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this
+     causes a number of problems).
+     "looks fine" markus@
 
 20131015
  - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync

readconf.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.207 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.208 2013/10/16 02:31:45 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -144,6 +144,8 @@ typedef enum {
 	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand,
 	oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oZeroKnowledgePasswordAuthentication,
 	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicaliseHostname, oCanonicaliseMaxDots,
+	oCanonicaliseFallbackLocal, oCanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs,
 	oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
 } OpCodes;
 
@@ -257,6 +259,11 @@ static struct {
 	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
 	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
 	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
+	{ "canonicalisefallbacklocal", oCanonicaliseFallbackLocal },
+	{ "canonicalisehostname", oCanonicaliseHostname },
+	{ "canonicalisemaxdots", oCanonicaliseMaxDots },
+	{ "canonicalisepermittedcnames", oCanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs },
 	{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
 
 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
@@ -535,6 +542,34 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
 	return result;
 }
 
+/* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */
+static void
+valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+	size_t i, l = strlen(name);
+	u_char c, last = '\0';
+
+	if (l == 0)
+		fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum);
+	if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0]))
+		fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" "
+		    "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name);
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
+		name[i] = (char)c;
+		if (last == '.' && c == '.')
+			fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
+			    "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name);
+		if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
+		    c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */
+			fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains "
+			    "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name);
+		last = c;
+	}
+	if (name[l - 1] == '.')
+		name[l - 1] = '\0';
+}
+
 /*
  * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
  */
@@ -609,6 +644,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
 	{ "auto",			REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
 	{ NULL, -1 }
 };
+static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalisehostname[] = {
+	{ "true",			SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+	{ "false",			SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+	{ "yes",			SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+	{ "no",				SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+	{ "always",			SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
 
 /*
  * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
@@ -628,6 +671,7 @@ process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
 	size_t len;
 	Forward fwd;
 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+	struct allowed_cname *cname;
 
 	if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
 		cmdline = 1;
@@ -1263,6 +1307,62 @@ parse_int:
 		intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
 		goto parse_flag;
 
+	case oCanonicalDomains:
+		value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+			valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep || value)
+				continue;
+			if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			options->canonical_domains[
+			    options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oCanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs:
+		value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
+		while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
+			/* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
+			if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
+				arg2 = arg;
+			else {
+				lowercase(arg);
+				if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
+				    arg2[1] == '\0') {
+					fatal("%s line %d: "
+					    "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
+					    filename, linenum, arg);
+				}
+				*arg2 = '\0';
+				arg2++;
+			}
+			if (!*activep || value)
+				continue;
+			if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
+				fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			cname = options->permitted_cnames +
+			    options->num_permitted_cnames++;
+			cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
+			cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oCanonicaliseHostname:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalise_hostname;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalisehostname;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oCanonicaliseMaxDots:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalise_max_dots;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oCanonicaliseFallbackLocal:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalise_fallback_local;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
 	case oDeprecated:
 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
@@ -1426,6 +1526,11 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
 	options->request_tty = -1;
 	options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
 	options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+	options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
+	options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
+	options->canonicalise_max_dots = -1;
+	options->canonicalise_fallback_local = -1;
+	options->canonicalise_hostname = -1;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1579,6 +1684,12 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 		options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
 	if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
 		options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+	if (options->canonicalise_max_dots == -1)
+		options->canonicalise_max_dots = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalise_fallback_local == -1)
+		options->canonicalise_fallback_local = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalise_hostname == -1)
+		options->canonicalise_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
 #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
 	do { \
 		if (v != NULL && strcasecmp(v, "none") == 0) { \

readconf.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.97 2013/10/14 22:22:03 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.98 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@@ -29,7 +29,13 @@ typedef struct {
 /* Data structure for representing option data. */
 
 #define MAX_SEND_ENV		256
-#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES	256
+#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES	32
+#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS	32
+
+struct allowed_cname {
+	char *source_list;
+	char *target_list;
+};
 
 typedef struct {
 	int     forward_agent;	/* Forward authentication agent. */
@@ -140,9 +146,21 @@ typedef struct {
 
 	int	proxy_use_fdpass;
 
+	int	num_canonical_domains;
+	char	*canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+	int	canonicalise_hostname;
+	int	canonicalise_max_dots;
+	int	canonicalise_fallback_local;
+	int	num_permitted_cnames;
+	struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+
 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
 }       Options;
 
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO	0
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES	1
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS	2
+
 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO	0
 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES	1
 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO	2

roaming_client.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.5 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.6 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB
  *
@@ -259,10 +259,10 @@ wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void)
 		if (c != '\n' && c != '\r')
 			continue;
 
-		if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+		if (ssh_connect(host, NULL, &hostaddr, options.port,
 		    options.address_family, 1, &timeout_ms,
-		    options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port,
+		    options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) == 0 &&
-		    options.proxy_command) == 0 && roaming_resume() == 0) {
+		    roaming_resume() == 0) {
 			packet_restore_state();
 			reenter_guard = 0;
 			fprintf(stderr, "[connection resumed]\n");

ssh.1

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.337 2013/10/15 14:10:25 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.338 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 16 2013 $
 .Dt SSH 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -417,6 +417,11 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
 .It AddressFamily
 .It BatchMode
 .It BindAddress
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicaliseFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicaliseHostname
+.It CanonicaliseMaxDots
+.It CanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs
 .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
 .It CheckHostIP
 .It Cipher

ssh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.384 2013/10/14 23:31:01 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.385 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -231,6 +231,134 @@ tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
 	}
 }
 
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_host(const char *name, u_int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
+{
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+	bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (cname != NULL)
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+		if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
+			loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
+		    __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
+		if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
+			error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+			    __func__, name,  res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
+			if (clen > 0)
+				*cname = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
+ * and perform the replacement if it is.
+ */
+static int
+check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct allowed_cname *rule;
+
+	if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.canonicalise_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalise names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	    options.canonicalise_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return 0;
+	debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+		rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
+		if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list,
+		    strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list,
+		    strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1)
+			continue;
+		verbose("Canonicalised DNS aliased hostname "
+		    "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+		free(*namep);
+		*namep = xstrdup(cname);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
+ * canonicalisation rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
+ * if no name was found after canonicalisation.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_canonicalise(char **hostp, u_int port)
+{
+	int i, ndots;
+	char *cp, *fullhost, cname_target[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo *addrs;
+
+	if (options.canonicalise_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalise names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	    options.canonicalise_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return NULL;
+	/* Don't apply canonicalisation to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
+	ndots = 0;
+	for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		if (*cp == '.')
+			ndots++;
+	}
+	if (ndots > options.canonicalise_max_dots) {
+		debug3("%s: not canonicalising hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
+		    __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalise_max_dots);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
+		*cname_target = '\0';
+		xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
+		    options.canonical_domains[i]);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, options.port, 0,
+		    cname_target, sizeof(cname_target))) == NULL) {
+			free(fullhost);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Remove trailing '.' */
+		fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
+		/* Follow CNAME if requested */
+		if (!check_follow_cname(&fullhost, cname_target)) {
+			debug("Canonicalised hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+			    *hostp, fullhost);
+		}
+		free(*hostp);
+		*hostp = fullhost;
+		return addrs;
+	}
+	if (!options.canonicalise_fallback_local)
+		fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, host);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 /*
  * Main program for the ssh client.
  */
@@ -240,12 +368,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog;
 	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN], *host_arg, *logfile;
 	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char cname[NI_MAXHOST];
 	struct stat st;
 	struct passwd *pw;
 	int timeout_ms;
 	extern int optind, optreset;
 	extern char *optarg;
 	Forward fwd;
+	struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
 
 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
 	sanitise_stdfd();
@@ -630,9 +760,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 				usage();
 			options.user = p;
 			*cp = '\0';
-			host = ++cp;
+			host = xstrdup(++cp);
 		} else
-			host = *av;
+			host = xstrdup(*av);
 		if (ac > 1) {
 			optind = optreset = 1;
 			goto again;
@@ -644,6 +774,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (!host)
 		usage();
 
+	lowercase(host);
+	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+
 	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 	ERR_load_crypto_strings();
 
@@ -728,6 +861,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
 	    options.proxy_use_fdpass)
 		fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (original_effective_uid != 0)
+		options.use_privileged_port = 0;
+#endif
 
 	/* reinit */
 	log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog);
@@ -762,10 +899,26 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		options.port = default_ssh_port();
 
 	/* preserve host name given on command line for %n expansion */
-	host_arg = host;
 	if (options.hostname != NULL) {
-		host = percent_expand(options.hostname,
+		cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
 		    "h", host, (char *)NULL);
+		free(host);
+		host = cp;
+	}
+
+	/* If canonicalisation requested then try to apply it */
+	if (options.canonicalise_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		addrs = resolve_canonicalise(&host, options.port);
+	/*
+	 * If canonicalisation not requested, or if it failed then try to
+	 * resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's usual
+	 * search rules.
+	 */
+	if (addrs == NULL) {
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+		check_follow_cname(&host, cname);
 	}
 
 	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
@@ -803,16 +956,15 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
 
 	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
-	if (ssh_connect(host, &hostaddr, options.port,
+	if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
-	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms,
+	    options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
-	    options.tcp_keep_alive,
+	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive,
-#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	    options.use_privileged_port) != 0)
-	    options.use_privileged_port,
+ 		exit(255);
-#else
+
-	    original_effective_uid == 0 && options.use_privileged_port,
+	freeaddrinfo(addrs);
-#endif
+	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
-	    options.proxy_command) != 0)
+	    options.server_alive_count_max);
-		exit(255);
 
 	if (timeout_ms > 0)
 		debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
@@ -1621,4 +1773,3 @@ main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
 	signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler);
 	errno = save_errno;
 }
-

ssh_config.5

@@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.170 2013/10/15 14:10:25 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.171 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2013 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 16 2013 $
 .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -200,6 +200,77 @@ Note that this option does not work if
 .Cm UsePrivilegedPort
 is set to
 .Dq yes .
+.It Cm CanonicalDomains
+when
+.Cm CanonicaliseHostname
+is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
+search for the specified destination host.
+.It Cm CanonicaliseFallbackLocal
+specified whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalisation fails.
+The default of
+.Dq no
+will attempt to lookup the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
+search rules.
+A value of
+.Dq yes
+will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to fail instantly if
+.Cm CanonicaliseHostname
+is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
+specified by
+.Cm CanonicalDomains .
+.It Cm CanonicaliseHostname
+controls whether explicit hostname canonicalisation is performed.
+The default
+.Dq no
+is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
+hostname lookups.
+If set to
+.Dq yes
+then, for connections that do not use a
+.Cm ProxyCommand ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will attempt to canonicalise the hostname specified on the command line
+using the
+.Cm CanonicalDomains
+suffixes and
+.Cm CanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs
+rules.
+If
+.Cm CanonicaliseHostname
+is set to
+.Dq always ,
+then canonicalisation is applied to proxied connections to.
+.It Cm CanonicaliseMaxDots
+specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname name before
+canonicalisation is disabled.
+The default of
+.Dq 1
+allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain)
+.It Cm CanonicalisePermittedCNAMEs
+specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
+canonicalising hostnames.
+The rules consist of one or more arguments of
+.Sm off
+.Ar source_domain_list : Ar target_domain_list
+.Sm on
+where
+.Ar source_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that are may follow CNAMEs in canonicalisation
+and
+.Ar target_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that they may resove to.
+.Pp
+For example,
+.Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
+will allow hostnames matching
+.Dq *.a.example.com
+to be canonicalised to names in the
+.Dq *.b.example.com
+or
+.Dq *.c.example.com
+domains.
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
 Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
 The argument to this keyword must be

sshconnect.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.240 2013/09/19 01:26:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.241 2013/10/16 02:31:46 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
 {
 	char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
 
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%hu", port);
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
 	xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
 	ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport,
 	    "r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
@@ -170,8 +170,6 @@ ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port,
 
 	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
 	packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
-	    options.server_alive_count_max);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -187,16 +185,6 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 	pid_t pid;
 	char *shell;
 
-	if (!strcmp(proxy_command, "-")) {
-		packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
-		packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
-		    options.server_alive_count_max);
-		return 0;
-	}
-
-	if (options.proxy_use_fdpass)
-		return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
-
 	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
 		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
 
@@ -258,8 +246,6 @@ ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
 
 	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
 	packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]);
-	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
-	    options.server_alive_count_max);
 
 	/* Indicate OK return */
 	return 0;
@@ -429,33 +415,18 @@ timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
  * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
  * the daemon.
  */
-int
+static int
-ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
+ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
-    u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms,
+    struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
-    int want_keepalive, int needpriv, const char *proxy_command)
+    int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
 {
-	int gaierr;
 	int on = 1;
 	int sock = -1, attempt;
 	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
-	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
 
 	debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv);
 
-	/* If a proxy command is given, connect using it. */
-	if (proxy_command != NULL)
-		return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, proxy_command);
-
-	/* No proxy command. */
-
-	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
-	hints.ai_family = family;
-	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
-	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
-	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname,
-		    host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
-
 	for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
 		if (attempt > 0) {
 			/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
@@ -467,7 +438,8 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 		 * sequence until the connection succeeds.
 		 */
 		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
-			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
+			    ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
 				continue;
 			if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
 			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
@@ -500,8 +472,6 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 			break;	/* Successful connection. */
 	}
 
-	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
-
 	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
 	if (sock == -1) {
 		error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
@@ -519,12 +489,28 @@ ssh_connect(const char *host, struct sockaddr_storage * hostaddr,
 
 	/* Set the connection. */
 	packet_set_connection(sock, sock);
-	packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval,
-	    options.server_alive_count_max);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int
+ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs,
+    struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
+    int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv)
+{
+	if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family,
+		    connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv);
+	} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
+		packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		return 0; /* Always succeeds */
+	} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
+		return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port,
+		    options.proxy_command);
+	}
+	return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command);
+}
+
 static void
 send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1)
 {
@@ -1265,7 +1251,7 @@ void
 ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
     struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
 {
-	char *host, *cp;
+	char *host;
 	char *server_user, *local_user;
 
 	local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
@@ -1273,9 +1259,7 @@ ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
 
 	/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
 	host = xstrdup(orighost);
-	for (cp = host; *cp; cp++)
+	lowercase(host);
-		if (isupper(*cp))
-			*cp = (char)tolower(*cp);
 
 	/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
 	ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms);

sshconnect.h

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.27 2010/11/29 23:45:51 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.28 2013/10/16 02:31:47 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ struct Sensitive {
 	int	external_keysign;
 };
 
-int
+struct addrinfo;
-ssh_connect(const char *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short, int, int,
+int	 ssh_connect(const char *, struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *,
-    int *, int, int, const char *);
+    u_short, int, int, int *, int, int);
 void	 ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
 
 void	 ssh_login(Sensitive *, const char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,