upstream commit

Don't count the initial block twice when computing how
many bytes to discard for the work around for the attacks against CBC-mode.
ok djm@; report from Jean Paul, Kenny, Martin and Torben @ RHUL

Upstream-ID: f445f509a4e0a7ba3b9c0dae7311cb42458dc1e2
This commit is contained in:
markus@openbsd.org 2017-03-11 13:07:35 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent ef653dd5bd
commit 0fb1a617a0
1 changed files with 3 additions and 3 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.246 2017/02/28 06:10:08 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.247 2017/03/11 13:07:35 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1850,11 +1850,11 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need);
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));