upstream: record when the host key checking code downgrades a
certificate host key to a plain key. This occurs when the user connects to a host with a certificate host key but no corresponding CA key configured in known_hosts; feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ada81853ff9ee7824c62f440bcf4ad62030c901
This commit is contained in:
parent
12ae8f95e2
commit
13cee44ef9
8
kex.h
8
kex.h
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.109 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.110 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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@ -105,8 +105,10 @@ enum kex_exchange {
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KEX_MAX
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};
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#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
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#define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002
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/* kex->flags values */
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#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 /* KEXINIT sent */
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#define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002 /* Initial KEX, not rekey */
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#define KEX_HOSTCERT_CONVERT 0x0004 /* Client downgraded hostcert->plain */
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struct sshenc {
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char *name;
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55
sshconnect.c
55
sshconnect.c
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.332 2020/09/09 21:57:27 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.333 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
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* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
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@ -707,6 +707,10 @@ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
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/*
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* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
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* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
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*
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* If cert_fallbackp is not NULL then will attempt to convert certificate host
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* keys to plain keys if no certificate match was found and will return
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* non-zero via *cert_fallbackp if this fall-back was used.
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*/
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#define RDRW 0
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#define RDONLY 1
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@ -715,7 +719,7 @@ static int
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check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
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struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
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char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
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char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
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char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles, int *cert_fallbackp)
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{
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HostStatus host_status;
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HostStatus ip_status;
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@ -726,12 +730,15 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
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const char *type;
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const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
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int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
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int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
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int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr), cert_fallback = 0;
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int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
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int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
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struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
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u_int i;
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if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
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*cert_fallbackp = 0;
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/*
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* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
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* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
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if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
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port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
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debug("checking without port identifier");
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/*
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* NB. do not perform cert->key fallback in this
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* recursive call. Fallback will only be performed in
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* the top-level call.
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*/
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if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
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ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
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system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
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system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
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NULL) == 0) {
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debug("found matching key w/out port");
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break;
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}
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@ -1126,10 +1139,13 @@ check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
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free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
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if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
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free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
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if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
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*cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
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return 0;
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fail:
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if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
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if (cert_fallbackp != NULL && want_cert &&
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host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
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/*
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* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
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* search normally.
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@ -1141,6 +1157,7 @@ fail:
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if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
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fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
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host_key = raw_key;
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cert_fallback = 1;
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goto retry;
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}
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sshkey_free(raw_key);
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return -1;
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}
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/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
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/*
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* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify.
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*
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* If the host key was a certificate that was downgraded to a plain key in
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* the process of matching, then cert_fallbackp will be non-zero.
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*/
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int
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verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
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verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key,
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int *cert_fallbackp)
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{
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u_int i;
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int r = -1, flags = 0;
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int r = -1, flags = 0, cert_fallback = 0;
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char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
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struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
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if (cert_fallbackp != NULL)
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*cert_fallbackp = 0;
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if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
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options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
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error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
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}
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r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
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options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
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options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
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options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles,
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&cert_fallback);
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out:
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sshkey_free(plain);
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free(fp);
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free(cafp);
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if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
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sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
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r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
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if (r == 0) {
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if (host_key != NULL) {
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sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
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r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
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}
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if (r == 0 && cert_fallbackp != NULL)
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*cert_fallbackp = cert_fallback;
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}
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return r;
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.40 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.41 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
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void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
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struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int);
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int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *);
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int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, int *);
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void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
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char **, char **);
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.326 2020/09/18 05:23:03 djm Exp $ */
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/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.327 2020/10/03 08:11:28 djm Exp $ */
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/*
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* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
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* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
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static int
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verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
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{
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if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
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int cert_downgraded = 0;
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if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
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&cert_downgraded) == -1)
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fatal("Host key verification failed.");
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if (cert_downgraded)
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ssh->kex->flags |= KEX_HOSTCERT_CONVERT;
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return 0;
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}
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