- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 23:10:30

[ssh.c]
     log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
     after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
     servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
     automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
     "nice!" markus@

ChangeLog

@@ -67,6 +67,13 @@
      [auth1.c auth2-none.c]
      skip the initial check for access with an empty password when
      PermitEmptyPasswords=no; bz#1638; ok markus@
+   - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/06/25 23:10:30
+     [ssh.c]
+     log the hostname and address that we connected to at LogLevel=verbose
+     after authentication is successful to mitigate "phishing" attacks by
+     servers with trusted keys that accept authentication silently and
+     automatically before presenting fake password/passphrase prompts;
+     "nice!" markus@
 
 20100622
  - (djm) [loginrec.c] crank LINFO_NAMESIZE (username length) to 512

ssh.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.338 2010/05/16 12:55:51 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.339 2010/06/25 23:10:30 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -829,6 +829,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
 	    pw, timeout_ms);
 
+	if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) {
+		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
+		    get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port());
+	} else {
+		verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
+	}
+
 	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
 	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
 		for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {