diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c index d338896eb..361279872 100644 --- a/auth2-pubkey.c +++ b/auth2-pubkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.61 2016/12/30 22:08:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.62 2017/01/30 01:03:00 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -622,9 +622,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; u_long linenum = 0; - u_int i; + u_int i, found_principal = 0; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { + /* Always consume entire input */ + if (found_principal) + continue; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; @@ -657,11 +660,12 @@ process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; - return 1; + found_principal = 1; + continue; } } } - return 0; + return found_principal; } static int @@ -829,6 +833,9 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) char *cp, *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL; const char *reason = NULL; + /* Always consume entrire file */ + if (found_key) + continue; if (found != NULL) key_free(found); found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); @@ -915,7 +922,7 @@ check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); free(fp); found_key = 1; - break; + continue; } } if (found != NULL) diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c index 9108b8612..97dd2ef0a 100644 --- a/auth2.c +++ b/auth2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.136 2016/05/02 08:49:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.137 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -212,6 +212,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) static int input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; @@ -235,9 +236,10 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; - debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user); + debug2("%s: setting up authctxt for %s", + __func__, user); } else { - logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); + /* Invalid user, fake password information */ authctxt->pw = fakepw(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); @@ -247,6 +249,8 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); #endif + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", + authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user); setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); @@ -292,6 +296,7 @@ void userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, const char *submethod) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ char *methods; int partial = 0; @@ -353,6 +358,7 @@ userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, packet_write_wait(); /* now we can break out */ authctxt->success = 1; + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); } else { /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c index ef4018b0e..ddd2b24a3 100644 --- a/channels.c +++ b/channels.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.356 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.357 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -3067,7 +3067,7 @@ channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } packet_check_eom(); c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port, - "connected socket", originator_string); + "connected socket", originator_string, NULL, NULL); free(originator_string); free(host); if (c == NULL) { @@ -4028,9 +4028,13 @@ channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } -/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ +/* + * Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path, + * passing back the failure reason if appropriate. + */ static Channel * -connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) +connect_to_reason(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname, + int *reason, const char **errmsg) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; @@ -4071,7 +4075,12 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) { + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) + != 0) { + if (errmsg != NULL) + *errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; @@ -4094,6 +4103,13 @@ connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) return c; } +/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ +static Channel * +connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + return connect_to_reason(name, port, ctype, rname, NULL, NULL); +} + /* * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel * that needs to deal with this connection. @@ -4138,7 +4154,8 @@ channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * -channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) +channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, + char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; @@ -4163,9 +4180,11 @@ channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", host, port); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; return NULL; } - return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname); + return connect_to_reason(host, port, ctype, rname, reason, errmsg); } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h index 09c3c3655..ce43236d5 100644 --- a/channels.h +++ b/channels.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.120 2016/10/18 17:32:54 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.121 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -275,7 +275,8 @@ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int); void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void); void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void); void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void); -Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *, int *, + const char **); Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short, diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c index 5bec8c0f4..5a213878c 100644 --- a/clientloop.c +++ b/clientloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.289 2016/09/30 09:19:13 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.290 2017/01/29 21:35:23 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -991,7 +991,7 @@ process_cmdline(void) CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { - logit("Unkown port forwarding."); + logit("Unknown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c index 69a104fbf..1e80cfa9a 100644 --- a/compat.c +++ b/compat.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.99 2016/05/24 02:31:57 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.100 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" +#include "kex.h" int compat13 = 0; int compat20 = 0; @@ -250,42 +251,14 @@ proto_spec(const char *spec) return ret; } -/* - * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter' - * pattern list. - */ -static char * -filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter) -{ - Buffer b; - char *orig_prop, *fix_prop; - char *cp, *tmp; - - buffer_init(&b); - tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal); - while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { - if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) { - if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) - buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); - buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp)); - } else - debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp); - } - buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); - fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b)); - buffer_free(&b); - free(orig_prop); - - return fix_prop; -} - char * compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) return cipher_prop; debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); - cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*"); + if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_list(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_list failed"); debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); if (*cipher_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported ciphers found"); @@ -298,7 +271,8 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) return pkalg_prop; debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); - pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa"); + if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_list(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_list failed"); debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); @@ -312,10 +286,14 @@ compat_kex_proposal(char *p) return p; debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) - p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); + if ((p = match_filter_list(p, + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_list failed"); if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { - p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"); - p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"); + if ((p = match_filter_list(p, + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," + "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL) + fatal("match_filter_list failed"); } debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); if (*p == '\0') diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index eb9f45dcc..972addfeb 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -740,6 +740,9 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 + dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics. + dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE" AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], @@ -1471,36 +1474,47 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([skey], LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], - [ - if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + [ + ldns="" + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no]) + if test "x$PKGCONFIG" = "xno"; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + else + LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`" + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`" + fi + elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then + CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" + LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" + LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" + ldns=yes + fi - if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then - CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" - LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" - fi - - AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) - LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" - LDNS_MSG="yes" - - AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) - AC_LINK_IFELSE( - [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ + # Verify that it works. + if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then + AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) + LDNS_MSG="yes" + AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) + AC_LINK_IFELSE( + [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } - ]]) - ], - [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], + ]]) + ], + [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) - fi - ] -) + fi +]) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" @@ -1771,11 +1785,8 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ warn \ ]) -dnl Wide character support. Linux man page says it needs _XOPEN_SOURCE. -saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" -CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE" +dnl Wide character support. AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth]) -CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes} AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support]) @@ -5083,6 +5094,7 @@ echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" +echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG" diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index 6a94bc535..a30dabe5f 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.127 2016/10/10 19:28:48 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.128 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -211,7 +211,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) /* * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to - * indicate that it should be appended to the default. + * indicate that it should be appended to the default or '-' that the + * specified names should be removed. */ int kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list) @@ -222,14 +223,18 @@ kex_assemble_names(const char *def, char **list) *list = strdup(def); return 0; } - if (**list != '+') { - return 0; + if (**list == '+') { + if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + free(*list); + *list = ret; + } else if (**list == '-') { + if ((ret = match_filter_list(def, *list + 1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + free(*list); + *list = ret; } - if ((ret = kex_names_cat(def, *list + 1)) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - free(*list); - *list = ret; return 0; } diff --git a/match.c b/match.c index c15dcd1ef..aeba4bb77 100644 --- a/match.c +++ b/match.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.33 2016/11/06 05:46:37 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.34 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -284,3 +284,32 @@ match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next) free(s); return NULL; } + +/* + * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching + * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string. + */ +char * +match_filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter) +{ + size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1; + char *fix_prop = malloc(len); + char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal); + char *cp, *tmp; + + if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) + return NULL; + + tmp = orig_prop; + *fix_prop = '\0'; + while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { + if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) { + if (*fix_prop != '\0') + strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len); + strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len); + } + } + free(orig_prop); + return fix_prop; +} + diff --git a/match.h b/match.h index db97ca8f7..937ba0412 100644 --- a/match.h +++ b/match.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.17 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ int match_hostname(const char *, const char *); int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); +char *match_filter_list(const char *, const char *); /* addrmatch.c */ int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *); diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c index 43f484709..96d22b7e4 100644 --- a/monitor.c +++ b/monitor.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.166 2016/09/28 16:33:06 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.167 2017/02/03 23:05:57 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl @@ -283,6 +283,7 @@ monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) void monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; @@ -356,6 +357,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", __func__, authctxt->user); + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); @@ -695,6 +697,7 @@ mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) { + struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ char *username; struct passwd *pwent; int allowed = 0; @@ -739,6 +742,8 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell); out: + ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s", + authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user); buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c index 265c5f12b..2d6639c5c 100644 --- a/mux.c +++ b/mux.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.63 2016/10/19 23:21:56 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.64 2017/01/21 11:32:04 guenther Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * @@ -2161,7 +2161,6 @@ int muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; - socklen_t sun_len; int sock; u_int pid; @@ -2185,8 +2184,6 @@ muxclient(const char *path) memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + - strlen(path) + 1; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) @@ -2196,7 +2193,7 @@ muxclient(const char *path) if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) { + if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c index ad1f6b497..94e8460ca 100644 --- a/packet.c +++ b/packet.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.243 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.245 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -352,6 +352,25 @@ ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh) return ssh->state->mux; } +int +ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list args; + int r; + + free(ssh->log_preamble); + if (fmt == NULL) + ssh->log_preamble = NULL; + else { + va_start(args, fmt); + r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args); + va_end(args); + if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + return 0; +} + int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) { @@ -1049,7 +1068,7 @@ ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len) /* Time-based rekeying */ if (state->rekey_interval != 0 && - state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) + (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()) return 1; /* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction */ @@ -2074,27 +2093,36 @@ ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } +static void +fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l) +{ + snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d", + ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "", + ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); +} + /* * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. */ void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) { + char remote_id[512]; + + fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); + switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: - logdie("Connection closed by %.200s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logdie("Connection %s %.200s port %d timed out", - ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + logdie("Connection %s %s timed out", + ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: - logdie("Disconnected from %.200s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id); case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ECONNRESET) - logdie("Connection reset by %.200s port %d", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh)); + logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: @@ -2102,17 +2130,16 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) { - logdie("Unable to negotiate with %.200s port %d: %s. " - "Their offer: %s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), - ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r), + logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. " + "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r), ssh->kex->failed_choice); } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - logdie("%s%sConnection %s %.200s port %d: %s", + logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), ssh_err(r)); + remote_id, ssh_err(r)); } } @@ -2125,7 +2152,7 @@ sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { - char buf[1024]; + char buf[1024], remote_id[512]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; int r; @@ -2138,12 +2165,13 @@ ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ + fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id)); va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ - logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf); + logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf); /* * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait @@ -2396,10 +2424,10 @@ ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes) } void -ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, time_t seconds) +ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds) { - debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %d seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, - (int)seconds); + debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes, + (unsigned int)seconds); ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; } diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h index bfe7da615..0d25b352c 100644 --- a/packet.h +++ b/packet.h @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.74 2016/10/11 21:47:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.76 2017/02/03 23:03:33 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen @@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ struct ssh { char *local_ipaddr; int local_port; + /* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */ + char *log_preamble; + /* Dispatcher table */ dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX]; /* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */ @@ -104,6 +107,8 @@ void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *); void ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *); int ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *); +int ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); int ssh_packet_log_type(u_char); @@ -154,7 +159,7 @@ int ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *); const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *); int ssh_local_port(struct ssh *); -void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, time_t); +void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t); time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *); void *ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *); diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c index bf52589f6..bfcd2b3f1 100644 --- a/readconf.c +++ b/readconf.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.262 2016/10/25 04:08:13 jsg Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.268 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 - Cipher 3des + Ciphers 3des-cbc Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su - Cipher none + Ciphers aes128-ctr PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com @@ -180,6 +180,44 @@ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { + /* Deprecated options */ + { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, + { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, + { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, + { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, + { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, + { "usersh", oDeprecated }, + + /* Unsupported options */ + { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, + { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, + + /* Sometimes-unsupported options */ +#if defined(GSSAPI) + { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, +# else + { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, +#endif +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, + { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, +# else + { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, + { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, +#endif +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, + { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, +# else + { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported }, + { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported }, +#endif + { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, @@ -188,30 +226,15 @@ static struct { { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort }, - { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, - { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ - { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ - { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, - { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, - { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, -#if defined(GSSAPI) - { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, -#else - { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, - { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, -#endif - { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, - { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, @@ -233,15 +256,12 @@ static struct { { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, - { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, - { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, - { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, @@ -250,13 +270,6 @@ static struct { { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, -#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, - { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, -#else - { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, - { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, -#endif { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, @@ -277,7 +290,6 @@ static struct { { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, - { "useroaming", oDeprecated }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, @@ -835,11 +847,11 @@ process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, activep = &cmdline; } - /* Strip trailing whitespace */ + /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) return 0; for (len--; len > 0; len--) { - if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) + if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } @@ -1187,7 +1199,7 @@ parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) @@ -1198,7 +1210,7 @@ parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) @@ -1210,7 +1222,8 @@ parse_int: if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) @@ -1224,7 +1237,8 @@ parse_keytypes: if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) @@ -1507,6 +1521,11 @@ parse_keytypes: flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH), activep, depth + 1); + if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) { + fatal("Can't open user config file " + "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i], + strerror(errno)); + } /* * don't let Match in includes clobber the * containing file's Match state. @@ -2453,10 +2472,10 @@ dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; - if (code == oDynamicForward && + if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; - if (code == oLocalForward && + if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); @@ -2529,8 +2548,10 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); +#ifdef WITH_RSA1 dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); +#endif dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); @@ -2542,7 +2563,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level); +#endif dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); @@ -2562,7 +2585,9 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); +#endif dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); diff --git a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh index 91621a59c..34bced154 100644 --- a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh +++ b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.7 2016/09/26 21:34:38 bluhm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.8 2017/01/06 02:51:16 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="disallow agent attach from other uid" @@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then else chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK} - ssh-add -l > /dev/null 2>&1 + ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1 r=$? if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1" fi if test -z "$sudo" ; then # doas - ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null + ${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null else # sudo - < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ssh-add -l 2>/dev/null + < /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null fi r=$? if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh index 2539db9b7..60c37d896 100644 --- a/regress/forwarding.sh +++ b/regress/forwarding.sh @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.16 2016/04/14 23:57:17 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.19 2017/01/30 05:22:14 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="local and remote forwarding" @@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ base=33 last=$PORT fwd="" CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock -rm -f $CTL for j in 0 1 2; do for i in 0 1 2; do @@ -29,7 +28,8 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do q=$p fi trace "start forwarding, fork to background" - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 + rm -f $CTL + ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" - sleep 10 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost done for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ for d in L R; do -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true if [ $? != 0 ]; then - fail "connection failed, should not" + fatal "connection failed, should not" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ @@ -75,30 +75,32 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true trace "clear local forward proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + rm -f $CTL + ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" else # this one should fail - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \ + ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "local forwarding not cleared" fi - sleep 10 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost trace "clear remote forward proto $p" - ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ + rm -f $CTL + ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" else # this one should fail - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \ + ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "remote forwarding not cleared" fi - sleep 10 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost done for p in 2; do @@ -115,6 +117,7 @@ echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" + rm -f $CTL ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10 trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" @@ -123,21 +126,24 @@ for p in ${SSH_PROTOCOLS}; do test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" - ${SSH} -S $CTL -O exit somehost + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost done for p in 2; do trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd - ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 - ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 + rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123] + ${SSH} -S $CTL -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" - #wait - sleep 10 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost done diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh index 39d310deb..1df2924f5 100644 --- a/regress/integrity.sh +++ b/regress/integrity.sh @@ -1,12 +1,10 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.19 2016/11/25 02:56:49 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.20 2017/01/06 02:26:10 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets -# XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length -# XXX and ssh tries to read... tries=10 startoffset=2900 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` @@ -27,6 +25,7 @@ for m in $macs; do elen=0 epad=0 emac=0 + etmo=0 ecnt=0 skip=0 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c index 7ff319c16..e1593367b 100644 --- a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c +++ b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2016/09/21 17:03:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/03 23:01:42 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for matching functions * @@ -103,6 +103,25 @@ tests(void) /* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */ TEST_DONE(); +#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \ + do { \ + char *result = match_filter_list((string), (filter)); \ + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \ + free(result); \ + } while (0) + + TEST_START("match_filter_list"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", ""); + CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a"); + CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", ""); + TEST_DONE(); /* * XXX TODO * int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c index 3b82322dc..12765b7cf 100644 --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.301 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.304 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved @@ -270,7 +270,7 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) - options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) @@ -971,6 +971,15 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; + /* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */ + if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) + return 0; + for (len--; len > 0; len--) { + if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL) + break; + line[len] = '\0'; + } + cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; @@ -1173,7 +1182,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) @@ -1432,7 +1442,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) @@ -1443,7 +1453,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && !mac_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) @@ -1455,7 +1465,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) + if (*arg != '-' && + !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' ? arg + 1 : arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c index c4e4699da..2976f5594 100644 --- a/serverloop.c +++ b/serverloop.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.189 2016/12/14 00:36:34 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.191 2017/02/01 02:59:09 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -430,7 +430,7 @@ server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) } static Channel * -server_request_direct_tcpip(void) +server_request_direct_tcpip(int *reason, const char **errmsg) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; @@ -449,11 +449,13 @@ server_request_direct_tcpip(void) if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding) { c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port, - "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip"); + "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED; } free(originator); @@ -468,6 +470,10 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; u_short originator_port; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + + if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user"); target = packet_get_string(NULL); originator = packet_get_string(NULL); @@ -480,7 +486,7 @@ server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag && !options.disable_forwarding && - use_privsep) { + (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) { c = channel_connect_to_path(target, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); } else { @@ -577,7 +583,8 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; - int rchan; + const char *errmsg = NULL; + int rchan, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); @@ -591,7 +598,7 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { c = server_request_session(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { - c = server_request_direct_tcpip(); + c = server_request_direct_tcpip(&reason, &errmsg); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { @@ -614,9 +621,9 @@ server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); - packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); + packet_put_int(reason); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { - packet_put_cstring("open failed"); + packet_put_cstring(errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); @@ -702,6 +709,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) int want_reply; int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; struct sshbuf *resp = NULL; + struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw; + + if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) + fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user"); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); @@ -709,12 +720,8 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* -R style forwarding */ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { - struct passwd *pw; struct Forward fwd; - pw = the_authctxt->pw; - if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) - fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user"); memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); @@ -762,9 +769,10 @@ server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || no_port_forwarding_flag || options.disable_forwarding || - !use_privsep) { + (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) { success = 0; - packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); + packet_send_debug("Server has disabled " + "streamlocal forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the socket */ success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener( diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c index c30d54e62..eea8d0a0a 100644 --- a/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.106 2016/05/02 10:26:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.107 2017/01/06 03:41:58 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * @@ -752,10 +752,13 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; break; +#endif case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; @@ -769,7 +772,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: - fatal("unknown key type %s", tname); + default: + fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5 index 591365f34..016adbc73 100644 --- a/ssh_config.5 +++ b/ssh_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.240 2016/10/15 19:56:25 jmc Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 15 2016 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.241 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 3 2017 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -415,6 +415,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Bd -literal -offset indent @@ -784,6 +788,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -807,6 +815,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -1027,6 +1039,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, @@ -1102,6 +1118,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm @@ -1264,6 +1284,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index 615a0455b..a671ffaeb 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.251 2016/12/04 23:54:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.254 2017/02/03 02:56:00 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -198,8 +198,8 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) } if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) - packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, - (time_t)options.rekey_interval); + packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, + options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) @@ -939,14 +939,14 @@ input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[150]; - const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : - authctxt->host; + const char *host; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); + host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; info = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); @@ -1641,7 +1641,7 @@ ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ - if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) || + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8 index 41fc5051a..7725a692c 100644 --- a/sshd.8 +++ b/sshd.8 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.287 2016/11/30 02:57:40 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.288 2017/01/30 23:27:39 dtucker Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: January 30 2017 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -631,7 +631,7 @@ and files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is -maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, +maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index aed4e299e..5efbeb4e8 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.480 2016/12/09 03:04:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.481 2017/02/03 02:56:00 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -2261,7 +2261,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void) if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits(options.rekey_limit, - (time_t)options.rekey_interval); + options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5 index 32b29d240..454e46e0b 100644 --- a/sshd_config.5 +++ b/sshd_config.5 @@ -33,8 +33,8 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.239 2016/11/30 03:00:05 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.242 2017/02/03 23:01:19 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: February 3 2017 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -437,6 +437,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The supported ciphers are: .Pp @@ -649,6 +653,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -843,6 +851,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent @@ -933,6 +945,10 @@ If the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. .Pp The algorithms that contain .Qq -etm @@ -1280,6 +1296,10 @@ Alternately if the specified value begins with a .Sq + character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. +If the specified value begins with a +.Sq - +character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed +from the default set instead of replacing them. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, @@ -1644,13 +1664,13 @@ The username. .El .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand -accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %t, and %u. +accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand -accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %K, %k, %h, %i, %s, %T, %t, and %u. +accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, and %u. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, and %u. diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c index 00a0a73ec..1f0dc44db 100644 --- a/utf8.c +++ b/utf8.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.3 2016/05/30 12:57:21 schwarze Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.4 2017/02/02 10:54:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze * @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap) sz = strlen(src) + 1; if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) { free(src); + ret = -1; goto fail; }