- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 14:07:35

[ssh-rsa.c]
     more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
     data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
     "groovy" deraadt@
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller 2010-08-03 16:04:03 +10:00
parent 844cccfc1a
commit 4e8285e312
2 changed files with 11 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -6,6 +6,11 @@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 04:45:30
[ssh-keygen.c]
avoid bogus compiler warning
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 14:07:35
[ssh-rsa.c]
more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted
data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol.
"groovy" deraadt@
20100819
- (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-ud.1] Bug #1786: update ssh-copy-id.1 with more

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2010/07/16 14:07:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa)
{
u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
int len;
int len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
const u_char *oid = NULL;
u_char *decrypted = NULL;
@ -250,11 +250,13 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
goto done;
}
if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
if (!oidmatch) {
error("oid mismatch");
goto done;
}
if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
if (!hashmatch) {
error("hash mismatch");
goto done;
}