upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment
prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash. There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5
This commit is contained in:
parent
eb68e669bc
commit
59a194825f
13
sk-usbhid.c
13
sk-usbhid.c
|
@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
|||
/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.29 2021/02/18 02:15:07 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.30 2021/05/31 06:48:42 djm Exp $ */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2020 Pedro Martelletto
|
||||
|
@ -669,7 +669,7 @@ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
|
|||
{
|
||||
fido_cred_t *cred = NULL;
|
||||
const uint8_t *ptr;
|
||||
uint8_t user_id[32];
|
||||
uint8_t user_id[32], chall_hash[32];
|
||||
struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
|
||||
struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
|
||||
size_t len;
|
||||
|
@ -721,8 +721,13 @@ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
|
|||
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, challenge,
|
||||
challenge_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
|
||||
if (sha256_mem(challenge, challenge_len,
|
||||
chall_hash, sizeof(chall_hash)) != 0) {
|
||||
skdebug(__func__, "hash challenge failed");
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, chall_hash,
|
||||
sizeof(chall_hash))) != FIDO_OK) {
|
||||
skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
|
||||
fido_strerr(r));
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue