upstream: spelling; ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d01f2e9d59a999d5d42fc3b3efcf8dfb892e31b

PROTOCOL

@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ approaches.
 OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
 a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
 RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
-initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
 "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
 may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
 are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
 
 When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
 name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
-the the protocol:
+the protocol:
 
 a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
    out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
@@ -790,4 +790,4 @@ master instance and later clients.
 OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
 in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.52 2023/12/19 06:41:14 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.53 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $

PROTOCOL.agent

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ with private keys as they are loaded from a PKCS#11 token.
 	bool		certs_only
 	string		certsblob
 
-Where "certsblob" constists of one or more certificates encoded as public
+Where "certsblob" consists of one or more certificates encoded as public
 key blobs:
 
 	string[]	certificates
@@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ A SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED will return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS
 if any key (plain private or certificate) was successfully loaded, or
 SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if no key was loaded.
 
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.21 2023/12/18 14:46:56 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.22 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $

ssh-keyscan.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.153 2023/06/21 05:06:04 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.154 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
  *
@@ -504,11 +504,11 @@ congreet(int s)
 
 	/*
 	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
-	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitrarily
+	 * protocol identification string may be preceded by an arbitrarily
 	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
 	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
 	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
-	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
+	 * preceding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
 	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
 	 */
 	for (;;) {

sshkey.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.140 2023/10/16 08:40:00 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.141 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
@@ -1927,7 +1927,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
 		goto out;
 	}
 	if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
-		/* Skip nonce that preceeds all certificates */
+		/* Skip nonce that precedes all certificates */
 		if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 			goto out;

xmss_hash.c

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.3 2022/04/20 16:00:25 millert Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.4 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */
 /*
 hash.c version 20160722
 Andreas Hülsing
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, u
 }
 
 /*
- * Implemts H_msg
+ * Implements H_msg
  */
 int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n)
 {