- (djm) Added WARNING.RNG file and modified configure to ask users of the
builtin entropy code to read it. - (djm) Prefer builtin regex to PCRE.
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parent
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commit
6f9c337401
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@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
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20001025
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- (djm) Added WARNING.RNG file and modified configure to ask users of the
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builtin entropy code to read it.
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- (djm) Prefer builtin regex to PCRE.
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20001020
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- (djm) Don't define _REENTRANT for SNI/Reliant Unix
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- (bal) Imported NEWS-OS waitpid() macros into NeXT. Since implementation
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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
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This document contains a description of portable OpenSSH's random
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number collection code. An alternate reading of this text could
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well be titled "Why I should pressure my system vendor to supply
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/dev/random in their OS".
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Why is this important? OpenSSH depends on good, unpredictable numbers
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for generating keys, performing digital signatures and forming
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cryptographic challenges. If the random numbers that it uses are
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predictable, then the strength of the whole system is compromised.
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A particularly pernicious problem arises with DSA keys (used by the
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ssh2 protocol). Performing a DSA signature (which is required for
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authentication), entails the use of a 160 bit random number. If an
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attacker can predict this number, then they can deduce your *private*
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key and impersonate you.
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If you are using the builtin random number support (configure will
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tell you if this is the case), then read this document in its entirety
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and consider disabling ssh2 support (by adding "Protocol 1" to
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sshd_config and ssh_config).
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Please also request that your OS vendor provides a kernel-based random
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number collector (/dev/random) in future versions of your operating
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systems.
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On to the description...
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The portable OpenSSH contains random number collection support for
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systems which lack a kernel entropy pool (/dev/random).
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This collector operates by executing the programs listed in
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($etcdir)/ssh_prng_cmds, reading their output and adding it to the
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PRNG supplied by OpenSSL (which is hash-based). It also stirs in the
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output of several system calls and timings from the execution of the
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programs that it runs.
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The ssh_prng_cmds file also specifies a 'rate' for each program. This
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represents the number of bits of randomness per byte of output from
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the specified program.
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The random number code will also read and save a seed file to
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~/.ssh/prng_seed. This contents of this file are added to the random
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number generator at startup.
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This approach presents two problems:
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1. It is slow.
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Executing each program in the list can take a large amount of time,
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especially on slower machines. Additionally some program can take a
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disproportionate time to execute.
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This can be tuned by the administrator. To debug the entropy
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collection is great detail, turn on full debugging ("ssh -v -v -v" or
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"sshd -d -d -d"). This will list each program as it is executed, how
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long it took to execute, its exit status and whether and how much data
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it generated. You can the find the culprit programs which are causing
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the real slow-downs.
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The entropy collector will timeout programs which take too long
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to execute, the actual timeout used can be adjusted with the
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--with-entropy-timeout configure option. OpenSSH will not try to
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re-execute programs which have not been found, have had a non-zero
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exit status or have timed out more than a couple of times.
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2. Estimating the real 'rate' of program outputs is non-trivial
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The shear volume of the task is problematic: there are currently
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around 50 commands in the ssh_prng_cmds list, portable OpenSSH
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supports at least 12 different OSs. That is already 600 sets of data
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to be analysed, without taking into account the numerous differences
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between versions of each OS.
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On top of this, the different commands can produce varying amounts of
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usable data depending on how busy the machine is, how long it has been
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up and various other factors.
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To make matters even more complex, some of the commands are reporting
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largely the same data as other commands (eg. the various "ps" calls).
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17
configure.in
17
configure.in
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@ -266,8 +266,14 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(libs,
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# Checks for libraries.
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AC_CHECK_LIB(z, deflate, ,AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first ***]))
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AC_CHECK_LIB(util, login, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBUTIL_LOGIN) LIBS="$LIBS -lutil")
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AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info,
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AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE) LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre")
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AC_CHECK_FUNC(regcomp,
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[],
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[
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AC_CHECK_LIB(pcre, pcre_info,
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AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBPCRE) LIBS="$LIBS -lpcreposix -lpcre")
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]
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)
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if test -z "$no_libsocket" ; then
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AC_CHECK_LIB(nsl, yp_match, , )
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RAND_MSG="EGD ($EGD_SOCKET)"
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else
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RAND_MSG="Builtin (timeout $entropy_timeout)"
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BUILTIN_RNG=1
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fi
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fi
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echo ""
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if test ! -z "$BUILTIN_RNG" ; then
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echo "WARNING: you are using the builtin random number collection service."
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echo "Please read WARNING.RNG and request that your OS vendor includes"
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echo "/dev/random in future versions of their OS."
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echo ""
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fi
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