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upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters 

This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.

Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
that allow shell injection attacks to occur.

It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
user's specified ProxyCommand.

To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.

feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2023-12-18 14:47:44 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 0cb50eefdd
commit 7ef3787c84
No known key found for this signature in database
1 changed files with 40 additions and 1 deletions
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41
ssh.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.598 2023/10/12 02:48:43 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.599 2023/12/18 14:47:44 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
free(cinfo);
}
static int
valid_hostname(const char *s)
{
size_t i;
if (*s == '-')
return 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
valid_ruser(const char *s)
{
size_t i;
if (*s == '-')
return 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
return 0;
/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
return 0;
/* Disallow \ in last position */
if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (!host)
usage();
if (!valid_hostname(host))
fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
options.host_arg = xstrdup(host);
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */