upstream: tighten pledge(2) after session establishment

feedback, ok & testing in snaps deraadt@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aecf4d49d28586dfbcc74328d9333398fef9eb58
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2022-11-28 01:38:22 +00:00 committed by Darren Tucker
parent f7cebbbf40
commit 815c470493
No known key found for this signature in database
1 changed files with 87 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.383 2022/11/28 01:37:36 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.384 2022/11/28 01:38:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
static time_t server_alive_time; /* Time to do server_alive_check */
static int hostkeys_update_complete;
static int session_setup_complete;
static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
int session_ident = -1;
@ -757,6 +759,72 @@ client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
}
/*
* Returns non-zero if the client is able to handle a hostkeys-00@openssh.com
* hostkey update request.
*/
static int
can_update_hostkeys(void)
{
if (hostkeys_update_complete)
return 0;
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
options.batch_mode)
return 0; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
void
client_repledge()
{
debug3_f("enter");
/* Might be able to tighten pledge now that session is established */
if (options.control_master || options.control_path != NULL ||
options.forward_x11 || options.fork_after_authentication ||
can_update_hostkeys() ||
(session_ident != -1 && !session_setup_complete)) {
/* Can't tighten */
return;
}
/*
* LocalCommand and UpdateHostkeys have finished, so can get rid of
* filesystem.
*
* XXX protocol allows a server can to change hostkeys during the
* connection at rekey time that could trigger a hostkeys update
* but AFAIK no implementations support this. Could improve by
* forcing known_hosts to be read-only or via unveil(2).
*/
if (options.num_local_forwards != 0 ||
options.num_remote_forwards != 0 ||
options.num_permitted_remote_opens != 0 ||
options.enable_escape_commandline != 0) {
/* rfwd needs inet */
debug("pledge: network");
if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else if (options.forward_agent != 0) {
/* agent forwarding needs to open $SSH_AUTH_SOCK at will */
debug("pledge: agent");
if (pledge("stdio unix proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
} else {
debug("pledge: fork");
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* XXX further things to do:
*
* - might be able to get rid of proc if we kill ~^Z
* - ssh -N (no session)
* - stdio forwarding
* - sessions without tty
*/
}
static void
process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
{
@ -1238,6 +1306,7 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
int conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready;
debug("Entering interactive session.");
session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
if (options.control_master &&
!option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
@ -1270,6 +1339,9 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* might be able to tighten now */
client_repledge();
start_time = monotime_double();
/* Initialize variables. */
@ -1303,7 +1375,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
if (have_pty)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
if (session_ident != -1) {
if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
@ -2209,6 +2280,8 @@ client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
update_known_hosts(ctx);
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
hostkeys_update_complete = 1;
client_repledge();
}
/*
@ -2242,7 +2315,7 @@ client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
size_t i, len = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
int r;
int r, prove_sent = 0;
char *fp;
static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
@ -2251,11 +2324,9 @@ client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
if (hostkeys_seen)
fatal_f("server already sent hostkeys");
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
options.batch_mode)
return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
if (!can_update_hostkeys())
return 1;
hostkeys_seen = 1;
ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
@ -2424,12 +2495,18 @@ client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
client_register_global_confirm(
client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm, ctx);
ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
prove_sent = 1;
/* Success */
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(buf);
if (!prove_sent) {
/* UpdateHostkeys handling completed */
hostkeys_update_complete = 1;
client_repledge();
}
/*
* NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
* what the client does with its hosts file.
@ -2585,6 +2662,9 @@ client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send shell");
}
session_setup_complete = 1;
client_repledge();
}
static void