diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids index 59e80518a..5839cc3ba 100644 --- a/.skipped-commit-ids +++ b/.skipped-commit-ids @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ cc12a9029833d222043aecd252d654965c351a69 moduli-gen Makefile f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0 moduli update 1e0a2692b7e20b126dda60bf04999d1d30d959d8 sshd relinking makefile changes e1dc11143f83082e3154d6094f9136d0dc2637ad more relinking makefile tweaks +5a636f6ca7f25bfe775df4952f7aac90a7fcbbee moduli update Old upstream tree: diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL index 1894d573d..26387793f 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL +++ b/PROTOCOL @@ -137,12 +137,12 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very short packet lengths, which would not be possible with other approaches. -1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension +1.10 transport: strict key exchange extension OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the -initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append +initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored @@ -150,20 +150,21 @@ if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets. When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to -the the protocol: +the protocol: -a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or - out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the - connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. - Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages - that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as - SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. +a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if out-of-sequence + packet or any message that is not strictly required by KEX is + received. This includes terminating the connection if the first + packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. Unexpected packets for + the purpose of strict KEX include messages that are otherwise + valid at any time during the connection such as SSH2_MSG_DEBUG, + SSH2_MSG_IGNORE or SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED. b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS). -1.10 transport: SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication +1.11 transport: SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO during user authentication This protocol extension allows the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO to be sent during user authentication. RFC8308 does allow a second @@ -735,6 +736,7 @@ identifiers: The server will reply with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY: byte SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY + uint32 id string usernames string groupnames @@ -790,4 +792,4 @@ master instance and later clients. OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented in the PROTOCOL.agent file. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.51 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.55 2024/01/08 05:05:15 djm Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent index e4a6b74c5..7637882f1 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.agent +++ b/PROTOCOL.agent @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ with private keys as they are loaded from a PKCS#11 token. bool certs_only string certsblob -Where "certsblob" constists of one or more certificates encoded as public +Where "certsblob" consists of one or more certificates encoded as public key blobs: string[] certificates @@ -112,4 +112,4 @@ A SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED will return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if any key (plain private or certificate) was successfully loaded, or SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if no key was loaded. -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.21 2023/12/18 14:46:56 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.22 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ diff --git a/PROTOCOL.mux b/PROTOCOL.mux index 5a3dd5fe0..fef2e13d4 100644 --- a/PROTOCOL.mux +++ b/PROTOCOL.mux @@ -188,8 +188,6 @@ For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with 7. Requesting closure of port forwards -Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE). - A client may request the master to close a port forward: uint32 MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD @@ -295,4 +293,4 @@ XXX session inspection via master XXX signals via mux request XXX list active connections via mux -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.13 2022/01/01 01:55:30 jsg Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.14 2024/01/08 05:11:18 djm Exp $ diff --git a/README.platform b/README.platform index 7b754ba42..4edf9d1f5 100644 --- a/README.platform +++ b/README.platform @@ -53,11 +53,12 @@ Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X. -Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and -MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode -using a third party driver. More information is available at: - http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/ +Tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and MacOS X 10.4 in +Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode using a third +party driver. More information is available at: + https://tuntaposx.sourceforge.net +Recent Darwin/MacOS X versions are likely unsupported. Linux ----- diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c index d50b30781..21b4adb6d 100644 --- a/kex.c +++ b/kex.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.184 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.185 2024/01/08 00:34:33 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * @@ -776,10 +776,11 @@ static int kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; - int r; + int r, initial = (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0; + char *cp, **prop; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); - if (kex->ext_info_c && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) + if (kex->ext_info_c && initial) ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_input_ext_info); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); @@ -787,10 +788,32 @@ kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) return r; if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0) return r; + if (initial) { + /* Remove initial KEX signalling from proposal for rekeying */ + if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &prop)) != 0) + return r; + if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(prop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], + kex->server ? + "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" : + "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) { + error_f("match_filter_denylist failed"); + goto fail; + } + free(prop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); + prop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = cp; + if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, prop)) != 0) { + error_f("kex_prop2buf failed"); + fail: + kex_proposal_free_entries(prop); + free(prop); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + kex_proposal_free_entries(prop); + free(prop); + } kex->done = 1; kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL; sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); - /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; diff --git a/m4/openssh.m4 b/m4/openssh.m4 index 5d4c56280..033df501c 100644 --- a/m4/openssh.m4 +++ b/m4/openssh.m4 @@ -20,18 +20,24 @@ char *f2(char *s, ...) { va_end(args); return strdup(ret); } +const char *f3(int s) { + return s ? "good" : "gooder"; +} int main(int argc, char **argv) { - (void)argv; char b[256], *cp; + const char *s; /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; + (void)argv; f(1); - snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i,j,k,l,m,n,o); + s = f3(f(2)); + snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %s\n", i,j,k,l,m,n,o,s); if (write(1, b, 0) == -1) exit(0); - cp = f2("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i,j,k,l,m,n,o); + cp = f2("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %s\n", i,j,k,l,m,n,o,s); + if (write(1, cp, 0) == -1) exit(0); free(cp); /* * Test fallthrough behaviour. clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h index 65c8bc7fb..b050fa835 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/getopt.h +++ b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h @@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ #ifndef _GETOPT_H_ #define _GETOPT_H_ +#ifndef __THROW +# if defined __cplusplus +# define __THROW throw() +# else +# define __THROW +# endif +#endif + /* * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions */ @@ -63,8 +71,8 @@ int getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *, #ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_ #define _GETOPT_DEFINED_ -int getopt(int, char * const *, const char *); -int getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **); +int getopt(int, char * const *, const char *) __THROW; +int getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **) __THROW; extern char *optarg; /* getopt(3) external variables */ extern int opterr; diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h index 0ec57cade..5944d0aad 100644 --- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h +++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h @@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ #include "blf.h" #include "fnmatch.h" +#ifndef __THROW +# if defined __cplusplus +# define __THROW throw() +# else +# define __THROW +# endif +#endif + #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS) # include # define login_getpwclass(pw) login_getclass(pw->pw_class) @@ -187,7 +195,7 @@ int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) -int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); +int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts) __THROW; #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile index 0b4238fd3..107213029 100644 --- a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ # NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts. -CC=clang-11 -CXX=clang++-11 +CC=clang-16 +CXX=clang++-16 FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,fuzzer -fno-omit-frame-pointer -FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer +FUZZ_LIBS=-L/usr/lib/llvm-16/lib -lFuzzer -CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS) +CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-exceptions -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS) CFLAGS=$(CXXFLAGS) LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS) LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lmd -lcrypto -lfido2 -lcbor $(FUZZ_LIBS) diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c index 1d419820c..c3051c72b 100644 --- a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c +++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c @@ -175,3 +175,10 @@ test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen) cleanup_idtab(); cleanup_sockettab(); } + +int +pkcs11_make_cert(const struct sshkey *priv, + const struct sshkey *certpub, struct sshkey **certprivp) +{ + return -1; /* XXX */ +} diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1 index f0186cd5f..290ba91d3 100644 --- a/ssh-add.1 +++ b/ssh-add.1 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.85 2023/12/18 14:46:56 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.86 2023/12/19 06:57:34 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 18 2023 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: December 19 2023 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ .Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-add -.Op Fl cCDdKkLlqvXx +.Op Fl CcDdKkLlqvXx .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl H Ar hostkey_file .Op Fl h Ar destination_constraint @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ .Op Ar .Nm ssh-add .Fl s Ar pkcs11 -.Op Fl vC +.Op Fl Cv .Op Ar certificate ... .Nm ssh-add .Fl e Ar pkcs11 @@ -94,6 +94,9 @@ to work. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds +.It Fl C +When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process +certificates only and skip plain keys. .It Fl c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. @@ -102,9 +105,6 @@ Confirmation is performed by Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from .Xr ssh-askpass 1 , rather than text entered into the requester. -.It Fl C -When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process -certificates only and skip plain keys. .It Fl D Deletes all identities from the agent. .It Fl d diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c index 41884d687..335ab78bc 100644 --- a/ssh-add.c +++ b/ssh-add.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.169 2023/12/18 14:46:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.171 2024/01/08 00:30:39 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -797,14 +797,14 @@ usage(void) "usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]\n" #else fprintf(stderr, -"usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-H hostkey_file]\n" +"usage: ssh-add [-CcDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-H hostkey_file]\n" " [-h destination_constraint] [-S provider] [-t life]\n" #endif #ifdef WITH_XMSS " [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n" #endif " [file ...]\n" -" ssh-add -s pkcs11\n" +" ssh-add -s pkcs11 [-Cv] [certificate ...]\n" " ssh-add -e pkcs11\n" " ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n" ); @@ -825,12 +825,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv) LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; struct sshkey *k, **certs = NULL; struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints = NULL; -#ifdef WINDOWS - // when ndest_contraints is implemented, will have to use complex I size_t ndest_constraints = 0, ncerts = 0; -#else - size_t ndest_constraints = 0i, ncerts = 0; -#endif /* WINDOWS */ /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c index b6a3f4810..7347aaee5 100644 --- a/ssh-agent.c +++ b/ssh-agent.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.303 2023/12/18 14:48:08 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.304 2023/12/18 15:58:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -1525,7 +1525,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e) /* Add an identity to idlist; takes ownership of 'key' and 'comment' */ static void add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, char *comment, const char *provider, - time_t death, int confirm, struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints, + time_t death, u_int confirm, struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints) { Identity *id; diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c index 1d2df709b..af0dc79b8 100644 --- a/ssh-keyscan.c +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.153 2023/06/21 05:06:04 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.154 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * @@ -504,11 +504,11 @@ congreet(int s) /* * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-" - * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitrarily + * protocol identification string may be preceded by an arbitrarily * large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-". * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the - * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded + * preceding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded * in multiple iterations of the outer loop). */ for (;;) { diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c index cc3450172..8ac96ba1c 100644 --- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c +++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c @@ -688,6 +688,7 @@ pkcs11_make_cert(const struct sshkey *priv, RSA_set_method(ret->rsa, helper->rsa_meth); if (helper->nrsa++ >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("RSA refcount error"); +#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW) } else if (priv->type == KEY_ECDSA) { if ((helper = helper_by_ec(priv->ecdsa)) == NULL || helper->fd == -1) @@ -697,6 +698,7 @@ pkcs11_make_cert(const struct sshkey *priv, EC_KEY_set_method(ret->ecdsa, helper->ec_meth); if (helper->nec++ >= INT_MAX) fatal_f("EC refcount error"); +#endif } else fatal_f("unknown key type %s", sshkey_type(priv)); diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c index bfea7fc06..9962d9647 100644 --- a/sshconnect2.c +++ b/sshconnect2.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.371 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.372 2024/01/08 00:34:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. @@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]; - char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; + char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL; int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0; xxx_host = host; @@ -253,14 +253,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist"); free(all_key); - if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) - fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); - if (use_known_hosts_order) hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo); - kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers, - options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression), + kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, + options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs, + compression_alg_list(options.compression), hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms); free(hkalgs); @@ -285,13 +283,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done); - - /* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */ - free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); - myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = - compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms); - if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0) - fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf"); + kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ @@ -301,7 +293,6 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send packet"); #endif - kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); } /* diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c index 3dd48ee06..b3afe8ebe 100644 --- a/sshd.c +++ b/sshd.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.601 2023/12/18 14:45:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.602 2024/01/08 00:34:34 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -2935,6 +2935,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done); + kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ @@ -2944,7 +2945,6 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal_fr(r, "send test"); #endif - kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal); debug("KEX done"); } diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c index 2d0db5e5b..e32c40390 100644 --- a/sshkey.c +++ b/sshkey.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.140 2023/10/16 08:40:00 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.141 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. @@ -1936,7 +1936,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, goto out; } if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { - /* Skip nonce that preceeds all certificates */ + /* Skip nonce that precedes all certificates */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; diff --git a/xmss_hash.c b/xmss_hash.c index db0e5fa36..70c126ae2 100644 --- a/xmss_hash.c +++ b/xmss_hash.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.3 2022/04/20 16:00:25 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.4 2023/12/20 00:06:25 jsg Exp $ */ /* hash.c version 20160722 Andreas Hülsing @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, u } /* - * Implemts H_msg + * Implements H_msg */ int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n) {