upstream: move subprocess() from auth.c to misc.c

make privilege dropping optional but allow it via callbacks (to avoid
need to link uidswap.c everywhere)

add some other flags (keep environment, disable strict path safety check)
that make this more useful for client-side use.

feedback & ok markus@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80ea9fdcc156f1a18e9c166122c759fae1637bf
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2020-12-22 00:12:22 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 649205fe38
commit a34e14a5a0
5 changed files with 190 additions and 167 deletions

154
auth.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.150 2020/12/20 23:36:51 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.151 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -841,158 +841,6 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
}
}
/*
* Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
* Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
* The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
* /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
* "tag" is prepended to log messages.
* NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
* av[0].
*/
pid_t
subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
pid_t pid;
char *cp, errmsg[512];
u_int envsize;
char **child_env;
if (child != NULL)
*child = NULL;
debug3_f("%s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)",
tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
/* Check consistency */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
(flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
error_f("inconsistent flags");
return 0;
}
if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
error_f("inconsistent flags/output");
return 0;
}
/*
* If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
* and appears safe-ish to execute
*/
if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
return 0;
}
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
av[0], strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
/* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
restore_uid();
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1: /* error */
error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
close(p[1]);
return 0;
case 0: /* child */
/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
envsize = 5;
child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
fd = -1;
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
fd = p[1];
else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
fd = devnull;
if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
execve(av[0], av, child_env);
error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
break;
}
close(p[1]);
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
close(p[0]);
else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
/* Don't leave zombie child */
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
;
return 0;
}
/* Success */
debug3_f("%s pid %ld", tag, (long)pid);
if (child != NULL)
*child = f;
return pid;
}
/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */

8
auth.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.100 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.101 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
@ -225,12 +225,6 @@ void auth_debug_reset(void);
struct passwd *fakepw(void);
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */
pid_t subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
int sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.102 2020/12/17 23:28:50 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.103 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -530,9 +530,10 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
@ -968,9 +969,10 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
}
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;

171
misc.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.156 2020/11/27 00:49:58 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.157 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -2479,3 +2479,172 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
close(devnull);
return ret;
}
/*
* Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
* Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
* The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
* /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
* "tag" is prepended to log messages.
* NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
* av[0].
*/
pid_t
subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
pid_t pid;
char *cp, errmsg[512];
u_int nenv = 0;
char **env = NULL;
/* If dropping privs, then must specify user and restore function */
if (drop_privs != NULL && (pw == NULL || restore_privs == NULL)) {
error("%s: inconsistent arguments", tag); /* XXX fatal? */
return 0;
}
if (pw == NULL && (pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
error("%s: no user for current uid", tag);
return 0;
}
if (child != NULL)
*child = NULL;
debug3_f("%s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)",
tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
/* Check consistency */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
(flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
error_f("inconsistent flags");
return 0;
}
if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
error_f("inconsistent flags/output");
return 0;
}
/*
* If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
* and appears safe-ish to execute
*/
if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
return 0;
}
if (drop_privs != NULL)
drop_privs(pw);
if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
av[0], strerror(errno));
goto restore_return;
}
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH) == 0 &&
safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
goto restore_return;
}
/* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
restore_return:
if (restore_privs != NULL)
restore_privs();
return 0;
}
if (restore_privs != NULL)
restore_privs();
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1: /* error */
error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
close(p[1]);
return 0;
case 0: /* child */
/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV) == 0) {
nenv = 5;
env = xcalloc(sizeof(*env), nenv);
child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LANG", cp);
}
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
fd = -1;
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
fd = p[1];
else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
fd = devnull;
if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (env != NULL)
execve(av[0], av, env);
else
execv(av[0], av);
error("%s %s \"%s\": %s", tag, env == NULL ? "execv" : "execve",
command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
break;
}
close(p[1]);
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
close(p[0]);
else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
/* Don't leave zombie child */
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
;
return 0;
}
/* Success */
debug3_f("%s pid %ld", tag, (long)pid);
if (child != NULL)
*child = f;
return pid;
}

12
misc.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.90 2020/11/27 00:49:58 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.91 2020/12/22 00:12:22 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -99,6 +99,16 @@ void sock_set_v6only(int);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD (1) /* Discard stdout */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE (1<<1) /* Redirect stdout */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD (1<<2) /* Discard stderr */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH (1<<3) /* Don't check for safe cmd */
#define SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV (1<<4) /* Keep parent environment */
pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
typedef struct arglist arglist;
struct arglist {
char **list;