From adab6f12992c522e1208fa2bdf89ce572840ccf8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Darren Tucker Date: Sun, 5 Dec 2010 09:01:47 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27 [auth-rsa.c] move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed) bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@ --- ChangeLog | 4 ++++ auth-rsa.c | 9 +++++---- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog index 26c9b477c..a8aeacc56 100644 --- a/ChangeLog +++ b/ChangeLog @@ -7,6 +7,10 @@ check that g^x^q === 1 mod p; recommended by JPAKE author Feng Hao (this code is still disabled, but apprently people are treating it as a reference implementation) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/12/03 23:55:27 + [auth-rsa.c] + move check for revoked keys to run earlier (in auth_rsa_key_allowed) + bz#1829; patch from ldv AT altlinux.org; ok markus@ 20101204 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c] Use arc4random_uniform(range) diff --git a/auth-rsa.c b/auth-rsa.c index 56702d130..4edaab056 100644 --- a/auth-rsa.c +++ b/auth-rsa.c @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.79 2010/12/03 23:55:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland @@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) MD5_CTX md; int len; - if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) - return 0; - /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { error("auth_rsa_verify_response: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", @@ -249,6 +246,10 @@ auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) "actual %d vs. announced %d.", file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); + /* Never accept a revoked key */ + if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) + break; + /* We have found the desired key. */ /* * If our options do not allow this key to be used,