upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for

being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.

bz#2897; ok dtucker

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2018-09-21 12:20:12 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 383a33d160
commit bbc8af72ba
1 changed files with 10 additions and 4 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.130 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.131 2018/09/21 12:20:12 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@ -459,6 +459,8 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
cp = line;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
@ -477,16 +479,20 @@ sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0)
switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
continue;
default:
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
(check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
}
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
out: