upstream: make sshd_config AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand and

AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the %D (routing domain) and a new %C (connection
address/port 4-tuple) as expansion sequences; ok markus

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee9a48bf1a74c4ace71b69de69cfdaa2a7388565
This commit is contained in:
djm@openbsd.org 2023-07-27 22:25:17 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 999a2886ca
commit d1ffde6b55
No known key found for this signature in database
2 changed files with 31 additions and 16 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.118 2023/02/17 04:22:50 dtucker Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.119 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -340,8 +340,8 @@ match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
* returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, const struct sshkey *key,
const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
@ -416,6 +416,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"C", conn_id,
"D", rdomain,
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
@ -477,7 +479,7 @@ match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
@ -514,7 +516,7 @@ user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
}
/* Try querying command if specified */
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key,
&principals_opts))
conn_id, rdomain, &principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
@ -613,7 +615,7 @@ user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
const char *conn_id, const char *rdomain, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
FILE *f = NULL;
@ -675,6 +677,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"C", conn_id,
"D", rdomain,
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
@ -749,11 +753,9 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int success = 0, i;
char *file;
char *file, *conn_id;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
const char *rdomain, *remote_ip, *remote_host;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
@ -764,6 +766,14 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
return 0;
if ((rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
rdomain = "";
remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
xasprintf(&conn_id, "%s %d %s %d",
ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_local_port(ssh),
remote_ip, ssh_remote_port(ssh));
for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
continue;
@ -781,18 +791,19 @@ user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
goto out;
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host,
&opts)) != 0)
conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip,
remote_host, &opts)) != 0)
remote_host, conn_id, rdomain, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
out:
free(conn_id);
if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;

View File

@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.348 2023/03/03 04:36:20 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2023 $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.349 2023/07/27 22:25:17 djm Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: July 27 2023 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -2021,6 +2021,10 @@ which are expanded at runtime:
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It %C
Identifies the connection endpoints, containing
four space-separated values: client address, client port number,
server address, and server port number.
.It \&%D
The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
.It %F
@ -2048,13 +2052,13 @@ The username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
accepts the tokens %%, %C, %D, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
accepts the tokens %%, %C, %D, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.