upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of

how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@

OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160
This commit is contained in:
naddy@openbsd.org 2019-12-17 16:21:07 +00:00 committed by Darren Tucker
parent f65cf1163f
commit e905f7260d
1 changed files with 4 additions and 7 deletions

11
sshd.8
View File

@ -33,8 +33,8 @@
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.308 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.309 2019/12/17 16:21:07 naddy Exp $
.Dd $Mdocdate: December 17 2019 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
@ -255,14 +255,11 @@ The client compares the
host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
This key agreement results in a shared session key.
The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.
The client selects the encryption algorithm
to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided
through a cryptographic message authentication code
(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128,
hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
through a cryptographic message authentication code.
.Pp
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using