- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16

[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
     [ssh-rsa.c]
     s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
This commit is contained in:
Damien Miller 2010-07-16 13:58:37 +10:00
parent 8a0268f1b3
commit ea1651c98e
10 changed files with 27 additions and 23 deletions

View File

@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for
some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was
readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16
[auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c]
[ssh-rsa.c]
s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
20100714
- (tim) [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] Bug 1796: Test for skip_x11_askpass

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.77 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16])
MD5_Final(mdbuf, &md);
/* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */
if (timing_safe_cmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) {
/* Wrong answer. */
return (0);
}

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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.307 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.308 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -917,7 +917,7 @@ x11_open_helper(Buffer *b)
}
/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len ||
timing_safe_cmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
return -1;

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.3 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: jpake.c,v 1.4 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
@ -434,7 +434,7 @@ jpake_check_confirm(const BIGNUM *k,
if (peer_confirm_hash_len != expected_confirm_hash_len)
error("%s: confirmation length mismatch (my %u them %u)",
__func__, expected_confirm_hash_len, peer_confirm_hash_len);
else if (timing_safe_cmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
else if (timingsafe_bcmp(peer_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash,
expected_confirm_hash_len) == 0)
success = 1;
bzero(expected_confirm_hash, expected_confirm_hash_len);

4
key.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.89 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.90 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* read_bignum():
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b)
return 0;
if (buffer_len(&a->certblob) != buffer_len(&b->certblob))
return 0;
if (timing_safe_cmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob),
if (timingsafe_bcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob),
buffer_len(&a->certblob)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;

4
misc.c
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.78 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.79 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
@ -851,7 +851,7 @@ ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
}
int
timing_safe_cmp(const void *_s1, const void *_s2, size_t n)
timingsafe_bcmp(const void *_s1, const void *_s2, size_t n)
{
u_char *s1 = (u_char *)_s1;
u_char *s2 = (u_char *)_s2;

4
misc.h
View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.42 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.43 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ void sanitise_stdfd(void);
void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
int timing_safe_cmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.107 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.108 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
timing_safe_cmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
return (0);
return (1);
}
@ -1103,14 +1103,14 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
len = buffer_len(&b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timing_safe_cmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len);
} else {
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timing_safe_cmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
xfree(p);
}
@ -1158,7 +1158,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timing_safe_cmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
xfree(p);
@ -1684,7 +1684,7 @@ mm_get_kex(Buffer *m)
kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len);
if (session_id2 == NULL ||
kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len ||
timing_safe_cmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)
fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id");
kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m);
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server;

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.167 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.168 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -1307,7 +1307,7 @@ packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr,
buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet),
buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet));
if (timing_safe_cmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input),
mac->mac_len) != 0) {
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.42 2010/07/13 11:52:06 djm Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/07/13 23:13:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
*
@ -250,11 +250,11 @@ openssh_RSA_verify(int type, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen);
goto done;
}
if (timing_safe_cmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) != 0) {
error("oid mismatch");
goto done;
}
if (timing_safe_cmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
if (timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) != 0) {
error("hash mismatch");
goto done;
}