upstream commit

Skip passwords longer than 1k in length so clients can't
easily DoS sshd by sending very long passwords, causing it to spend CPU
hashing them. feedback djm@, ok markus@.

Brought to our attention by tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, shilei-c at
360.cn and coredump at autistici.org

Upstream-ID: d0af7d4a2190b63ba1d38eec502bc4be0be9e333
This commit is contained in:
dtucker@openbsd.org 2016-07-21 01:39:35 +00:00 committed by Damien Miller
parent 324583e8fb
commit fcd135c9df
1 changed files with 6 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */
/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.45 2016/07/21 01:39:35 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ extern login_cap_t *lc;
#define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
#define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */
#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN 1024
void
disable_forwarding(void)
{
@ -87,6 +89,9 @@ auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
static int expire_checked = 0;
#endif
if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
return 0;
#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
ok = 0;