-Ohashalg=sha1|sha256 when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to allow algorithm
selection. bz3493 ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6e07fe21318a873bd877f333e189eb963a11b3d
name and hostkey type match instead of only one. While there, simplify the
code somewhat and add some debugging. Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok
djm@.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4
Revert commitid: gJtIN6rRTS3CHy9b.
-------------
identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but other DNS RR
types are present and display a more useful error message for this
case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@
-------------
This caused unexpected failures when VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes, SSHFP results
are missing but the user already has the key in known_hosts
Spotted by dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 97e31742fddaf72046f6ffef091ec0d823299920
identify the case where SSHFP records are missing but
other DNS RR types are present and display a more useful error message for
this case; patch by Thordur Bjornsson; bz#2501; ok dtucker@
Upstream-ID: 8f7a5a8344f684823d8317a9708b63e75be2c244
[dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types.
patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
[key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
[dns.c dns.h README.dns ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
add experimental support for verifying hos keys using DNS as described
in draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt. more information in README.dns.
ok markus@ and henning@
djm@openbsd.org
dtucker@openbsd.org
markus@openbsd.org
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker