1cfbfaf4a0
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/15 19:40:02
...
[key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c]
also print certificate type (user or host) for ssh-keygen -L
ok djm kettenis
2010-03-22 05:58:24 +11:00
2befbad9b3
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/04 01:44:57
...
[key.c]
use buffer_get_string_ptr_ret() where we are checking the return
value explicitly instead of the fatal()-causing buffer_get_string_ptr()
2010-03-04 21:52:18 +11:00
41396573af
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
...
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/03/03 01:44:36
[auth-options.c key.c]
reject strings with embedded ASCII nul chars in certificate key IDs,
principal names and constraints
2010-03-04 21:51:11 +11:00
0a80ca190a
- OpenBSD CVS Sync
...
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54
[PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c]
[auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c]
[hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c]
[myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5]
Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts.
OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much
simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and
some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are
regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface
of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy.
Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys
when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts.
see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details.
Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing
CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details.
Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in
the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage.
Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file
PROTOCOL.certkeys
feedback and ok markus@
2010-02-27 07:55:05 +11:00
561724f38d
- dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/01/13 01:10:56
...
[key.c]
Ignore and log any Protocol 1 keys where the claimed size is not equal to
the actual size. Noted by Derek Martin, ok djm@
2010-01-13 22:43:05 +11:00
57e0d01260
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2009/12/11 18:16:33
...
[key.c]
switch from 35 to the more common value of RSA_F4 == (2**16)+1 == 65537
for the RSA public exponent; discussed with provos; ok djm@
2010-01-08 18:52:27 +11:00
2f54adabbb
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/10/10 05:00:12
...
[key.c]
typo in error message; ok djm@
2008-11-03 19:24:16 +11:00
c6aadd994d
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/25 07:05:16
...
[key.c]
In random art visualization, make sure to use the end marker only at the
end. Initial diff by Dirk Loss, tweaks and ok djm@
2008-11-03 19:16:20 +11:00
87dd5f2804
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/07/07 23:32:51
...
[key.c]
/*NOTREACHED*/ for lint warning:
warning: function key_equal falls off bottom without returning value
ok djm@
2008-07-11 17:35:09 +10:00
007132a7c9
- otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/25 11:13:43
...
[key.c]
add key length to visual fingerprint; zap magical constants;
ok grunk@ djm@
2008-06-29 22:45:37 +10:00
0f0ef0ab1f
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 22:03:36
...
[key.c]
add my copyright, ok djm@
2008-06-13 08:58:05 +10:00
4b3b9773ec
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 06:32:59
...
[key.c]
We already mark the start of the worm, now also mark the end of the worm
in our random art drawings.
ok djm@
2008-06-13 04:55:10 +10:00
987ac84a17
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 05:42:46
...
[key.c]
supply the key type (rsa1, rsa, dsa) as a caption in the frame of the
random art. while there, stress the fact that the field base should at
least be 8 characters for the pictures to make sense.
comment and ok djm@
2008-06-13 04:54:40 +10:00
267e28bb75
- otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/12 00:13:13
...
[key.c]
use an odd number of rows and columns and a separate start marker, looks
better; ok grunk@
2008-06-13 04:48:11 +10:00
d32b28a307
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:51:57
...
[key.c]
#define statements that are not atoms need braces around them, else they
will cause trouble in some cases.
Also do a computation of -1 once, and not in a loop several times.
spotted by otto@
2008-06-13 04:45:50 +10:00
014d76fa72
- otto@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 23:02:22
...
[key.c]
simpler way of computing the augmentations; ok grunk@
2008-06-13 04:43:51 +10:00
9c16ac9263
- grunk@cvs.openbsd.org 2008/06/11 21:01:35
...
[ssh_config.5 key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c key.c
sshconnect.c]
Introduce SSH Fingerprint ASCII Visualization, a technique inspired by the
graphical hash visualization schemes known as "random art", and by
Dan Kaminsky's musings on the subject during a BlackOp talk at the
23C3 in Berlin.
Scientific publication (original paper):
"Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
http://sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn,
thus switching to the other color of the chessboard.
Graphs are not unambiguous for now, because circles in graphs can be
walked in either direction.
discussions with several people,
help, corrections and ok markus@ djm@
2008-06-13 04:40:35 +10:00
3d295a6cf0
- (dtucker) [key.c defines.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Move old OpenSSL
...
compat glue into openssl-compat.h.
2008-02-28 19:22:04 +11:00
932040285f
- ray@cvs.openbsd.org 2007/07/12 05:48:05
...
[key.c]
Delint: remove some unreachable statements, from Bret Lambert.
OK markus@ and dtucker@.
2007-08-08 14:28:26 +10:00
0bc85579a9
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/11/06 21:25:28
...
[auth-rsa.c kexgexc.c kexdhs.c key.c ssh-dss.c sshd.c kexgexs.c
ssh-keygen.c bufbn.c moduli.c scard.c kexdhc.c sshconnect1.c dh.c rsa.c]
add missing checks for openssl return codes; with & ok djm@
2006-11-07 23:14:41 +11:00
ded319cca2
- (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]
...
[auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
[auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c]
[cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c]
[dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
[kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c]
[md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c]
[scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c]
[ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c rc4.diff]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c]
[openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c]
[openbsd-compat/port-uw.c]
Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h;
compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
2006-09-01 15:38:36 +10:00
d783435315
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42
...
[OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c]
[auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c]
[auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c]
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ]
[auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c]
[buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c]
[cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
[compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c]
[groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c]
[kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c]
[key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
[monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c]
[monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c]
[readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h]
[serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c]
[sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c]
[ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
[sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
[uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
[loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h]
almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files"
ok djm, sort of ok stevesk
makes the pain stop in one easy step
NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as
that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required
for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
2006-08-05 12:39:39 +10:00
a7a73ee35d
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/01 23:22:48
...
[auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c]
[auth2-chall.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c buffer.c canohost.c]
[channels.c clientloop.c dh.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c kex.c kexdhc.c]
[kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h log.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c]
[monitor_wrap.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c]
[servconf.c session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c]
[sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshtty.c uuencode.c]
[uuencode.h xmalloc.c]
move #include <stdio.h> out of includes.h
2006-08-05 11:37:59 +10:00
e3476ed03b
- stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23
...
[atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
[auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c]
[authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c]
[cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c]
[compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c]
[includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
[mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
[monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c]
[progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
[session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
[ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c]
[sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c]
move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
2006-07-24 14:13:33 +10:00
57c30117c1
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 13:17:03
...
[atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c]
[auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c]
[auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c]
[auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c]
[buffer.c canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c]
[cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c]
[deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c fatal.c groupaccess.c hostfile.c kex.c]
[kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c]
[mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c]
[monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c]
[readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c]
[session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c]
[sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c]
[ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
[uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c]
Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s that
Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
2006-03-26 14:24:48 +11:00
07d86bec5e
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 00:05:41
...
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth2-chall.c channels.c]
[clientloop.c deattack.c gss-genr.c kex.c key.c misc.c moduli.c]
[monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c scard.c sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c]
[ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c uuencode.c]
[xmalloc.c xmalloc.h]
introduce xcalloc() and xasprintf() failure-checked allocations
functions and use them throughout openssh
xcalloc is particularly important because malloc(nmemb * size) is a
dangerous idiom (subject to integer overflow) and it is time for it
to die
feedback and ok deraadt@
2006-03-26 14:19:21 +11:00
bbaad7772a
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:13:16
...
[key.c]
djm did a typo
2006-03-26 14:03:03 +11:00
69b7203e6f
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:10:19
...
[auth.c key.c misc.c packet.c ssh-add.c]
in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
2006-03-26 14:02:35 +11:00
429fcc23db
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 11:38:46
...
[key.c]
(really) last of the Coverity diffs: avoid possible NULL deref in
key_free. via elad AT netbsd.org; markus@ ok
2006-03-26 14:02:16 +11:00
b0fb6872ed
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18
...
[atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c]
[auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c]
[auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c]
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c]
[auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c]
[canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c]
[cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c]
[compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c]
[groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c]
[kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c]
[loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c]
[monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c]
[nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c]
[scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c]
[sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c]
[ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c]
[ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c]
[sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c]
[uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c]
[openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c]
RCSID() can die
2006-03-26 00:03:21 +11:00
eccb9de72a
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/06/17 02:44:33
...
[auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c authfd.c authfile.c]
[bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c dns.c gss-serv.c]
[kex.c kex.h key.c mac.c match.c misc.c packet.c packet.h scp.c]
[servconf.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c]
[ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
make this -Wsign-compare clean; ok avsm@ markus@
NB. auth1.c changes not committed yet (conflicts with uncommitted sync)
NB2. more work may be needed to make portable Wsign-compare clean
2005-06-17 12:59:34 +10:00
08d04faf24
- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/10/29 23:57:05
...
[key.c]
use new buffer API to avoid fatal errors on corrupt keys in authorized_keys
files; ok markus@
2004-11-05 20:42:28 +11:00
5cb30ad2ec
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2004/07/28 09:40:29
...
[auth.c auth1.c auth2.c cipher.c cipher.h key.c session.c ssh.c
sshconnect1.c]
more s/illegal/invalid/
2004-08-12 22:40:24 +10:00
f58b58ced1
- jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/10 16:23:41
...
[bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c]
[key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c]
[ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h]
constify. ok markus@ & djm@
2003-11-17 21:18:23 +11:00
29588616c2
- avsm@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/07/09 13:58:19
...
[key.c]
minor tweak: when generating the hex fingerprint, give strlcat the full
bound to the buffer, and add a comment below explaining why the
zero-termination is one less than the bound. markus@ ok
2003-07-14 17:28:34 +10:00
502d384b74
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/06/24 08:23:46
...
[auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c channels.c key.c key.h
monitor.c packet.c packet.h serverloop.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
int -> u_int; ok djm@, deraadt@, mouring@
2003-06-28 12:38:01 +10:00
37876e913a
- jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/05/14 18:16:20
...
[key.c key.h readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c]
[dns.c dns.h README.dns ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c]
add experimental support for verifying hos keys using DNS as described
in draft-ietf-secsh-dns-xx.txt. more information in README.dns.
ok markus@ and henning@
2003-05-15 10:19:46 +10:00
e8a240f966
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/02/12 09:33:04
...
[key.c key.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
merge ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.h into key.h; ok deraadt@
2003-02-24 12:01:40 +11:00
386f1f3e6c
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/02/04 09:32:08
...
[key.c]
better debug3 message
2003-02-24 11:54:57 +11:00
a10f56151b
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/09/09 14:54:15
...
[channels.c kex.h key.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c radix.c uuencode.c]
signed vs unsigned from -pedantic; ok henning@
2002-09-12 09:49:15 +10:00
2bf759cba5
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 10:41:47
...
[key.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
don't allocate, copy, and discard if there is not interested in the data;
ok deraadt@
2002-07-07 22:13:31 +00:00
c51b924a80
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 04:15:33
...
[key.c monitor_wrap.c sftp-glob.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c]
patch memory leaks; grendel@zeitbombe.org
2002-07-07 22:10:15 +00:00
a962c2fb35
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/30 21:59:45
...
[auth-bsdauth.c auth-skey.c auth2-chall.c clientloop.c key.c
monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h scard.h session.h sftp-glob.c ssh.c
sshconnect2.c sshd.c]
minor KNF
2002-07-04 00:14:17 +00:00
836f0e9d9a
- deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/06/23 03:26:19
...
[cipher.c key.c]
KNF
2002-06-23 21:21:30 +00:00
01fff0c9d4
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/05/31 13:16:48
...
[key.c]
add comment:
key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature
and -1 on error.
2002-06-06 20:54:07 +00:00
6328ab3989
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/19 10:49:35
...
[auth-krb5.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth.c cipher.c key.c misc.h packet.c session.c
sftp-client.c sftp-glob.h sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c
ttymodes.c]
KNF whitespace
2002-03-22 02:54:23 +00:00
a674e8df80
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/03/18 17:23:31
...
[key.c key.h]
add key_demote() for ssh-privsep
2002-03-22 01:45:53 +00:00
3a5b023330
Stupid djm commits experimental code to head instead of branch
...
revert
2002-03-13 13:19:42 +11:00
646e7cf3d7
Import of Niels Provos' 20020312 ssh-complete.diff
...
PAM, Cygwin and OSF SIA will not work for sure
2002-03-13 12:47:54 +11:00
80cb27dd7c
- markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/02/28 15:46:33
...
[authfile.c kex.c kexdh.c kexgex.c key.c ssh-dss.c]
add some const EVP_MD for openssl-0.9.7
2002-03-05 01:33:36 +00:00
Damien Miller
Darren Tucker
Ben Lindstrom